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ABSTRACT
The "Musiues" in Venezuela:
Immigration Goals and Reality,
1936 - 1961
September 1980
Susan Berglund-Thompson
B.A. (cum laude) , Boston University
M.S., Simmons College
M.A.
,
University of Massachusetts
Ph.D.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jane M. Loy
Encouragement of Immigration became the official policy of the
Venezuelan government after the death of the dictator Juan Vicente Gomez
in December 1935. Between 1936 and 1961, a total of some 850,000 foreign-
ers entered the country, giving Venezuela its first experience with
massive immigration. The purpose of this study is to provide a macro-
history of this immigration process, utilizing previously unused source
materials
.
In 1936, Venezuela presented a bleak image. The small population
(3,491,159), physically debilitated by chronic diseases and malnutrition,
largely illiterate, lived in a country which, economically speaking, had
one foot in the past and the other in the future. The government, prof-
iting from the expanding petroleum industry, was rich, while the people
were poor. Concerned Venezuelans, recognizing the necessity of modern-
izing and developing the country, viewed immigration as one means
of
viii
doing so.
Advocates of inunigration asserted that immigrants would foster
demographic growth, populate uninhabited rural areas, spur agricultural
and industrial development, expand and diversify the work force and
foster new skills and habits. A few proponents, influenced by Spencer-
iaii social positivism, felt that only with the massive arrival of Euro-
peans, those exemplars of modern civilization, would the country be able
to overcome the defects Inherent in a mestizo population. An analysis
of the immigration laws and the circulars issued clearly reveal how each
administration brought immigration policy into line with its other goals.
The limited published data on the foreign population resident
in Venezuela between 1936 and 1961 made it necessary to take samples of
thi' personal information records of the foreigners on file in the Ex-
triinjeria (Alien Office). These data, denominated VENIMSTATS, include
such items as nationality, sex, age, civil status, occupation, address,
naturalization and permanency. The most interesting analyses focused on
permanency. Only about fifty percent of the foreigners stayed in
Venezuela, ranging from a low of 41.7% in the 1948 sample to a high of
57.6% in the 1961 sample. Nationality was the determining factor in most
cases, significantly affecting other variables. Of the five major
nationality groups, the Portuguese were the most likely to stay (73.1%),
followed by the Colombians (65.6%), the Spanish (58.2%), the Italians
(41.3%) and the Americans (6.7%).
An analysis of the short-term impact of the immigrants showed
that most immigration goals were not achieved, at least not as
immigration
ix
advocates had envisioned. Demographic growth was an autochthonous
phenomenon, resulting from significant improvements in health care and
sanitary conditions. Two-thirds of the immigrants settled in urban
areas instead of populating uninhabited regions. Industrial growth,
fueled by petroleum revenues, was capital intensive. Immigrant partic-
ipation in the labor force was primarily in the service sector. Their
activity in the secondary sector was mostly limited to construction and
artisan workshops.
A comparison of Venezuela's immigration experience with that of
other countries indicates that it was an amalgam of the traditional and
the modern. Venezuela received "traditional" immigrants, mainly from
Italy, Spain and Portugal, with low and middle occupational skills.
Temporal or "transilient" migrants, mostly Americans, with professional
or managerial skills, were brought in by the transnational companies.
The latter have had a corporate impact on the economic development of
the country, while the former, more fully integrated into the Venezuelan
milieu, have seen their impact limited by social, economic and demo-
graphic factors.
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration as a factor in the development of modern Venezuela
is a much discussed but little studied theme. There have been only a
few serious studies of post World War II immigration bt'cause of the
scarcity of statistical information on the foreign population. Most
research has depended on the data provided by the national censuses.
Exceptions are Las inmigraciones en Venezuela: sus efectos economicos y
sociales
,
a 1953 field study sponsored by the Pan American Union of a
group of 524 immigrants in the state of Portuguesa and the Estudio
analitico de la politica inmigratoria en Venezuela
,
completed in 19 77,
by the author and Humberto Hernandez Caliman. This latter work had as
its objective the provision of the necessary data, historical and con-
temporary, to facilitate decision-making with regard to current immi-
gration policy."'" Two other important studies, based on census data,
are Chi-Yi Chen's Movimientos migratorios en Venezuela and Mary Kritz's
diictoral dissertation, "Immigration and Social Structure: The
Venezuelan Case." The Chen monograph is primarily concerned with
''^Anlbal Buitron, Las inmigraciones en Venezuela: sus efectos
economicos y sociales (Washington, 1956) and Susan Berglund Thompson
'and Humberto Hernandez Caliman, Estudio analitico de la politica in-
mi gratoria en Venezuela (Caracas, 19 77).
^Chi-Yi Chen, Movimientos migratorios en Venezuela (Caracas,
1968) and Mary Kritz, "Immigration and Social Structure: The Venezuelan
Case" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1972). The infor-
mation on international migration in the Chen monograph has been ex-
panded slightly in his more recent work, done with Michel Picouet,
Dj namica de la poblacion: Caso de Venezuela (Caracas, 1979).
internal migration but also briefly considers international movements.
The Kritz thesis analyzes data from the 1961 national population census
to determine the effect of immigration on the social structure of
Venezuela
.
More fully, Kritz, a sociologist, attempted to answer two
questions: why did the inraiigration occur, and where do the immigrants
fit into the Venezuelan social structure? Kritz briefly and rather
superficially considered the factors which influenced the formulation
of policies to encourage immigration, but the focus of her study was an
attempt to determine "the extent to which the immigrant population that
entered Venezuela between 1945 and 1960 introduced ethnic cleavages
into a society where the major cleavages were based on social and
economic lines." Kritz compared the position of the foreign migrants
with that of Venezuelan internal and non-migrants through an analysis
of the 1961 census. She found that by 1961 structural differences ex-
isted and that the foreign migrants appeared to be the most advantaged
of the three groups. In particular, the foreigners were characterized
by having higher educational attainments, higher occupational achieve-
ment and higher labor force participation than either of the two
Venezuelan groups. Kritz acknowledged that since the data base com-
prised only those foreigners still in Venezuela in 1961, it presented a
3
static picture of the immigrant presence.
The object of the present study is to go beyond the Kritz
^Kritz, "Immigration and Social Structure," especially 23 and
analysis by studying the "musiues"^ over time. To supplement the
limited statistical information on the foreign population in the na-
tional censuses, additional data were located in the Anuario estadis-
_tlco, published by the Ministry of Development (Fomento)
. These
statistics, referring to births, marriages, deaths, migratory movement
and delinquent activity, among other items, had never been used in
immigration studies until they were compiled and subsequently published
in the above-mentioned Estudio analitico . These statistics, however,
did not provide sufficient information for the purposes of the present
scudy. Such factors as age at entry, civil status, number of children,
occupation, address, trips out of the country and permanency were still
lacking. For this reason, samples of the personal information records
of foreigners on file in the Extranjeria (Alien Office) were taken by
the author. The data thus collected are valid for each individual from
the time of entry into Venezuela through 1975, and reflect all changes
occurring between the two dates. Details on the sampling technique are
available in appendix B.
The major purpose of this study is to provide a macro-history
of the immigration process in Venezuela from 1936 to 1961. There is a
general consensus that modern Venezuela dates from the death of Juan
Vicente Gomez in December 1935. Mariano Picon-Salas, a major
Venezuelan author, captured this feeling with his well-known conunent,
"We can say that with the ending of the Gomez dictatorship, the
'^"Musiu" is a generic name which Venezuelans apply to all
foreigners. It is a corruption of the honorary title monsieur and has
bei'.n in use since the late eighteenth century.
twentieth century begins in Venezuela. It begins with a delay of
thirty-five years. One of the many measures instituted by the new
government to modernize and develop the country was the implementation
of an Immigration program. The Immigration and Colonization Law of
1936 reflected the age-old hope that Venezuela would develop rapidly,
as had Argentina, Brazil and the United States, with the aid of new
blood and new ideas. Immigration remained a vital component in govern-
ment plans for economic expansion and social development until 1958,
when immigration was abruptly curtailed. This study, however, will
continue through the year 1961 in order to measure the effects of that
important change in policy and to utilize the national census data of
that year.
Reasons for promoting immigration, the legal mechanisms of con-
trol, statistical information on the immigrant population over time and
an analysis of the short-term impact of this immigration on the chang-
ing social, economic and political realities of the country are
detailed In the text.
The first chapter of this study describes conditions In
Venezuela at the time of the passage of the new immigration law In
1936. These conditions explain the origin and orientation of the law
and make clear the nature of the problems to be surmounted in moderniz-
ing and developing the country.
Chapter II reveals the aspirations of various sectors of the
population with regard to the perceived benefits of immigration. The
^Mariano Picon Salas, "La aventura venezolana," In 150 anos de
vida republlcana: 1811-1961 (Caracas, 1963), I, 45.
influence of Spencerlan social positivism is traced, with special at-
tention to the resulting racial discrimination codified in the law.
The views of influential intellectual, political and economic spokesmen
are considered and the influence of the press on public attitudes
toward immigration is explained.
Chapter III deals with the legal framework for immigration,
starting with the 1936 Immigration Law and the 1937 Foreigners' Law,
both of which controlled the entry of foreigners throughout the period
under study. The permutations in immigration policy effected by each
successive administration through the issuance of circulars and decrees
are examined for their significance as indicators of the goals of each
administration.
Chapters IV and V analyze the statistical data available on the
foreigners resident in Venezuela between 1936 and 1961. Chapter IV
explains some of the common misconceptions relating to the use of the
word "immigrant" in the Venezuelan context and the errors frequently
made in the utilization of published immigration statistics. It then
describes the preliminary period of immigration, which lasted from 1936
to 1947. Chapter V treats Venezuela's first experience with "massive"
immigration. Although total immigration during the period 1948-1961
did not exceed 800,000 persons, the native population was scarcely five
million in 1950 and only seven million in 1961. Due to the age struc-
ture and geographical distribution of the foreigners, their impact was
thus greater than their numbers alone would indicate. The data ob-
tained by sampling the files in the Extranjeria are presented in this
chapter.
In Chapter VI, the goals of immigration advocates—demographic
growth, colonization of rural areas, agricultural and industrial de-
velopment, expansion and diversification of the work force, the foster-
ing of new skills and habits—are measured against the changes which
occurred in Venezuela between 1936 and 1961. Competition for jobs,
outbursts of xenophobism and the permanency of the immigrants are also
discussed
.
The concluding chapter attempts to put the Venezuelan immigra-
tion experience in a more general context. According to Michael M.
Hall, with the exception of recent works on internal migration, Latin
America has been the subject of relatively few immigration studies.^
Assuming the potential value of investigating the role immigrants have
played, Hall indicated that the procedure for outlining a social his-
tory of the subject was far from clear. "Historians have customarily
limited themselves to the description and explanation of rather spe-
cific cases, and their generalizations have applied at most to particu-
lar historical epochs and more commonly to individual groups or socie-
ties."^
Due to the nature of this study, the generalizations developed
in micro-studies of individual groups or societies cannot easily be
tested in the context of a global study. Also, such studies tend to
focus on the immigrant's adaptation to his new environment. The
^Michael M. Hall, "Approaches to Immigration History," in New
Approaches to Latin American History , eds. Richard Graham and Peter H.
Smith (Austin, 1974), 175.
^Ibid., 177-178,
process of integration can only be superficially studied in the present
case, in part because of the limited time period, but more importantly
because of the lack of meaningful data. Such data are more easily re-
covered with reference to a specific community or nationality group.
The limitations of time, the lack of vital secondary sources, and the
necessity to create even the most basic statistical data from archival
sources, precluded such considerations from the present study.
The Venezuelan immigration experience differs substantially from
that of other Latin American countries. Venezuela's first experience
with massive immigration came not at the end of the nineteenth and the
beginning of the twentieth centuries, but after World War II, Tradi-
tional Latin American immigration had taken place in a laissez faire
milieu, characterized by relative freedom of movement on the part of
the migrants. Once having entered a new country, the migrants received
little information or assistance from the state in their search for
employment, and their welfare needs were left to the voluntary actions
of churches, immigrant aid societies and private benevolent groups.
This rather haphazard process changed in the period after World War I.
According to Anthony H. Richmond, modern immigration differs from that
of the past in that it is (1) smaller in scale and subject to political
control, (2) planned and governed by 'welfare state' considerations,
(3) a two way or multi-directional movement, (4) mainly inter-urban
rather than rural-urban and (5) educationally or occupationally highly
selective. Immigration in Venezuela, however, was an amalgam of the
^Anthony H. Richmond, "Sociology of Migration in Industrial and
Post-Industrial Societies," in Migration, ed. J. A. Jackson (Cambridge,
1969), 238.
two processes. The government itself had two distinct policies: the
traditional, under which almost ninety percent of the immigrants entered
which was fairly unrestricted and offered no assistance to the
Immigrant abroad or in Venezuela, and the modern, which had its basis
in the Immigration Law, was selective, and provided varying services
to the immigrants who benefited from its provisions. Venezuela also
received two types of immigrants— the traditional immigrants, mainly
from Italy, Portugal or Spain, with low or middle level occupational
skills, ready to work in agriculture or construction, and the "tran-
silient" or temporal immigrants, with professional or managerial skills,
mostly brought in by the multi-national companies. The co-existence
of the two types of immigration was matched by the co-existence of
traditional and modern institutional structures in Venezuela during
this period of transition.
Although no general theory of migration has yet evolved,
particularly one which is usable by historians, Everett S. Lee has
provided a number of migration hypotheses against which migration
patterns can be tested.^ The hypotheses are grouped in three general
areas of concern: (1) the volume of migration, (2) the establishment
of the migration stream and counterstream and (3) the characteristics
of the migrants. In order to facilitate comparisons of immigrant ex-
periences, the concluding chapter will measure the validity of Lee's
hypotheses against the Venezuelan immigration experience, 1936-1961.
^Everett S. Lee, "A Theory of Migration," in Migration , ed. J. A.
Jackson (Cambridge, 1969), 282-297. This article was previously pub-
lished in Demography , 3 (1966), 47-57.
C H A P T E R I
PRECONDITIONS FOR IMMIGRATION: VENEZUELA IN 1936
The year 1936 marked a turning point in the history of Venezuela.
With the death of the dictator Juan Vicente Gomez on December 17, 1935,
Venezuela was free to enter into the mainstream of the twentieth cen-
tury. The country immediately began the long and difficult processes
of transforming itself from a social and political wasteland and ra-
tionalizing its petroleum-distorted economy. The new president,
Eleazar Lopez Contreras (1936-1941), summed up the great task confront-
ing the nation in his "Program of Government," delivered to the Congress
on February 21, 1936. This so-called "February Program" demonstrated
a genuine understanding of the struggle the country would face in its
bid for development. Education, health, immigration, the economic
infrastructure, as well as political and administrative structures
would all require sweeping and at times radical measures to enable the
country to free itself from the chains, literal and metaphysical, with
which the Gomez regime had shackled Venezuela.
The phrase which best captures the effort to modernize is
Arturo Qslar Pietri's "sow the petroleum." Although petroleum produc-
tion predated the year 1936, it was only with the termination of the
Gomez dictatorship that the government began to plan and implement a
national program to invest petroleum revenues for purposes of develop-
t. In addition to the measures taken to modernize the laws andment
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public administration, the government hoped to expand the economy be-
yond its petroleum and agricultural bases. By developing an industrial
sector, new sources of wealth and employment would emerge. Moderniza-
tion also meant eradicating endemic and epidemic diseases, eliminating
illiteracy and training workers for jobs in the new industries. Fi-
nally, modernization meant upgrading the cultural norms of the people,
particularly those related to work habits and familial responsibility.
In 1936, the goal of immigration was to "Europeanize" the Venezuelans
because Europeans were viewed as the personification of modern civil-
ization."''
The modernization of the political and administrative life of
the country had its beginnings in the slow but continuous moderniza-
tion of the army which Lopez Contreras had begun to implement during
the Gomez dictatorship. Lopez Contreras firmly believed that a pro-
fessional army should not play an active part in politics but should
rather "stand aside from partisan politics and remain indifferent to
the entreaties of interested parties who sought armed assistance for
2
their cause." Although Lopez Contreras did not dismiss all military
In truth, as will be seen in greater detail in the following
chapter, Venezuela's Immigration goals, particularly during the first
years under study here, largely replicated the goals of the nineteenth-
century Argentine elite. As summarized by Gino Germani, the latter be-
lived that a modern national state "could only be established on the ba-
sis of a transformed social structure and change in its human composition.
This attitude was reinforced by ideas about the role of racial factors
and national characteristics. European ideas were not sufficient; it
was necessary to physically bring Europe to America in order to modern-
ize Argentina. See Gino Germani, "Mass Immigration and Modernization
in Argentina," in Masses in Latin America , ed. Irving Louis Horowitz
(New York, 1970), 289-290.
^Winfield J. Burggraaff, The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Po litics,
1935-1959 (Columbia, Missouri, 1972), 43.
11
personnel from civilian posts immediately, there was a continual de-
cline in their numbers throughout his administration."^ In addition to
removing the military from the political arena, Lopez Contreras re-
leased all the political prisoners of the Gomez regime, allowed the
exiles to return to Venezuela, and approved the formation of political
parties. The Venezuelan zest for political activity, suppressed during
Gomez's twenty-seven year dictatorship, flourished in the new atmos-
phere of tolerance.
At the beginning of his government, Lopez Contreras lifted
press censorship and permitted mass political meetings. But when the
demagoguery of the political leaders induced public riots and disorders,
he suspended constitutional guarantees. This action provoked further
disorders which culminated in a massive and bloody protest demonstra-
tion on February 14, 1936. Not wishing to provoke revolution in the
streets, Lopez Contreras ordered a thorough investigation of the inci-
dent. Within a week responsibility for it was laid at the door of the
governor of the Federal District who was summarily relieved of his post.
In a further effort to defuse the situation, the president restored
constitutional guarantees on 21 February. The announcement was made
on the occasion of his presentation of the country's first national
program of government. The program also served to reduce tensions be-
cause it made clear Lopez Contreras 's recognition of the social, eco-
nomic, and political problems of the country and his intention to
^Ibid. See also the list of ministers and state governors in
Eleazar Lopez Contreras, Gobierno y administracion. 1936-1 941
(Pamplona.
Colombia, 1946), 63-65.
12
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rectify them.
The "February Program" provides a convenient summary of the
problems confronting the country at the beginning of the national
government's efforts to modernize. The seven major goals of the pro-
gram were: (1) the rationalization of public laws and administration;
(2) the need to increase the population and radically improve public
health; (3) the integration and expansion of public transportation
and transportation systems; (4) the improvement and expansion of
public education; (5) the revitalization of agriculture; (6) the de-
lineation of coherent fiscal and commercial policies and (7) the en-
couragement of immigration and colonization.^
Lopez Contreras placed immigration last in his program because
he viewed it as a catalyst which would make other reforms more effec-
tive. Advocates of immigration saw it as a means to increase the
population, to expand the work force and the consumer market, to popu-
late deserted areas of the country, particularly in agricultural and
frontier regions, and to improve the biological inheritance of the
Venezuelans through inter-marriage. Immigration was also valued as a
means to acquire needed occupational skills. Because public education
"^Rodolfo Luzardo, Notas historico-economicas , 1928-1963 (Cara-
cas, 1963), 44-47 and Ramon Bias Sanchez, Transicion: Politica y rea l-
idad en Venezuela (Caracas, 1937), 63-64. Diaz Sanchez's book is an
interesting contemporary account of the year of transition between the
death of Gomez and the end of L6pez Contreras's first year as president.
^Lopez Contreras, Gobierno y administracion , 5-14. The "Pro-
grama" has also been reprinted in Naudy Suarez Figueroa, Programas
po litacos venezolanos de la primera mitad del slglo XX (Caracas, 1977),
I, 123-134. Lopez Contreras repeated these goals in his three year plan
presented to the Congress in 1938. See Suarez Figueroa, Programas
po liticos
,
I, 197-232.
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was ignored during the Gomez regime, Venezuela found itself with an
almost completely illiterate population at the same timu that the
national government embarked on a program to modernize the country.
Besides contributing specific skills and knowledge, the immigrant was
expected, by a process of osmosis, to inculcate his sense of discipline
and responsibility in Juan Bimba. The scope of the problems immigra-
tion was intended to alleviate becomes more apparent with a detailed
view of demographic, educational and economic conditions in 1936.
In 1936 the population of Venezuela was only 3,491,159 persons
dispersed in a territory of 912,050 square kilometers. Population
density, a traditional index of development, was 3.8 persons per square
kilometer. The distribution of the population was unequal, however:
the Federal District contained 146.85 persons per square kilometer
while the state of Bolivar (the Guayana region) had only .5 person and
the Amazonas Territory an insignificant .1 person* One expression of
density which reflected the geographical realities of the country was
that the mountainous regions, with their temperate climate, had an
approximate area of 75,500 square kilometers and a population of
2,133,679 persons (density 28.3) while the plains regions, subject to
high temperatures and almost annual flooding had an area of 836,53^9
square kilometers and only 1,357,480 inhabitants (density 1.6).
^Juan Bimba is the name used to refer to the average Venezuelan,
akin to Argentina's Juan Pueblo.
^Venezuela, Ministerio de Fomento, Direccion General de Estadis-
tica. Sexto censo (Caracas, 1940), III, 13-19. (Hereinafter cited as
Sexto censo.
)
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Besides geographical distribution, there is another important
index which is the rural-urban distribution. By 1936 Venezuelan census
standards, an urban dweller was one who lived in a population center of
at least 1,000 inhabitants. By this standard, 34.7 percent of the
population was urban in 1936 and 65.3 percent was rural. ^ This index
was originally closely associated with industrialization because it was
an urban phenomenon. Theoretically, improvements in agricultural
technology led to less need for manpower and the surplus labor drifted
to the industrializing cities to find work. In Venezuela, however,
the growing percentage of persons living in urban areas was not the
result of iniprovements in agricultural technology or industrialization,
but rather the pull exercised by the presence of petroleum money.
The economy of Venezuela will be discussed below at greater
length, but it should be noted here that petroleum, as it still does,
had an enormous impact on the pattern of development in Venezuela.
The money generated by the petroleum industry caused notable changes in
the distribution of the population, either directly because of the
areas of exploitation, or indirectly because of government spending
of oil revenues. Although the petroleum industry never employed more
than three percent of the labor force, it always paid relatively high
salaries, which led to the creation of spin-off economic activities
in the service sector. Urban areas arose almost overnight in the
vicinity of the oil camps. Roads built by the petroleum companies to
facilitate their own transportation were opened to public use, thus
Sexto censo, III, 47.
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facilitating interchanges not directly related to the industry. Ef-
forts by the companies to improve health conditions for their employ-
ees redounded to the benefit of Venezuelans living in the areas of the
camps
.
Problems with land ownership and the low profitability of
agriculture in an economy increasingly saturated with petroleum money
combined with the abysmal health services and educational facilities
of the interior of the country to push people toward the bright lights
of the cities, such as they were. Caracas, the capital, has always
attracted people, but the population shifts due to the impact of petro-
leum affected the entire country. Without doubt, improved means of
communications facilitated movement from one place to another. By
1936, 11.2 percent of the population was living outside its native
state, and the number of those who had migrated from rural to urban
settings was even higher. In the few cases where migration was to-
ward rural areas, it reflected an escape from the static agricultural
lands to areas in which ownership possibilities existed. The collapse
of agricultural exports in the 1930s, initially due to the depression
but later aggravated by the high exchange rate of the oil-bloated
9
bolivar , also served to drive people off the land into the cities.
(See appendix A, table 25 for net inter-state migration, 1936-1961.)
Q
See Antonio Jose Briceno Parilli, Las migraciones mternas y
los municipios petroleros (Caracas, 1947) for an excellent early anal-
ysis of the migrations. See also Chi-Yi Chen, Movimientos migratorios ,
especially pages 61-75. Sergio Aranda, La economia venezolana: Una
interpretacion de su modo de funcionamiento 2 ed. (Mexico, 1978), 80-
81 comments on the problems caused by the collapse of export agriculture,
16
Venezuela's population had grown very slowly in the hundred
years prior to 1936. The birth rate fluctuated between 25.2 to 36.6
per thousand, but the mortality rate was very high—between 17 to 24.9
per thousand. The intercensal growth rate in the period 1844 to 1936
was never more than 1.8 and from 1891 to 1926 has been calculated at
no more than .8 percent annually. Clearly, the mortality rate was a
serious deterrent to population growth. Life expectancy in 1936 was
less than thirty-six years in the Caracas area. It is reasonable to
assume that it must have been even lower elsewhere since Caracas en-
joyed a better climate than most of the country and more adequate
health services."''^
Hundreds of thousands suffered from chronic and debilitating
diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, dysentery, gastro-enteritis
,
yellow fever, parasites and amoebas. The leading cause of death was
gastro-enteritis followed by tuberculosis and malaria. Internal
parasites were endemic in the interior of the country and chronic
malnutrition was a problem everywhere. There were few doctors in the
interior, and the country had only 3,653 hospital beds available in
1935. The grave problems of public health led to the division of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Health; the Ministry of Health and Social
Venezuela, Ministerio de Fomento, Direccion General de Estadis-
tica, Anuario estadistico de Venezuela, 1938 (Caracas, 1939), 77 and
116. (Hereinafter the various years will be cited as Anuario estadis -
tico with the appropriate year.) The official estimate of population
in 1838 was 887,168. Comparable figures for Argentina, a country of-
ten cited by immigration proponents were: 310,628 (1800) and 12,204,000
(1934); an Increase almost ten times that of Venezuela in the same
period of time. See Sexto censo . III, 11-12.
17
Welfare was created on February 25, 1936.^^
Besides being debilitated and few in numbers, Vc^nezuela's
population, as noted earlier, was in great part illiterate. The 1936
census revealed that more than sixty percent of the population could
not read or write. Over seventy percent of the children between seven
and fourteen were not attending school. The Central University in
Caracas, the larger of the two universities in the country, had only
1,256 students locked into a limited, traditional curriculum. Two-
thirds of the students were enrolled in law or medicine. The two
normal schools had 115 students between them. There were only 2,161
primary schools serving 137,126 students, and twenty high schools
with a total of 3,076 students. Teachers were so poorly prepared that
the government requested the assistance of a Chilean mission to study
the problem in 1936. At their recommendation, the Pedagogical Institute
Lopez Contreras, Administracion y gobierno , 47 and 52. The
causes of death can be found in Venezuela, Ministerio de Sanidad y
Asistencla Social, Direccion de Salubridad Publica, Division de Epi-
demiologla y Estadistica Vital, Relaclon anual de la Secclon de Esta-
dlstica Vital, ano 1939 (Caracas, 1940), 260-291. George Hill noted
that internal parasites were absolutely endemic in the interior of the
country and could reduce an individual's capacity to work by as much as
fifty percent. He added that if Venezuelans could be cured of their
various diseases and be fed properly, there would be no need for immi-
gration to increase the population. See George Hill and Ruth Hill,
Sobre las bases sociales y economicas de la immigracion y colonizacion
en Venezuela (Caracas, 1945), 61-67. A popular refrain of the interior
sums up the problem of diseases with typical Venezuelan humor:
Sarampion, tocan la puerta; Measles, someone is knocking at the
lechina ve a ver quien es , door;
si es la comadre viruela Chicken pox, go and see who it is,
dile que vuelva despues. If it is the comadre small pox
Tell her to come back later.
See Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela, politica y petroleo , 3d. ed. (Bogota,
1969), 206.
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of Caracas was established.
The level of educational preparation of the Venezuelans was on
a par with the demands of an economy dominated by subsistence agricul-
ture. Until the rise of the petroleum industry, agriculture had been
the mainstay of the Venezuelan economy, employing the largest segment
of the population, producing most of the national income and earning
the foreign exchange necessary to buy what was not produced. Cacao,
the premier crop of the first half of the nineteenth century, grew
principally in the states of Aragua, Carabobo, Miranda, Sucre and
Yaracuy. Coffee, which replaced cacao in importance as the leading
cash crop, required different climatic conditions and was grown pri-
marily in the Andean states of western Venezuela. Cattle raising was
the predominant economic activity of the central and plains states, as
well as the Guayana region- (See map, frontispiece.)
By the end of the 1920s petroleum had replaced coffee as the
leading export and by 1936 was providing almost ninety percent of the
export earnings. Commercial agriculture, damaged by the lack of inno-
vation and the swollen value of the bolivar , went into a relative de-
cline, maintaining its viability only through government subsidies.
Because commercial agriculture concentrated on the production of export
crops, it was unable to respond to the needs of the growing urban cen-
ters for normal food supplies. Such products as wheat flour, potatoes,
eggs, ham, lard, condensed milk, preserves, fish, dried fruit and,
-•^J.L. Salcedo-Bastardo, Historia fundamenta l de Venezuela, 2d.
rev. ed. (Caracas, 1972), 691-692. Sexto censo . III, 39-41; Lopez
Contreras, Administracion y gobierno , 43-44.
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generally speaking, all foodstuffs which could not be pi oduced without
a certain amount of equipment and skill, had to be imported. "'""^
Agriculture employed 57.9 percent of the economically active
population in 1936 but produced only 22.8 percent of the national in-
come. The per capita income in the agricultural sector was only 327.60
bolivares ($1 = Bs . 3.35). Because of the lack of innovation in agri-
cultural techniques, many acres of fertile land had become exhausted
or eroded. Irrigation and flood control mechanisms necessary to devel-
op the agricultural lands of the llanos did not exist. Farmers cleared
the land by the slash and burn method; fertilizers, mechanized
machinery and pest control were almost unknown and few farmers prac-
ticed crop rotation. Since land-holdings were not taxed they tended to
be extensive and underproductive . Much of the best agricultural land
14
had been seized by Gomez and his cohorts.
Traditional products such as foodstuffs, textiles, leather,
Enrique Siewers, "The Organization of Immigration and Land
Settlement in Venezuela," International Labour Review , XXXIX (June 1939),
766-769. A technical mission which studied the situation in 1940 re-
ported that Venezuela was dependent on imports for a substantial part
of its foodstuffs. See American Advisory Economic Mission to Venezuela,
Repo rt to the Minister of Finance (Washington, D.C., 1940), 5. The
report is sometimes referred to as the Fox Report.
""^United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic
Survey of Latin America, 1950: Recent Facts and Trends in the Economy
of Venezuela (New York, 1951), 16-27. Much of the information in this
section has been derived from this report. Other useful surveys ot the^^
economy include: Jose Antonio Mayobre, "Desde 1936 hasta nuestros dias
in Politica V economla en Venezuela, 1810-1976 (Caracas, 1976),
Ramon Veloz, Economla y finanzas de Venezuela, 1830-1944 (Caracas, 1945);
Tomas Enrique Carrillo Batalla, "La dinamica del desarrollo economico
venezolano," Revlsta de economla latinoamericana , Ano V, No. 17 Uyb^;
,
45-68, and the previously cited works by Sergio Aranda and the Hills.
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beer and tobacco dominated the fledgling industrial sector. In the
industrial census of 1936 some 8,000 establishments were characterized
as industrial, but the great majority employed fewer than five persons
and were in fact artisan workshops. The incipient industries included
cement, the preparation of chocolate and butter, paper, aguardiente,
sugar (_papel6n ) , cheese, as well as those previously mentioned. Total
employment was some 50,000 persons, with another 96,000 in crafts. "''^
The sheer number of commercial establishments indicated the
prosperity of an oil-fueled economy. The 1936 commercial census enu-
merated some 23,000 establishments and, according to the population
census, some 64,300 persons worked in the sector. An indication of
the low industrial activity in the country is the fact that imports
comprised about 45 percent of the goods sold in these stores. In fact,
in 1936, import duties provided the national government with more of
its revenues than did petroleum. It is quite possible that the govern-
ment did not move effectively to promote Industrial development be-
cause to have done so would have meant depriving itself of a lucrative
source of revenue. In any event, even in the face of the recommenda-
tions of a technical mission that import duties be lowered to partially
ease the high cost of imported foodstuffs and other basic necessities,
the government in fact raised them, to try and remedy the balance of
^\nuarlo estadlstico, 1940, 207, 209, 229. The greatest number
of industrial establishments produced foodstuffs (4,381), followed by
textiles (941), leather goods (568) and wood products (536). See also
Weine Karlsson, Manufacturing in Venezuela; Studies on Development and
Location (Stockholm, 1975) which is strongest on the pre-1950 period.
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trade deficit it had with certain countries. (See appendix A, table
26, for government revenues, selected sources.)
Venezuela presented a bleak image in 1936. The small popula-
tion, debilitated and largely illiterate, lived in a country which
had, economically speaking, one foot in the past and the other in the
future. The government, which increasingly profited from petroleum,
the only modern sector of the economy, was rich, while the people were
poor. Perhaps the most positive aspect of the Venezuelan panorama in
1936 was the pervasive desire for change. Immigration as an agent o£
change became a frequently discussed topic among intellectuals,
businessmen, politicians, and government spokesmen. Their advocacy of
immigration revealed many facets of the problems involved in modernising
and developing the country.
^^Anuario estadistico, 1940 , 213, 214, 234. The commercial
census listed only 20,768 persons working in the sector. The higher
figure can be found in Jose A. Silva Michelena, The Illusion of Demo
cracy in Dependent Nations (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 55. Nearly 17,
commercial establishments sold foodstuffs.
CHAPTER II
IMMIGRATION ADVOCATES AND PUBLIC OPINION
The seal of approval which Lopez Contreras placed on immigra-
tion in his "February Program" was not a radical innovation. Immigra-
tion had been officially sanctioned since independence as a means to
increase the perennially small population and to promote economic
development. Primarily because of the almost constant civil strife
prior to 1908, very little immigration had ever been attracted to
Venezuela.''' The enforced domestic tranquility of the Gomez dictator-
ship (1908-1935) sparked new intellectual interest in immigration,
particularly on the part of those influenced by positivist social
philosophy.
Briefly, positivism held that any country whose government
shaped its social and economic policy in accordance with universally
applicable social laws would enjoy material and cultural progress.
Some people, influenced by positivism but also by the biological deter-
minism of Herbert Spencer, not only approved of immigration as a means
of development, but faulted the Venezuelan mixed-blood, "Juan Bimba,"
for Venezuela's lack of progress. The pseudo-scientific racial
theories based on biological determinism considered non-whites inher-
ently inferior and condemned mestizaje.
^See Susan Berglund Thompson, "Las bases sociales y economicas
de las leyes de inmigracion venezolanas, 1831-1935," Boletin Historico
(Fundacion John Boulton, Caracas), Numero 48 (forthcoming).
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These ideas found great acceptance among the Venezuelan elite
which prided itself on its white blood. No definite statistics exist
on the racial composition of Venezuela in the early twentieth century,
but most observers agree that about ten percent of the population was
pure black and some eighty percent was a mixture of African, American
Indian and European, During the first decades of the twentieth century
members of the small, white elite, influenced by Spencerian positivism,
began publishing studies which placed increasing blame on the "racially
inferior" population for Venezuela's lack of development and looked to
2Europeans, particularly northern Europeans, for their models.
In terms of immigration, the 1936 law was not the first to ex-
clude persons on a basis of race. The law of 1891 had that honor, but
the exclusions were dropped in the laws of 1893 and 1894. The 1912
law limited immigration to the "European race" which is a sociological
definition of race rather than a biological one. In 1918 a new immi-
gration law permitted the immigration of Japanese, but it was only a
theoretical experiment, as no Japanese went to Venezuela. In a separ-
See Ellas Pino Iturrieta, Positivismo y gomecismo (Caracas,
1978), Luis Beltran Guerrero, Introduccion al positivismo venezolano
(Caracas, 1956) and Marisa Kohn de Beker, Tendenclas positivistas en
Venezuela (Caracas, 1970) for general overviews on the subject. See
Win^throp R. Wright, "Elitist Attitudes toward Race in Twentieth-Century
Venezuela," in Slavery and Race Relations in Latin America , ed. Robert
B. ToplLn (Westport, Conn., 1974), 325-347 and Leslie B. Rout, The
African Experience in Spanish America, 1502 to the Present Day (Cam-
bridge, 1976), 249-260 for comments on racial mixture and attitudes in
modern Venezuela. See also German Carrera Damas , El culto a Boliver,
2d. ed. (Caracas, 1973), 110-111 and 170-171 for comments on the nega-
tive attitude of the Venezuelan elite toward persons of mixed blood
and their subsequent deprecation of the "pueblo." Raymond E. Crist and
Edward P. Leahy give slightly different statistics on race: roughly
60 percent mestizo and mulatto; 19 percent white; 2 percent Indxan; 9
percent black. See their Venezuela; Search for aJUddle Ground (New
York, 1969), 30.
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nate Foreigners' Law of 1918, which controlled the entry of anyone not
specifically an immigrant (and indeed there were no immigrants under
Gomez), a clause permitted the entry of anyone excluded on racial
grounds by the immigration law if the person did not intend to settle
permanently in Venezuela. This clause, which was retained in every
subsequent Foreigners' Law, proved to be a convenient loophole for ad-
mitting foreigners who were otherwise denied entry. The petroleum
/
companies utilized the loophole to bring in thousands of blacks from ^
the Antilles, but conflicts between them and Venezuelan workers pro-
voked Gomez to issue a circular in 1929 which reiterated the prohibi-
tion of the 1918 Immigration Law. Persons of color could not enter as
immigrants and all those already resident would have to carry papers
|
indicating their legal right to move from one place to another in the
country. In the introduction to the annual report of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs for that year, this measure was held to be just
because "the primordial element to be considered in those who come to
settle in Venezuela is race; a race which raises by its fusion the
physical, intellectual and moral level of the Venezuelans."^
3
For example, the clause (Article 11) is found in the current
Foreigners' Law which was promulgated in 1937.
4Venezuela, Ministerio de Relaciones Interiores, Memoria y cuenta,
1929 (Caracas, 1930), 130. (The Memoria y cuenta of this Ministry will
hereinafter be cited as MRI, Memoria y cuenta and the appropriate year.)
See also Edwin Liewen, Petroleum in Venezuela, A History (Berkeley, 1954),
51. It is possible that the oil companies simply imported workers with-
out going through the proper government channels and thus Gomez found
it necessary to publicly remind them that permission to enter Venezuela
was the prerogative of the government.
^MRI, Memoria y cuenta, 1929 , xvi.
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Jose F. Castillo, a lawyer, coimneated on those same workers from the
Antilles in 1936. He claimed it would have been better for Venezuela
if they had never come and recommended that they return to their native
countries because, "we have no need to increase the already strong per-
centage of black population which afflicts the nation."^
One of the most influential books written during the Gomez
dictatorship was Laureano Vallenilla Lanz
' s Cesarismo democratico
.
Vallenilla Lanz defended the concept of dictatorship (the "Gendarme
Necesario") given the social characteristics of the Venezuelans and the
geographic conditions of the country. Venezuela's constitution was
,
merely a civilized ideal which could never be realized without the
mediating influence of European immigrants. Vallenilla Lanz stated
that such immigration was one of the two great needs of the country.
There could be no progress without such immigration and with it, the
"Gendarme" would no longer be necessary.^
Alberto Adriani was another proponent of immigration during the
Gomez regime who was strongly influenced by Spencerian positivism.
Adriani, then the only trained economist in Venezuela, later served as
Lopez Contreras's Minister of Agriculture and then Minister of Finance
(Hacienda). He wrote a series of essays in the latter part of the 1920s
which W:jre collected and published posthumously in 1937. These essays
Jose F. Castillo, Poblacion e inmigracion (Caracas, 1936), 11.
'^Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, Cesarismo democratico; Estudios sobre
las bases sociologicas de la constitucion efectiva de Venezuela , 4th ed
.
(Caracas, 1961), especially pages 213-214, 220. The book was first
publishBd in 1919.
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touched on many of the problems of development in Venezuela, one of
which was its population.^ Adriani was concerned not only with the
small size of the population but also with its condition. He advocated
European immigration, not only to increase the population but to improve
it by means of the European's higher standard of living and his more
advanced social and intellectual status. The educated immigrant, be-
sides contributing his knowledge, would save the country at least 10,000
bolivares, the sum which would have been invested in his upbringing if
he were Venezuelan. Those inmiigrants not well educated would also con-
tribute by taking over the more strenuous manual labor jobs, thus,
according to Adriani, pushing nationals into better positions.
Adriani also favored European immigration because it would
whiten the population. He was strongly opposed to the practice of per-
mitting private companies, e.g., the petroleum companies, to bring in
immigrants because they brought in cheap non-white labor. He admitted
that the Chinese and Hindu immigration which had been contracted in
other countries as coolie labor was frugal and hard-working, but he
believed their customs and standard of living to be incompatible with
Venezuelan development. The real danger, as he perceived it, was the
importation of blacks from the overpopulated Antilles. Adriani viewed
blacks as an important source of internal strife in Venezuela. Contem-
plating American intervention in the Caribbean, he thought that it was
in part occasioned by racial attitudes which judged colored people
as innately inferior. He feared that if Venezuela did not improve its
^Alberto Adriani, Labor venezolanista (Caracas, 1937), 80-88,
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racial mixture by whitening it, the United States might intervene in
Venezuela using the pretext of protecting its increasingly important
petroleum investments.
Another reason offered for specifying white immigration was that
several sociologists, among them Ross, Stoddard, and Key, argued that
only white immigration could save and develop the tropics.^ Adriani,
and those who thought as he did, must have been gratified when the new
immigration law of 1936 declared that non-whites were ineligible for
immigrant visas. Since Adriani was head of the ministry which sponsored
the new law it is reasonable to assume that he was responsible for the
clause. The fact that the clause was not removed until the 1960s
strongly suggests that it found a general acceptance among the govern-
ing elite of the country for many years.
Another prominent figure interested in immigration was Arturo
Uslar Pietri. In 1937, when he wrote his often cited essay "Venezuela
necesita inmigracion , " he was active in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and was soon to become the director of the Technical Institute for
Immigration and Colonization (ITIC). His article was originally pub-
lished in the Boletin of the Caracas Chamber of Commerce, where Adriani 's
essay on Immigration had also been published separately in 1930. Uslar
9
Lothrop Stoddard was, in fact, an historian by training. He
and Edward A. Ross were both influential in propagating the notion that
non-whites were biologically inferior. Stoddard had been greatly in-
fluenced by Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great Race (1916), and
Ross was evidently reacting to his experience with Asiatic immigration.
According to John Higham, these three men were greatly responsible for
the resurgent racism of the 1920s in the United States. One result of
their writings was the intellectual justification for the immigration
restrictions which were introduced in that decade. See Highara's Strangers
in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York, 1978),
15,' L09, 117, 271-275 , 367n.
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Pietri began by stating that tlie most advanced countries were those
which had opened their ports to immigration and that the immigrants
were essential factors in their development. Perhaps somewhat simplls-
tically he added that immigration would therefore "be the panacea for
our ills." The immigrants would be a mobile school for the Venezuelans,
who would thus learn about civilized living. He characterized the
economy as backward because of the lack of workers and the indolence of
a people racially mixed. Aware of the danger to national sovereignty
which massive immigration might present, he shrugged it aside, remarking
that there could be no meaningful talk of sovereignty in the midst of
such desolation and misery. He was so pessimistic about the composition
of the population that he wrote, with reference to the restriction against
non-white immigration in the recently passed law, "there is nothing to
preserve in terms of the people, whose standard of living is among the
lowest on earth. In terms of civilization, we have almost everything
yet to learn.
""'"^
The emphasis on race which Adriani posited and Uslar Pietri im-
plied is a reflection of the racial theories of Spencer, Count Gobineau
and Gustave Le Bon. It is indicative of the cultural climate of the
country that two such well-educated men could have written under their
influence at such a late date. The problem of race in Venezuela is more
sociological than biological in origin. The country is not noted for
racism in its biological sense, as distinctions are made primarily on
''"'^Arturo Uslar Pietri, Venezuela necesita inmigracion (Caracas,
1937). This is a reprint of an article which appeared in the Boletin
de la Camera de Comercio de Caracas, No. 284 (Julio 1937).
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a basis of color rather than on physiognomy or hair characteristics.
Nevertheless, there is definite evidence of racism as a social class
phenomenon. The higher the social class, the more importance given to
whi teness
.
Public comments on race became less frequent as time passed,
although the restrictions on non-white immigration were retained.
Racism, nevertheless, had reared its ugly head. But it was not recog-
nized as such until the 1940s, when the blame for it was passed to the
Americans. A highly publicized incident in 1945 confirmed the view of
many Venezuelans that racism was brought in by the Americans when Todd
Duncan, during a concert tour in Latin America, was refused a room at
the Anierlcan-owned-and-operated Hotel Avila in Caracas because he was
black. ''"^ In fact, racial prejudices existed among the elite long before
the American presence in Venezuela became important. What saved them
from becoming apparent sooner was the inequality of the Venezuelan social
system. It was not until the advent of Accion Democratica, with its
mass popular support, that the Venezuelan elite actually had to confront
"Juan Bimba." Romulo Betancourt, the leader of AD, made it clear in his
book, Venezuela, politlca y petroleo , that his party's encouragement of
immigration was not intended to "blanquear." Immigration was simply a
factor in production and an element to populate the country, but "the
white as white, and the European for the sake of European" were not im-
See, for example. El Nacional , June 1 and 4, 1945. Making it
clear that the action did not reflect Venezuelan attitudes, the June 1st
article concluded saying that if Venezuela could give hospitality to all
who solicit it (a possible reference to immigration), foreigners in
Venezuela ought to do the same. The June 4th article reported a speech
given in the Senate denouncing the incident.
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portant because the adecos had never considered them superior to the
Creole mestizo. The truth of the statement is supported by Silva
Michelena's observation that AD had lost crucial support among the
bourgeoisie by 1947 because of encouraging the "rabble" and the "Negroes"
to occupy high government positions and interact with the best fami-
13lies of Caracas.
Accion Democratica was undoubtedly the political party which
most consistently and strongly favored immigration, but it was not
alone. From 1936, when Lopez Contreras initiated his government, until
October 1945, when his successor, Isaias Medina Angarita, was overthrown
by a military coup, a total of fifty-one political parties and organiza-
tions were officially recognized, including the four major parties,
Accion Democratica (AD), Comite de Organizacion Politica Electoral
Independiente (COPEI), Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) , and Union
Republicana Democratica (URD). In the flurry of political activity,
there was usually some mention of immigration in the manifestos of the
12
Betancourt, Venezuela, politica y petroleo , 527-528. He specif-
ically contrasted the trienio government's inmiigration policy with that
espoused in nineteenth-century Argentina, the aim of which was to "Euro-
peanize" or "whiten" the native population.
1 3
Silva Michelena, The Illusion of Democracy , 63. See also the
coiiuTients of Carlos Delgado Chalbaud, a member of the Revolutionary Junta,
on the problems of dealing with "'negroes'" and " 'mulattoes. "' The re-
marks were made to the Charge d' Affaires of the American Embassy and
may have been inspired in part by what Delgado Chalbaud thought an
American official would want to hear. See U.S. Department of State,
Decimal Files, 831.00/1-2246, dispatch to Secretary of State, Caracas,
January 23, 1946. (Hereinafter dispatches to be cited as Embassy Caracas,
date and file number.)
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14new organizations.
The short-lived Movimiento de Organicacion Venezolana (ORVE)
,
initially a broad-based electoral front, included within its program
the need to establish an autonomous and prosperous national economy
by developing agricultural colonies and cooperatives, especially in the
interior, with the participation of immigrants. Among the signatories
of the manifesto were Alberto Adriani, Mariano Picon Salas, Joaquin
Gabaldon Marquez, and Romulo Betancourt, all of whom actively encouraged
immigration.
The Partido Democratico Nacional (PDN) , the forerunner of Accion
Democratica, was established in 1936 as the united leftist party. It
included ORVE and many other parties which had supported immigration,
but it did not include immigration as part of its platform until 1939,
when the party had already been declared illegal and its program pub-
1
6
lished clandestinely. The party supported the symbolic candidacy of
Romulo GaJlegos in 1941 in the presidential election to replace Lopez
Contreras. Gallegos included immigration as a part of his proposed pro-
gram, promising to encourage it in order to populate the desierto with
persons who shared the customs and traditions of the Venezuelans. He
also guaranteed that the immigrants would receive equitable but not
For an excellent survey of the myriad Venezuelan political
groupings and parties and their orientations see Manuel Vicente Magallanes
,
Lo s partidos pollticos en la evolucion historica venezolana (Caracas
,
1977). Pages 239-451 treat the period 1936-1948.
'"^Suarez Figueroa, Programas pollticos , I, 144.
-•-^Ibid., I, 271.
32
preferential treatment from the government
. Gallegos lost the elec-
tion to Medina, the hand-picked successor of Lopez Contreras.
Little political attention was given to immigration during
Medina's presidency (1941-1945) because of the war, although the polit-
ical party formed by supporters of Medina, the Partido Democratico
Veaezolano (PDV)
,
included immigration in its political platform.
When Romulo Gallegos was once again candidate for the presidency in
1947, he spoke very passionately of the need for immigration. His
fervor reflected not only a continuing theme in the policy of his party,
Accion Democratica, but also the actual policy being implemented by
ruling Revolutionary Junta, of which Romulo Betancourt was president.
Gallegos proclaimed that inmiigration would be "primordial and decisive"
in the great task of improving economic and social conditions in
Venezuela. Admitting that there had been a few problems in the adjustment
of the immigrants already in the country, he argued that the problems
were outweighed in importance by the benefits of incorporating greater
19
numbers of productive workers.
It should be noted that when political party platforms were
divided into areas of concern, the encouragement of immigration was al-
most always placed in the economic section, indicating that the parties
favored immigration as an aid to economic rather than social development.
""^Ibid., I, 282.
^^Ibid.
,
II, 50 and 58.
^^Ibid., II, 171-172. See also Betancourt, Venezuela, politica
y petroleo, 524-528 for comments on his government's immigration policy.
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Another interesting note is that, according to the programs of the four
major parties active between 1936 and 1948, published in Suarez Figueroa
Pro^ramas politicos
.
only AD consistently supported inmiigration. Both
URD and COPEI expressed only perfunctory interest, and the Comniunist
party failed to mention it.
Immigration lost its significance as a political issue between
1948 and 1958 because of the military dictatorship, but it picked up
force as a government policy. One of the most reticent, yet most
successful of the proponents of immigration was Laureano Vallenilla Lanz
hijo. Although he made few if any public pronouncements on the subject,
he was twice in a position to implement his own and his father's notions
about the necessity to have European immigration in order to free the
country from the problems which made caudillo presidents the norm rather
than the exception in the history of Venezuela. He was director of the
Technical Institute for Immigration and Colonization under President
Medina, but Medina was overthrown before his immigration program could
be implemented. When Marcos Perez Jimenez became president in December
1952, Vallenilla Lanz became his minister of Internal Affairs. As such,
he was in a position to formulate and implement a policy of unrestricted
immigration. The philosophical framework for this policy was ostensibly
supplied by Perez Jimenez's "New National Ideal," but this was simply
an up-dated version of the elder Vallenilla Lanz's social positivism.
Never concisely formulated, the New National Ideal had as one of its
major objectives "the rational transformation of the physical environ-
ment and the moral, intellectual, and material betterment of the country
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inhabitants." Perez Jimenez more tlian once cited immigration as a
primary factor in achieving these goals.
Immigration was a source of lively debate in the newspapers
throughout the period. The newspaper which most consistently supported
immigration was La Esfera, a politically conservative but economically
progressive Caracas daily. The reason for this support was undoubtedly
the influence of its editor, Ramon David Leon. Leon was particularly
concerned about the sad state of agriculture and the dangers inherent
in having extensive frontier areas which were almost uninhabited. Be-
ginning in January 1936, he published a continuous stream of editorials
touching on these and other prob 1 ems which immigration could alleviate,
citing the benefits which it had brought Chile, Brazil, and especially
21Argentina. These editorials were published in book form in 1939.
In 1941 Leon published a study on the immigrant as a factor in
economic development. He cited the relative sparseness of the population
as the major problem confronting the country and emphasized the economic
advantages of Immigration, particularly in terms of increasing the in-
ternal consumer market. Still conscious of the need to develop agri-
culture, he made it clear that the mere presence of immigrants in the
interior was not going to affect radically agricultural production. He
^^See the text, pages 62-64 for more detail on Vallenilla Lanz,
hijo . For more Information on the "New National Ideal," see Luis Cova
Garcia, Fundamento juridico del Nuevo Ideal Nacional (Caracas, 1955).
For some comments by Perez Jimenez, see Venezuela bajo e l Nuevo Ideal
Nacional: Realizaciones durante el segundo ano de gobierno del General
Ma
r
cos Perez Jimenez, 2 de diciembre de 1953 - 19 de abril de Jjjj^
(Caracas, 1955), 12, 13, 14, 27-29.
^-^La Esfera, Caracas, Campahas d e "La Esfera" (edi^toriales sobre
el problema agro-pecuario de Venezue la) (Caracas, 1939).
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aoLed that the lack of roads and irrigation plus the unhealthy conditions
of much of the plains regions made the donation of agricultural lands
a suspicious generosity which cost the nation nothing.
In 1944 he wrote a much longer study dealing with the changes
inherent in the shift from an agricultural-based to a petroleum-based
economy. He commented on the importance of immigration in making a
country great, citing the classic case of Argentina. In 1890 Argentina
was very similar in size to Venezuela, but by the 1940s it had a popu-
lation four times as great due primarily to immigration. Leon also
pointed out that population was not just an economic consideration but
a political one as well. Citing the populations of neighboring Brazil
and Colombia, he called Venezuela "a fragile reed" between the two,
thus drawing attention to frontier problems exacerbated by the fact
that many areas on the Venezuelan side of the frontier were not only
23
unguarded but unpopulated.
As editor of La Esfera
,
Leon had a perfect public forum in which
to espouse the cause of immigration. Newspapers were the most important
form of written information, as book publishing was an almost unknown
activity, probably because of the high level of illiteracy. Since the
press and individual columnists generally favored immigration, it re-
ceived widespread acceptance as a positive contribution to development
Ramon David Leon, El Inmigrante: factor economico (Caracas,
1941)
.
2 3
Ramon David Leon, De agropecuario a petrolero (Caracas, 1944),
61-62. The notion of encouraging immigration for reasons of national
defense also appeared in Obdulio Pulido, . . . Ensayos de inmigracion;
vari o s topicos; saneamiento (Caracas, 1937), 84-109.
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among the Venezuelans
. Venezuela's first scientifically organized
public opinion poll, taken in 1948, indicated as much.
The survey was taken in ten different areas, including Cumana,
Maturin, Caracas, Valencia, Barquisimeto
,
Maracaibo, and San Cristobal.
Of the 2500 forms distributed, 1554 were returned from housewives, and
people active in industry, commerce, and agriculture. Because it is
such a good reflection of Venezuelan attitudes on immigration, it is
reproduced here. It should be kept in mind that at the time of the
survey, Venezuela had still had little experience with immigration,
particularly in the interior of the country.
Opinion Poll on Immigration
QUESTION RESPONSE PERCENTAGE
1. Is there a difference be- Yes 71.5
tween an immigrant and a No 14.6
refugee? Don't know 13.9
2. Will your economic posi- Yes 77.5
tion Improve because of No 5.9
immigration? Don't know 16.6
24See Unlversidad Central de Venezuela, Biblioteca, Llbros
de Venezuela, prologo por Pedro Grases (Caracas, 1970), xxxiii-xxxiv
where Grases notes that from 1936 on, a great increase in publishing took
place, due mostly to the activities of public organisms. Published by
the government or privately printed, book distribution was very limited.
Until very recently ( i.e. , the 1960s) Venezuela had little commercial
publishing activity, unlike Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Brazil. The
press coverage given to immigration was such that the Library of the
Banco Central began a press clipping file (Recortes de Prensa , 30),
immigration having an economic interest for the bank.
Venezuela, Ministerio de Hacienda, Comision de Estudios Financieros
y Administrativos , La Inmigracion en Venezuela (Caracas, 1949), I, 120-
124. (Hereinafter the study will be cited as La inmigracion en Venezuela .)
The copies consulted were in the Ministry of Agriculture library. One
edition Is a typescript and includes interesting photographs. The sur-
vey was prepared by Dr. Enrique Tejera Paris.
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3. Is a Venezuelan a better
worker than a
foreigner?
4. What do you feel
when competing
with foreigners?
5. Should naturalization
procedures be facilitated?
6. Should immigration
be encouraged?
7. Which of these would
you prefer NOT come to
Venezuela?
(* rounded to the
nearest decimal)
8. Type of workers needed:
(* rounded to the
nearest decimal)
9. Should immigration be
permitted on a large
scale?
Yes JU . 0
No /. 0 c;HZ . J
Are the same 26.1
Don't know 1.4
Answers discarded
because lacked
"sincerity"
Yes JD . U
No 44.0
Don't know 20.0
Yes O J . J
No Q 1
Don ' t know J . D
Jews
Asiatics 7? 8
Blacks 65. 6
Ukranians 38 7
Poles 35 5
Ameri cans
Puerto Ricans 24.2*
Portuguese 18.2*
French 13. 2*
Italians 9 8*
Germans 2. 3*
English 1.7*
Agricultural worker 82. 2*
Mechanic 77.4*
Teacher 58.0
Construction worker 47.8*
Engineer 47.6*
46.0*
Doc t" or 40.3*
Servant 22.0*
XjCIW J* CI. 8.4*
Yes 34.5
No 41.1
It depends 10.9
Don ' t know 13.5
As can be seen, eighty-five percent of those interviewed were favor-
ably inclined toward immigration. This generally positive reaction to
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Immigration, particularly the notion M.^t i. i. •y cn tha it would improve an individu-
al's economic position, reflected the widespread acceptance of the idea
that immigration would promote economic development. The fact that
mechanics were thought to be almost as desirable as agricultural workers
indicated that development was seen in larger terms than simple agri-
cultural growth.
The only reservations expressed by those polled concerned the
number of immigrants would should be permitted (question nine) and their
ethnic or racial origins. Question seven indicates that some biases were
well-fixed in the Venezuelan consciousness against Jews, Asians, and
blacks. The first two could only have been the result of learned be-
havior, since at that time there were few Jews in Venezuela and fewer
Asiatics. Even the prejudice against blacks would have to have been
acquired in their absence, as there are areas in Venezuela, such as the
Andes, where they are as infrequently seen as Jews or Asiatics. The
surveyors explained that there was a tendency to confuse Ukranians and
Poles with Jews, which accounted for those negative feelings. The
opposition to Americans was particularly strong near the oil camps.
The response to question three, while it points up the desira-
bility of immigration, is a sad commentary on the negative self-image
which many Venezuelans seem to have had. In 1948, the noted economist
D.F. Maza Zavala wrote an article for his column in El Nacional in which
he decried the Venezuelan habit of deprecating anything Venezuelan and
esteeming anything foreign. Referring to the panegyrics about immigra-
tion, he warned Venezuelans that without faith in themselves, no mean-
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Ingful changes would occur in their country.
After the overthrow of Perez Jimenez in 1958, although immigra-
tion continued to be viewed favorably from a theoretical point of view,
it ceased to be promoted as policy, primarily because of worsening
economic conditions and high unemployment. Wlien it was drastically
curtailed in mid 1958, the Junta presented the restriction as a tempo-
rai7 measure. The Caracas Chamber of Commerce immediately began a press
campaign to change the decision, taking the position that the unemploy-
ment was only temporary and affected mostly the construction industry.
There was still much to be done to develop the economy and therefore
immigration was still necessary. Various articles appeared in the press
supporting continued immigration, reaching a crescendo in early 1959.
Romulo Betancourt had just been elected constitutional president of the
republic and proponents of Immigration evidently thought he might sus-
pend the decree, given his perenially strong support for immigration.
Nevertheless, the restriction continued in force, to all intents and
purposes. No doubt the negative attitude of the increasingly important
and increasingly politicized labor movement outweighed Betancourt 's
27
natural tendency to support immigration.
26
El Nacional
,
September 4 and October 5, 1948. The articles are
reprinted in his Paradojas venezolanas: Cronicas de economia y angustia
social (Caracas, 1958), 16-19.
2 7
See, for example, El Universal
,
September 6, 1958; El Nacional
January 3, 1959; La Esfera . El Nacional and El Independiente , March 2,
1959; the same plus El Universal , March 3, 1959. Immigration was opened
to skilled technicians in May 1960. In March 1961 the government re-
assured the Venezuelan Confederation of Labor (CTV) that no economical-
ly active sons would be allowed to enter under the family reunification
plan and that other visas were "frozen" as they had bet-n for some time.
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Until 1958, advocates of iimnigration were aided in their pro-
posals by the expanding economy and the relative political stability
of the country, despite the coups of 1945 and 1948. A third factor
in attracting immigration was government policy. Each administration
had its own style, and differing conditions in Venezuela provoked dif-
ferent responses. The following chapter elucidates government immigra-
tion policies and the legal framework which controlled the flow of immi-
grants.
See La Esfera, March 24, 1961 and El Nacional and El Universal , March 25,
1961. The Caracas Chamber of Commerce called the decision a mis-
take. See Ultimas Noticias
,
April 7, 1961.
CHAPTER III
IMMIGRATION LAWS AliT) GOVERNMENT POLICIES
Official immigration policy between 1936 and 1961 varied from
one administration to the next, despite the fact that the two fundamen-
tal laws regulating it were in effect throughout the period. The govern-
ment of President Eleazar Lopez Contreras (1936-1941) provided the
basic legal framework for subsequent immigration with the passage of the
new Immigration and Colonization Law (1936) and Foreigners' Law (1937).
In keeping with his gradualist approach and his belief that various
reforms needed to be accomplished before encouraging immigration, few
immigrants arrived during his tenure of office. His successor, Isaias
Medina Angarita (1941-1945), found himself hampered by war-time condi-
tions. Nevertheless, administrative measures taken in late 1944 indicate
that he had every intention of implementing a vigorous immigration
policy once the war had ended.
The golpe de estado which ended Medina's presidency on October 18,
1945 brought to power a revolutionary junta presided over by Romulo
Betancourt, leader of the party Accion Democratica. Under Betancourt
and President Romulo Gallegos (1948) an energetic policy was instituted,
a policy notable for its efforts to attract immigrants as well as to
facilitate their integration. The Military Junta which replaced
Gallegos in November 1948 continued the immigration program of the
adecos , but on a reduced scale.
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Significant changes were effected during the government of
General Marcos Perez Jimenez (1952-1958). The government revitalized
immigration policy, producing a definite bifurcation in the program.
During the period 1954-1957, while selective immigration procedures
continued under the auspices of the Immigration and Colonization Law
and the Institute Agrario Nacional (IAN), massive, non-selective immi-
gration entered the country under the auspices of the Foreigners' Law.
Perez Jimenez was overthrown on January 23, 1958, and the new
Government Junta placed restrictions on immigration shortly thereafter.
For the remainder of the period under study, immigration continued at
a greatly reduced rate, with emphasis on the reunion of families and
specific occupational skills. Even the election of Romulo Betancourt
(1959-1963) caused no appreciable change in the policy.
Two basic laws controlled the entry of foreigners into Venezuela
in the twentieth century: the Inmiigration Law and the Foreigners' Law.
New versions of both laws were enacted during the Lopez Contreras
government, but neither law differed substantially from its predecessors.
The 1936 Immigration and Colonization Law was very much the product of
the twelve previous immigration laws, all of which reflected Venezuela's
need to develop its agriculture."'' The emphasis on immigration for
agricultural purposes was made explicit in the 1893 law which was the
first to bear the full title of immigration and colonization. The 1912
law had so much detail on the establishing of agricultural colonies that
"'"For an analysis of Venezuela's previous immigration and for-
eigners' laws, see Berglund Thompson, "Las bases sociales y econoralcas."
ion
43
one is inunediately reminded of Spanish colonial policy on the foundat
and organization of cities. The 1918 law which replaced it was similar
in nature and remained in effect until 1936. The law passed in 1936
did not reflect new thinking, nor did it envision the enormous changes
which would result from government spending of petroleum revenues.
The 1936 law provided for such benefits as the payment of pas-
sage, free entry of personal and work-related goods, maintenance for
fifteen days at government expense, job placement, and access to land
parcels. Although Article 4 included artisans, industrialists, mechan-
ics and others among those eligible for immigrant visas, the main
tlirust of the law and its regulatory amendment, which created the Tech-
nical Institute for Immigration and Colonization (ITIC) in 1938. was
the organization and administration of agricultural colonies. Excluded
from obtaining an immigrant visa under this law were non-whites, per-
sons over sixty without family in Venezuela, persons with chronic, con-
tagious or disabling diseases, street vendors, persons with criminal
records, and those propagating ideas contrary to the form of government
2
established in Venezuela.
The Foreigners' Law governed the admission of those who did not
3enter with immigrant visas. A revised version was enacted in 1937.
2
Venezuela, Recopilacion de leyes y decretos de Venezuela
.
LIX,
t.2, 19-24. The regulatory amendment which created ITIC can be found in
Recopilacion
,
LXI, t.2. 362-383. The Instituto Agrario Nacional (IAN)
which replaced ITIC was created by means of Decreto No. 173. June 28,
1949.
3
Recopilacion
,
LX, 662-669. It was amended in 1942 because of
problems associated with war-time conditions. See Recopilacion , LXV,
t.l, 111-117. The fact that this law first appeared, in an abbreviated
form, in 1903 and was revised and expanded six times during the Gomez
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This law. still in effect, contains clauses on the rights and duties of
foreigners, admission to Venezuela, establishment of residency, security
deposit payments, registration, grounds for expulsion and for claims
against the government. Article 11 empowers the Federal Executive to
admit, at its discretion, any foreigner otherwise prohibited entry by
the restrictions of this law or the immigration law, as long as the
person enters on a temporary or t ranseunte visa. As will be seen,
about ninety percent of the foreigners entered under the provisions of
this law.
These two laws provided the legal framework for immigration,
but individual circulars and decrees provided the specific guidelines.
These in turn reflected the varying social, economic, and political
goals of each administration. During the Lopez Contreras administra-
tion, political concerns were undoubtedly the most important. Already
beset by Venezuelan leftist political activists, Lopez Contreras had no
desire to add to his problems by permitting Conmiunists to emigrate to
Venezuela. For that reason, very few Spanish Republicans or Basque
separatists were given visas. Lopez Contreras took the view that they
were Communists, otherwise they would not have wanted to leave Spain.
Venezuelan consuls were instructed to scrutinize carefully the political
4
philosophies of potential immigrants before issuing visas.
regime Indicates that its original purpose was to protect Venezuela
against the claims of foreigners resident in the country and to facili-
tate the deportation of undesirable foreigners.
"^Venezuela, Instituto Tecnologico de Inmigracion y Colonizaclon,
Memoria, 1939 (Caracas. 1940), 14, 16; Memoria 1940 (Caracas, 1941), 181-
182. (Hereinafter the annual reports will be cited as ITIC, Memoria and
the appropriate year.)
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Another directive prohibited consuls from issuing visas to
nationals from countries other than Spain, Portugal, France. Belgium.
Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, England, Switzerland, and those in
the Western Hemisphere. Persons not nationals of one of these countries,
all Jews, and persons of color could only receive visas authorized
directly by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.^
By 1942 war-time conditions had essentially paralized immigra-
tion activity. The officials of ITIC, which was nominally responsible
for all persons with immigrant visas, claimed that the inability to
provide and/or check required documents and the lack of transport were
the major deterrents to migration.^ In 1944 the Medina government began
planning for an expected wave of post-war immigration. It declared
the ports of Venezuela open to immigration,'' formed a government commit-
tee on refugees to maintain contact with the Intergovernmental Committee
Q
on Refugees, and contracted Dr. George Hill, a professor of sociology
and agriculture at the University of Wisconsin, to prepare an in-depth
Q
study on the need for immigration and its probable impact.
The Medina government was overthrown in October 1945 and so
Hill submitted his report to the Revolutionary Junta instead. Hill was
quite negative about the possible success of an immigration program be-
cause of the extremely poor social and economic conditions of the
^Documento 51 (Circular No. 2931: 1938). Archive del Dr. Enrique
Tejera Paris, Caracas. (Hereinafter the Archive will be cited as ATP).
^See, for example. ITIC. Memoria. 1940
,
171-172, 182-183, 187.
''m Naclonal , March 23. 1945.
g
El Nacional, January 12. 1945.
^El Nacional. March 18. 1945.
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country. He was particularly pessinustic about the possibility of
immigration for agricultural purposes, stating bluntly that Europeans,
despite the devastations of the war, would not accept the conditions
existent in rural Venezuela. Even Venezuelans did not accept them, as
their continual migration toward urban areas indicated. Either because
of strongly contrary beliefs or a determination to ignore a study begun
under the auspices of the previous regime, the Revolutionary Junta dis-
regarded Hill's recommendations. It established the National Commission
on Immigration to set guidelines for immigration policy and sent immi-
gration missions to France, Germany, and Italy. "^^
The policy of the trien io government (1945-1948) emphasized two
basic selection criteria: occupational compatibility and easy assimila-
tion. The most favored occupations were agricultural worker and domes-
tic servant, traditional policy preferences. Other desirable occupa-
tions were: mechanic, shoemaker, baker, tailor, furniture-maker, mason,
carpenter, and cook. Not acceptable were most kinds of engineers, Ph.D.s,
dentists, lawyers, economists, veterinarians, sailors, fishermen,
butchers, teachers, and non-Spanish speaking salespersons. All other
occupations were acceptable in limited numbers."'"''" The prohibition
against professionals existed because the government recognized that
tliere were too few opportunities for them to practice in Venezuela.
The other prohibitions were designed to protect Venezuelan workers from
''"^See Ej^ Universal
,
June 5, 1950 for comments indicating that
Hill's recommendations were correct but not politically acceptable.
""""""Documentos 15, 16 and 67, ATP.
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"unfair" competition, especially in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs,
because foreigners had demonstrated a willingness to work longer hours
12for less pay.
The need for workers was largely determined by the National
Conunission on Immigration, based on reports from regional commissions,
and decisions made at ITIC. Unfortunately, immigration officials were
never able to develop a sufficiently flexible occupational selection
process. Due to the backlog in transportation, persons given visas
months earlier often arrived in Venezuela when their occupational skills
13
were no longer needed. An additional problem was that a number of
prospective immigrants knew about the preferences and lied about their
14
occupation. But even when an immigrant arrived with a needed skill,
he still had trouble finding work due to the lack of employment informa-
tion. A major failure of the trienio government, and every succeeding
government, was the almost complete inability to place immigrants as
they arrived, regardless of their occupation. Even today there is still
no effective national employment service.
The other preoccupation was that the immigrants should mix well
with the Venezuelan population. Policy makers placed emphasis on cul-
tural and social similarities. For this reason, the preferred immigrant
12
See, for example, accounts in El^ Nacional , September 28 and
October 11, 1945.
'^Documentos 16, 18, 19, and 29, ATP.
"''^Immigrant interview, Caracas, March 23, 1976. The subject, an
engineer by profession, gave his occupation as farmer. Another case was
noted on the file card in the Extranjeria: "Although the bearer of the
passport states he is a farmer, he shows a complete lack of knowledge of
such labors." Source: VENmSTATS, case number 653. See also Documento 32,
ATP.
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was the Spaniard who shared the cultural traditions, language and reli-
gion of the Venezuelans. The government favored Spanish Republicans for
political reasons (during the t^rienio diplomatic relations with Spain
were broken), and the Canary Islanders for traditional reasons. Italians
were also popular because they mixed well, learned Spanish quickly,
worked hard, and were Catholics. Slavic immigrants, initially viewed
with some uncertainty, adjusted very quickly and thus found a welcome. "^^
The restrictions against Jews continued during this period. A
confidential circular, dated January 29, 1948, advised consuls to ab-
stain from granting any visas to those they suspected of being Jews and
to cancel visas which might have been issued. All visas for Jews had
to be approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs."'"^
Despite the continuing reservations expressed in the laws and
circulars against persons of color and Jews, the trienio government
evidently did not intend to follow an overtly racist immigration policy.
A revised immigration law was passed by the Congress in 1948 which | -if
eliminated the racial restrictions of the 1936 law."^'' Supposedly,
occupational and social characteristics were more important in creating
"^^
La inmigracion en Venezuela
,
II, 238.
'''^
Documento 25, ATP.
"'^
^Documento 13, ATP contains a draft of the proposed law. The
racial exclusion clause was to have been replaced by one which read,
"Persons whose standard of living is ostensibly inferior to that of the
Venezuelan people in general." (Article 18, section 8.) Also restricted
as immigrants, were persons whose professions were not judged to be
beneficial to the development of the country. (Article 18, section 1.)
Otherwise, the restrictions were the same as those found in the 1936 law.
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the restrictions than simple racial prejudice. The only colored immi-
gration Venezuela had received was from the Caribbean, and experience
had shown that they took jobs away from Venezuelans by working for
lower pay. Also, educated Venezuelans, if not all Venezuelans, con-
sidered the general "cultural level" of the West Indians to be even ( ^
lower than that of the Venezuelans, which admittedly was none too high."^^
The objection to Jewish immigration was widespread among Venezuelans, as
the public opinion poll previously discussed indicated. More than
eighty percent of those interviewed did not want Jews to emigrate to
Venezuela because they believed that Jews monopolized commerce and did
19
not care to mix with the Venezuelans.
On November 24, 1948, a military coup overthrew the government
of Romulo Gallegos before he had a chance to sign the new legislation,
and thus the 1936 law stayed on the books. The new government recalled
the immigration missions which had been sent to Europe. It also
announced a temporary suspension of the Immigration program on the
20grounds of unemployment among inmiigrants already in the country.
18
El Naclonal, December 4 and 6, 1946. To pay lower wages was
seen as the goal of the sugar industry (December 4), but the goal of the
petroleum companies was thought to be avoidance of unionization, as they
paid equal wages (December 6). In a debate on the proposed immigration
law in 1948, Gustavo Machado (PCV) and Domingo Alberto Rangel (AD) spoke
against permitting private companies to bring in immigration because the
companies would bring in cheap labor from the Antilles. Rafael Caldera
(COPEl) had previously defended the measure. It was suppressed. See
El Nacional
,
August 13, 1948. Wtien a reporter asked a sponsor of the
revised law to give an example of who would have a lower standard of liv-
ing than a Venezuelan, there was no reply. See El Naclonal , September 28,
1948.
"^^
La inmigracion en Venezuela , II, 121-122.
20
The Caracas Journal, December 27, 1948.
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By May of 1949 the government had re-established the program
but restricted it to 400 families a month. The restriction applied
only to those entering on an immigrant visa. The 400 families were to
consist of 150 refugee families, thus fulfilling the previous govern-
ment's pledge to the International Refugee Organization, 110 Italian
families, 100 families from Spain, one half of which were to be Canary
Islanders, and 10 each from Switzerland, Holland, Belgium and France.
The government cautioned immigration agents to select small families
because of the housing shortage in Venezuela. Occupational selection
favored artisans (including barbers, tailors, and the like), maids, a
small number of gardeners, unskilled laborers, graduate nurses, and
21
agricultural workers. Immigrants became the responsibility of the
National Agrarian Institute (IAN) which was created by the provisions of
Decree No. 173, June 28, 1949 and which replaced the Technical Institute
for Immigration and Colonization.
There was no specific limit on the number of persons who could
enter under the provisions of the Foreigners' Law, but consular officials
could not directly authorize the appropriate visas. Consultation with
the Ministry of Internal Affairs was obligatory. This consultation was
supposed to slow down immigration, which it effectively did because of
the paperwork involved. The instructions sent to consular officials
indicate that there were no major changes in policy except for the
necessity of obtaining prior approval from the Ministry. Egyptians,
^•^
Expediente 694 (1949), Archivo de la Direccion de Consulados,
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. Hereinafter the archive will be
cited as ADC.
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Greeks. Arabs, Portuguese and Turks were categorically refused visas
as either Immigrants or residents, although by consultation with the
Ministry they might possibly obtain temporary visas. With reference to
the procedures for Jews, the circular stated, "Even though, politically
speaking, there exists no racial discrimination in Venezuela, previous
consultation is necessary for individuals of the Hebrew race or reli-
gion." and the consuls were advised to discourage Jews from making
application for a visa. With regard to persons of color, the circular
stated that they were to be treated in the same way aa Hebrews. All
persons who received visas were required to sign a declaration that they
would not involve themselves in politics in Venezuela.
In order to obtain a visa the candidate was supposed to present
himself personally at the consulate or immigration mission. Specific
details varied slightly from consulate to consulate, but basically the
applicant was to supply a certain number of photographs, a health cer-
tificate signed by a doctor affiliated with the consulate, a police
certificate of good conduct, and his passport. The officials usually
required some proof of occupation and a certain amount of money which
would cover three months' living expenses in Venezuela plus the return
passage. In Spain and Italy a letter from a relative residing in
Venezuela ( carta de llamada ) or a work contract (carta de trabajo ) was
necessary, duly notarized in the appropriate consulate in Caracas. This
requirement inevitably led to abuses by those desperate to emigrate.
Persons and agencies in Caracas produced both false letters and con-
Expedlente 862 y_ 863 (1949), ADC contains the new instructions
for non-immigrant visas. Expedlente 1118 (1949) ADC contains a copy of
the pledge not to become involved in political activities.
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23tracts
.
Spain and especially Italy tried to obtain immigration agreements
with the Venezuelan government which would offer a certain amount of
protection to their nationals in terms of employment, health care, and
24housing. These benefits were already offered to those with immigrant
visas under the provisions of the immigration law, but the government
could not always fulfill them. Since it was not possible to guarantee
such protection to the limited number of persons who entered with immi-
grant visas, it would have been senseless to offer it to all who came.
The signing of such agreements would have left the Venezuelan govern-
ment open to claims on the part of the governments of Spain and Italy.
The Foreigners' Law existed precisely to parry such claims. Indeed, the
first such law dates from 1903, the year in which Venezuela's ports were
blockaded by foreign powers demanding restitution.
In December 1950 the Military Junta promulgated the Organic
Statute of the Ministries. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was
^-
^Expedientes 519 (1948), 683 (1949) and 236 (1950), ADC all
contain details on visa requirements. Expedientes 177, 742 and 1180
(1949) ADC all refer to problems related to the cartas de llamada and
work contracts with reference to the Italians. Expediente 926 (1950)
ADC is from the Venezuelan consul in Vigo, Spain and includes a press
clipping which says that since so many of the letters and contracts are
false, they will no longer be accepted by the Spanish government. To
obtain a passport it will be necessary to apply personally and demon-
strate a bank deposit sufficient to cover three months' living expenses
and return passage. The money would be held on deposit for six months
unless the emigrant decided to return to Spain within that lapse of
time, in which case the money would be released.
^
'^
Expediente 500 (1948) ADC indicates that Italy was looking
for an official agreement on immigration and had sent six cables to
that effect without receiving a reply. See also Expediente 519 (1948)
ADC re Italy and Expediente 900 (1952) ADC re Spain.
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assigned the responsibility for all categories of visas except that of
immigrant, which remained the responsibility of the National Agrarian
Institute. From that time onward, the consuls were authorized to work
directly with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in matters pertaining
to visas. As a result of these changes, the Extranjerw (Alien Office),
an agency within the Ministry, began taking a more active public role
in formulating and implementing immigration policy.
One of the first policy changes instituted by the Extranjeria
was its attempt to insist that immigrants bring their families to
Venezuela. It directed that a married man should make provision for
his family to join him or his visa would not be renewed. If he left
the country, he would not be given a return visa if he did not plan to
return with his family. The push for family reunion was based on the
hope of accelerating the Integration process and reducing the remittan-
2 6
ces sent back home for the support of families.
25
Expediente 399 (1951) ADC contains Circular No. 1 (January 2,
1951) which is a copy of the Organic Statute. The official name of the
Extranjeria has changed several times. It was originally called the Office
of National Security and Foreigners, became a separate entity in the
early 1950s and is currently joined with the national identification
office (Dlrecclon General de IdentifIcacion y Extranjeria - DIEX) . Al-
though both Venezuelans and foreigners use the services of this office,
it is commonly referred to as simply the "Extranjeria."
MRI, Memoria y cuenta de 1 de julio de 1948 a 31 de diciembre
de 1952
,
101. See Expediente 415 (1951) ADC for Portuguese reactions
to the plan; Expediente 397 (1952) ADC from the consul in Santa Cruz,
the Canary Islands, commenting on the increase in family members seeking
visas and Expediente 519 (1952) ADC from the Spanish ambassador in Cara-
cas, asking if it was obligatory. MRI's response was that it was not,
but that they considered it better that a family be together. Comments
in the press can be found in La Esfera . May 5 and 7, July 30, 1951 and
El Universal, May 23 and 29, 1951.
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In 1952 the government of Venezuela signed an agreement with
the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM) which was
used to further support the reunion of families. The provisions of
the agreement applied only to family members of those who had emigrated
with immigrant visas. Its benefits were further limited to the nation-
als of countries which were members of ICEM, thus initially affecting
mostly Italians, as Spain did not become a member until 1955.^^
A profound change in the immigration regulations came in Septem-
ber 1954 when consuls in Spain, Portugal and Italy were authorized by
the Ministry of Internal Affairs to issue temporary visas to any person
under the age of thirty-five who was literate, had certificates of good
health and good conduct, and who was not included in any of the restric-
29tions of the two laws. The Ministry extended this authorization to
the consuls in all other countries in Europe, to Beirut (with a limit
of 100 persons a month), and to the United States and Canada the follow-
ing year. The instructions were amplified somewhat, specifying that
27
The agreement did not become official until 1955. See Gaceta
Oficial
,
Numero 24,913 (November 11, 1955). Despite the delay, ICEM
began functioning in Venezuela at an earlier date.
09,
El Heraldo, ApU.1 24, 1953. Expediente 935 (1957) ADC in-
cludes a press clipping from the Madrid newspaper Ya, October 2, 1957,
commenting on the increase in emigration from Spain to Venezuela due to
Spain's membership in ICEM.
Expedientes 478 and 1388 (1954) ADC contain the new instruc-
tions. See also MRI, Memoria y cuenta, 1954, 53. If the applicent for
a visa proposed to bring his family with him at the same time, he was
given a resident visa. The report notes that many persons were stub-
born about not bringing their families to Venezuela and that this
occasioned the loss of large quantities of money sent abroad as re-
mittances. It also caused the government to suspect that such persons
had no intention of settling permanently in Venezuela.
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the person must be white, at least 1.60 meters tall (women 1.54), have
no physical defects, have an acceptable occupation, and be generally
30apt tor immigration.
The only official explanation offered for this new policy ap-
peared in the annual report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1955.
The introduction noted that in accordance with the principles sustained
by tlie First Magistrate, among which populating tlie desierto occupied
a prominent position, the Ministry had stimulated spontaneous immigra-
31
tion. President Perez Jimenez himself, in speaking about his "New
National ideal," reiterated time and again his goal of transforming the
physical setting and improving the knowledge and material well-being of
32
ail Venezuelans. This doctrine allocated the role of enriching the
liuman resources of the country to the immigrants, in the belief that
they would substantially improve the social and economic conditions of
33
the country. Perez Jimenez, or, more likely, Laureano Vallenilla
Lanz, hi,i
o
, the Minister of Internal Affairs, may have seen immigration
as the quickest way to create the relatively skilled work force needed
for government and private construction activities. It is also possible
that long range political considerations influenced the decision to per-
30
Expedlente 1253 (1955) ADC. For special instructions to the
consul in Beirut see Expediente 874 (1955) ADC.
31 ...
MRI, Memoria y cuenta, 1955 , 6. Spontaneous immigration re-
fers to those who come without official sponsorship.
See, for example, Venezuela bajo el Nuevo Ideal Naclonal , 12,
13, 14.
^^Ibid., 27-29. The man directly responsible for encouraging
immigration was the Minister of Internal Affairs, Laureano Vallenilla
Lanz, hijo. For additional information, see the text, pages 62-64.
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mit massive immigration. A new constitution, approved in 1953, gave
foreigners the right to vote in elections, pending the passage of an
enabling act. Such a law was enacted in 1957, allowing foreigners
with two years' residency to vote in the plebiscite v^hich Perez Jimenez
offered instead of an open election at the close of his term of office.
As will be discussed at greater length in chapter six, the foreign
communities appeared to support a favorable vote for the continuance of
Perez Jimenez in office.
The unrestricted immigration policy lasted until January 1957
wlien all requests for visas once again had to receive the prior approval
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or, as was usually the case, of
35the Extranjeria. The only countries excepted from the rule were
36Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Shortly thereafter it became necessary
to publish an official notice reminding people that tourist visas would
not be changed to temporary visas, a measure which indicated that per-
sons who suddenly found it difficult to get the temporary visa had be-
37gun using the tourist visa to gain entry to Venezuela. The instruc-
tions to stop Issuing the visas without previous consultation cited the
"international situation" as the reason for discontinuing the liberal
3AVenezuela, Constitucion de la Republica de Venezuela (1953),
Gaceta Oficial
,
Numero 372 Extraordinaria. See Title III, Article 34,
paragraph 3.
-^^
Expediente 222 (1956) ADC.
•^^
Expediente 313 (1957) ADC. In August 1957 permission to give
visas without previous consultation was re-established for nationals of
Siria and Lebanon. See MRI, Memoria y cuenta, 1957 , 123.
^^Expediente 354 (1957) ADC.
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Immigration policy. Later in the year consuls were once again advised
to investigate the political background of prospective immigrants very
38
carefully. It is probable that the government feared some kind of
political disturbance in the country, possibly because of the impending
plebiscite.
On January 23, 1958, the government of Perez Jimenez was over-
thrown by a military coup. Shortly thereafter the Council of Ministers
decided to restrict immigration substantially. Consular officials were
instructed not to grant visas to potential immigrants unless they were
related within the first degree (parent, child, husband or wife) to
39someone already resident in Venezuela. The government announced that
the new policy was a temporary measure to help solve the problem of un-
employment. The unemployment situation did not improve very quickly,
but the government was forced to modify its stance in order to admit
specialized workers and technicians. The Extranjeria established a
program in conjunction with the Ministry of Labor to certify the need
for a worker with a specific skill, the unavailability of such a worker
in Venezuela, and the credentials of the foreigner selected for the
O Q
Expediente 222 (1956) ADC. Besides a vague reference to the
"international situation," there is a circular which cautioned the
consuls not to give visas to communists or holders of passports of
communist governments. See Expediente 354 (1957) ADC.
^^MRl, Memoria y cuenta, 1958 , 289-290. See also Expediente
1333 (1958) ADC. From 1958 on, the Archive of the Direccionde Consula-
dos contains less and less material relating to immigration. The
annual report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs lists some of the
circulars, but they are not preserved in the ADC.
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job.
Another change was the elimination of IAN as the immigration
agency. Its functions with regard to immigration were transferred to
a department in the Ministry of Agriculture. This department shared
the Issuance of immigrant visas with the Extranjeria, but within a few
years the department disappeared, immigrant visas were no longer issued,
and people with immigrant visas (which entitled them to certain benefits
from the government) were forced to change them for resident visas.
Without doubt, the government felt it was not politic to assure benefits
to foreigners which Venezuelans did not have.
A problem which developed after the overthrow of Perez Jimenez
was the situation of the Colombians who had entered Venezuela illegally.
It is difficult to pinpoint the year in which the indocumentados became
a significant proportion of the foreign population of the country. Cer-
tainly no public attention was given to the problem, if there was one,
during previous years, and the reports from the consuls do not mention
it until 1958. Whether the problem began to assume serious proportions
in that year or simply became a focus of attention is difficult to de-
termine.
AO
MRI, Memoria y cuenta, 1958 , 290, 271. The visas were to be
approved by the Direccion de Prevision Social, Division de Mano de Obra
in the Ministry of Labor. This system worked in a very desultory manner
as the number of visas approved in this office indicates. Personnel re-
quired by the government did not have to be approved and gradually most
visas were negotiated directly in the Extranjeria.
"^-"MRI, Memoria y cuenta, 1960 , 380. The 1936 immigration law
was revised in 1966, solely to eliminate the racial restriction clause,
but the new law is a dead letter. No one is ever issued an immigrant
visa and therefore its provisions are never applied.
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In July 1958 a joint commission was formed by the !;overnments
of Venezuela and Colombia to discuss frontier problems. Tbe Instrument
of Reaffirmation of Colombian-Venezuelan Friendship resulted from the
meetings of the commission and was signed on November 6, 1959. This
agreement included a number of articles which were never completely or
consistently implemented, such as a census of the border population,
the legalization of the status of the indocumentados who numbered in
the census, an increase in consular officials, better cooperation be-
tween all officials working along the border and various measures re-
lated to agricultural workers and their working conditions. At the same
time the government dusted off the Frontier Regime Statute of 1942,
ostensibly to begin Implementing some of its clauses.
While the treaty was being worked out, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs made attempts to regulate frontier traffic more effectively.
More information was required to obtain the frontier pass and consuls
were reminded that only persons with a fixed residence in a frontier
state could obtain such passes. All other persons would have to ob-
tain regular visas which had to be approved in Caracas. This tighten-
ing up of the regulations led to various complaints on the part of
43
Colombians
.
In 1958 Venezuela legalized the status of 9,027 indocumentados
and ordered 729 more to leave the country, but in 1959, only 661 legal-
"^^
Expediente DC-1982 (1959) ADC. Mimeographed copies of both
documents were prepared for the information of officials of the
Extranj eria.
^^See, for example, Expedientes 1680 (1958), DC- 3-1141, DC-16-
1496, DC-16-1868 and DC-16-1910 (1959) ADC.
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izatlons were granted and 4,746 indocumentad,.s were obliged to leave
44the country. Assuming that one can have confidence in the data, what
caused this change in policy is not clear, although it may simply have
been related to continuing high unemployment. It might also have been
a method by which the new government could demonstrate its strength
and demand respect. By 1961. either the policy toward indocumentados
was relaxed or they ceased to enter in such numbers. Only 1,688 were
expelled and 3,008 were told to leave, less than half the previous
year's count. There is no figure given for the number of legalizations
in the annual report of the Ministry, but the Extranjeria listed 1,326
46in Its own statistics.
The immigration policy established in 1958, that of restricting
immigration to immediate family members, and later, to skilled workers
and technicians, remained the policy throughout the 1960s and early
1970s. Venezuela lost interest in encouraging immigration and the
44
MRI, Memoria y cuenta, 1958 , 290 and Memoria y cuenta, 1959 .
271 and 283. Some of the indocumentados were probably not Colombians,
but there was no breakdown by nationality.
45
For example, the Minister of Internal Affairs in a speech to
officials of DIEX commented that it had to be made clear that Venezuela
would not tolerate non-compliance with the law on the part of foreigners,
See the Memoria y cuenta, 1959 . 270.
^^In 1960, 1.847 had their status legalized and 9.963 were
forced to leave. See MRI. Memoria y cuenta, 1960 , 380 and 384. Memoria
y cuenta, 1961 , 367 and DIEX, Estadisticas , 1975 (Caracas, 1976),
"Legalizaciones concedidas." This source lists only 661 legalizations
in 1960 instead of the 1,847 which the Ministry's annual report listed.
The annual report for 1959 listed 661 legalizations. This is a small
sample of the inconsistencies found in Venezuelan official statistics.
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statistics indicate that foreigners, by aad large, lost interest in
47going there.
:roin
As has been shown, immigration policy varied considerably fi
one administration to another, despite the fact that the major policy
tools, the Immigration and Colonization Law of 1936 and the Foreigners'
Law of 1937, were in effect throughout the period. Lopez Contreras,
unlike his predecessor Gomez, believed that immigrants could aid in the
development of Venezuela, particularly in the agricultural sector,
which was still viewed as the major sector of the economy. In 1936
agriculture employed more than one-half of the work force and provided
over twimty percent of the national income. Although proponents of
immigration recognized that petroleum was the major source of export
earnings, it did not employ many workers. Also, responsible persons
recognized the danger of being a single export country. Agriculture
was seen as the natural source of income and employment, therefore
immigration was encouraged primarily for agricultural purposes. Lopez
Contreras, as he revealed in his "February Program," governed a country
with grave deficiencies on all levels. He was not greatly concerned
with immigration because he recognized that much would have to be
accomplished before immigration would be able to enhance growth of any
kind. What concern he did demonstrate was purely political. He did
This situation remained unchanged until 1973-1974 when the
increase in petroleum revenues and ambitious government plans to spend
them provoked another surge in immigration. One consistent group of
immigrants were the Colombians, but since most of them entered illegally,
little is known about their activities. For an analysis of their situa-
tion as It existed in 1972 see Norman Gall, "Los Indocumentados Colombia-
nos," Fieldstaff Reports , East Coast South American Series, XVI, No. 2
(1972)."
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not want Communists in Venezuela. As a result of this fear, very little
of the Spanish emigration during this period was allowed to enter
Venezuela because he suspected the fleeing Spaniards were Communists.
As the public opinion poll in 1948 demonstrated, most Venezuelans did
not want Jewish immigration because they felt Jews did not share or mix
with non-Jews. Considering the identity of the people who wanted to
leave Europe during Lopez Contreras's term of office (1936-1941), it is
not surprising that very little immigration was permitted to enter the
country
.
Medina Angarita was evidently more willing to admit immigrants,
but was greatly hampered by war-time conditions. It should be noted
that at the end of his regime, when immigration procedures were being
elaborated, Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, hijo , was the director of ITIC.
Vallenilla Lanz explained, in his Escrito de memorla
, that one of the
first things which he did as director was to elaborate a project to open
Venezuela's ports to immigration, specifying that any European between
the ages of twenty and forty would be able to enter. He was not con-
cerned about occupation quotas because he was convinced that the immi-
grants would not lack for work. At the least, the petroleum revenues
would provide public construction employment. The immigrant would ex-
pand the consumer market, the country would save the costs of educating
him, and he would serve as a model for the Venezuelans to emulate, in
terms of his skills and habits. In short, Vallenilla Lanz was the
quintessence of the Venezuelan proponent of immigration— the peer of any
nineteenth-century Argentine advocate.
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Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, Escrito de memoria, 102,
Accion Democratica was the political force of the trienio govern-
ment (1945-1948) and the adecos tried to construct a model immigration
program. They no doubt were aided by their contacts with more experi-
enced immigration officials who converged upon Europe in the wake of
the war. The documents preserved by Dr. Enrique Tejera Paris, who was
Venezuela's Immigration agent in Italy for about a year, illustrate
very clearly the goals and the problems encountered in developing the
program. The documents indicate that the problems lay less in the se-
lection of immigrants than with their reception and settlement in
Venezuela. When Dr. Tejera Paris returned to Venezuela, he became
active on a commission to study the latter problems; the report La
Inmigracion en Venezuela was the result of the commission's efforts to
clarify and resolve those problems.
The military junta which replaced the Gallegos government in
1948 paid relatively little attention to Immigration. The structure
established under the trienio government was preserved but the govern-
ment ceased to encourage immigration as actively as had the adecos .
It was not until Perez Jimenez became president in December
1952, and Vallenilla Lanz became his Minister of Internal Affairs,
that immigration was once again revived. It is obvious that the imml-
49
gration program was guided by the thinking of Vallenilla Lanz. What
he proposed in 1945 as director of ITIC became policy from 1954 through
1957. Vallenilla Lanz was convinced that only an infusion of Europeans
would modernize Venezuela; only Europeans could liberate the country
^^Colonel Tomas Perez Tenreiro, director of the Extranjeria
during the Perez Jimenez regime, confirmed the role of Vallenilla Lanz
in developing immigration. Interview, Caracas, March 1976.
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from the conditions which his father, author of Cesarlsrno den^^
held responsible for the succession of dictators who ruled Venezuela.
Considering that Perez Jimenez himself was a dictator, Vallenilla
Lanz's open-door immigration policy was ironical, to say the least.
The changes effected in immigration policy after the overthrow
of Perez Jimenez are readily understandable. The circular limiting
entry to family members appeared five months after the coup, so it is
doubtful that the new government felt threatened by the foreign communi-
ties. By June of 1958 the government had publicly acknowledged the
growing unemployment, acerbated by the paralization of public construc-
tion activities. The temporary limitation on immigration was a reason-
able response to the situation. The reopening of immigration to a few
skilled workers and professionals was also logical and done, in part,
at the insistance of the business community.
Not so easy to understand was the sudden problem with the
CoJombian indocumentados
. Numerically, they could not have become a
problem overnight, although, as will be seen, their numbers did increase
significantly after 1957. There is nothing in the press or the minis-
terial reports during the Perez Jimenez regime which indicated they
had been a problem all along. The growing unemployment was primarily
an urban problem and the Colombians worked mostly in rural areas. The
crackdown along the frontier may well have been caused by fears that
supporters of Perez Jimenez would congregate on the Colombian side of
The Caracas Chamber of Commerce was particularly vociferous
in demanding that immigration be reopened. See, for example, El
Universal
,
September 6, 1958 and April 16, 1960; El Nacional , January
3, 1959.
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the border, which was poorly policed, and try to invade Venezuela in
an attempt to restore the dictator. Another possibility is that a
reassessment of Immigration policy by new personnel brought the exis-
tance of the indocumentados to the attention of the government. Their
presence in frontier areas, which were sparsely populated, may simply
have provoked the concern of a newly established order.
In fact, an attempt was made to overthrow the government in
1960, although not with the intention of reinstalling Perez Jimenez.
The exiles entered Venezuela from Colombia, crossing the border in the
state of Tachira. See Ramon Velasquez, "Aspectos de la evolucion
politica de Venezuela en el ultimo medio siglo," in Venezuela moderna;
Medio siglo de historla, 1926-1976 (Caracas, 1976), 204-206.
52
See Expediente 1680 (1958) ADC for interchanges between the
Venezuelan consuls in Colombia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs re-
lating to problems caused by the tightening-up of frontier regulations.
Included is a memorandum from the Colombian ambassador guaranteeing that
Colombia would not permit machinations on Colombian soil against the new
regime. The Memoria y cuenta, 1959 of the Ministry of Defense notes in
the preface that "in order to better preserve public order and guarantee
the security of citizens and the national frontiers, military vigilance
has been increased ... to prevent the entry of contraband and persons
and/or materials which would serve to upset the progress of institution-
al order." (Page 12.)
CHAPTER IV
THE IMMIGRAIMT POPULATION: THE PRELIMINARY YEARS 1936-1947
Before beginning an analysis of the immigrant population in
Venezuela, a few words of explanation and caution must be offered con-
cerning the word immigrant and the statistics which refer to immigration.
An immigrant is one who crosses an international boundary with the in-
tention of living, if not settling permanently, in another country.
In Venezuela, an immigrant is, by law, one who enters the country with
an immigrant visa. However, not all persons who wished to emigrate to
Venezuela received such visas. Some entered with temporary visas, others
with resident visas, and some without any visa. A number of persons
went to Venezuela to work for a limited period of time and not with the
intention of staying. Considering the broad interpretation which can
be given to the word immigrant, this study treats as immigrants all
2foreigners who registered with the Extranjeria. In the text, the
words "foreigner" and "immigrant" are used interchangeably. With ref-
erence to the Colombians, the word "migrant" is also occasionally used.
The United Nations recommended that migration be defined as
removal for one year or more to be "permanent." See William Peterson,
"Migration: Social Aspects," in the International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences (New York, 1968) X, 286.
2
For the period 1936-1947, if the person possessed a visa which
allowed him to stay in Venezuela more or less permanently, he was con-
sidered an immigrant. Although the words "foreigner" and "immigrant" are
used interchangeably in the text, when the data are from the census the
word "foreigner" is used since the person may not have had such a visa
and indeed may not even have had a visa.
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Immigration across a contiguous boundary, particularly when the two
countries concerned share a common culture, can perhaps more accurately
be termed migration. The Andean region of Venezuela and Colombia forms
a cultural unity with a long tradition of reciprocal migration across
the border.
There is a certain amount of confusion in the existing literature
and press reports concerning the few published statistics which refer to
immigration in Venezuela. Due to the existence of two laws which regu-
lated the admission of foreigners, some immigration statistics refer
only to those persons who entered with immigrant visas, e.g., the
statistics of ITIC and IAN, which account for only some ten percent of
the total number of registered foreigners. Other statistics refer to all
foreigners who entered on non-tourist visas, e.g., the statistics of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Other statistics, published in the
Anuario estadlstico
, refer to all foreigners who entered the country
and do not differentiate between entries and re-entries. Still other
statistics, the commonly cited "net migration" (saldo migratorio )
,
available since 1891 and also published in the Anuario estadlstico , in-
clude both Venezuelans and foreigners. As there is not always a pub-
lished breakdown by nationality, there is no way of knowing precisely
how many foreigners entered the country before 1948. For example, the
net migration for 1907 was 912 persons, and it has been assumed that
this figure referred only to foreigners. The breakdown by nationality
published in the annual report of the Ministry of Development (Fomento)
"^See, for example, Federico Brito Figueroa, Historia economica
y social de Venezuel a (Caracas, 1974), II, 407. Brito Figueroa treats
immigration figures as though they referred only to foriegners and
emigration figures as though they referred only to Venezuelans.
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indicated, however, that 716 of those persons were Venezuelans. Among
the foreigners, 106 were English and 41 were Americans; 91 more Italians
and 138 more Dutchmen left Venezuela than entered.'^
After 1948, the net migration figures still include both Vene-
zuelans and foreigners, but it is possible to find separate statistics
for the foreigners in the Anuarlo estadlstico or the processed data of
the Extranjeria. For example, the net migration for 1960 was -9,951
persons, but this figure included only -380 foreigners; the other -9,571
were Venezuelans.^
A common error, with regard to immigration statistics, is the
use of the number of foreigners registered in the country. This figure
is a statistic of the Extranjeria and refers to the total number of
foreigners who have received a cedula (identity card) since 1941. It
is, in a way, the most exact indicator of immigration for Venezuela.
Any foreigner with a temporary, resident, or immigrant visa is obliged
to register for a cedula and the cedula is necessary for all kinds of
economic, legal and daily activity. When a person registers, a per-
manent number is assigned to him and he has the obligation to maintain
the cedula
,
identifiable by its permanent number, up-to-date. Even
after an absence of many years, a foreigner would revalidate the cedula
under the same number. Since identification is based on finger-prints,
there is almost no chance that a person will obtain more than one cedula
Minis terio de Fomento, Memoria y cuenta, 1907-1908 (Caracas,
1909), Indice, 91.
^Anuarlo estadlstico, 1957-1963 , I, 537. Some of the Venezuelans
were probably naturalized foreigners.
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number. The registration figure which results from the issuance of
ce_dulas is not, however, a completely accurate reflection of immigra-
tion in any one year. Not everyone registers in the same year in which
they enter, and children are not required to have cedulas
. The flaw in
the usage of the registration figures is that they do not indicate how
many foreigners have subsequently left the country permanently or have
died. Therefore the registration figures far exceed the number of
registered foreigners actually in the country.^
During the period 1936-1947, relatively few immigrants entered
Venezuela, either because of the timidity of officials or the problems
associated with war-time conditions. The 1936 national census revealed
only 47,026 foreigners in a total population of 3,491,159 persons (See
appendix A, table29 for census figures 1936-1971). Colombians comprised
about forty percent of the foreign population and the great majority of
them lived in the frontier state of Tachira. The next largest group
were the Spaniards, but they formed less than twelve percent of the
foreigners, followed by the Italians with less than seven percent, or
2,5 79 persons. In the 1936 census, unlike that of 1941, persons holding
passports from a colonial power, such as Great Britain or France, were
distinguished by their place of birth. For example, there were over
twenty-five hundred Trinidadians and more than one thousand Grenadines
with British passports. Among the holders of French passports were
1,L82 Sirians. Americans outnumbered the Germans, the French, and the
See, for example, Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic
Ch.inge in Latin America: The Governing of Restless Nations (New York,
i9o7), 307, footnote 22, where he states that Italian immigration rose
to 175,000 persons in 1956, when in fact that was the total number regis
tered by that date. The error was in a newspaper account.
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English, but there were only 1,782 of them; the English colony consisted
of only 804 persons. The second largest number of foreigners resided
in the Federal District, and the third in the state of Zulia. These two 'V
areas plus the state of Tachira contained slightly more than seventy
percent of the foreign population.''
The only global immigration statistic which has come to light
for the period 1936-1940 appears in Lopez Contreras's Administracion v
^qb^erno where the figure 28,000 is cited. ^ Although these foreigners
ostensibly came to settle permanently, the figure includes a number of
Americans who certainly had no such intention. The phrase "settle per-
manently" was used to describe anyone who planned to spend more than
six months in Venezuela and who therefore had to register as an alien.
The 1941 census showed 49,928 foreigners in the country, an increase
of only some three thousand persons. A partial tabulation of the foreign
population done by the Extranjerla showed that only 16,651 foreigners
(of a tabulated total of 33,711) had been in Venezuela for five or more
years. If the information was correct, it would mean that some 20,000
foreigners counted in the previous census must have left the country.
Sexto censo
,
III, 45, 540-541.
Lopez Contreras, Gobierno y administracion , 20.
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TABLE 1
1941 Tabulation of Foreigners by Numerically
Predominant Nationalities
Nationality Total 5 or more Years Residency
Colombian 10,073 4,859
Spanish 5,245 2^542
British 3,095 2U26
Italian 2,645 1,457
American 2,753 '593
German 1,499 5Q7
Fr"t;nch 1,273 894
Cuban 825 136
Chinese 789 625
Source: MRl, Memoria y cuenta, 1942 (Caracas, 1943), 167-173.
As can be seen from the table, Cubans had the lowest permanency
rate; less than twenty percent had been in Venezuela for at least five
years. Slightly over twenty percent of the Americans and forty percent
of the Germans had resided five or more years, while about fifty percent
of the Colombians, Spanish, Italians and French had done so. The
Chinese and the British had the highest permanency rates, almost eighty
percent, but it should be remembered that the British were in fact most-
ly natives of the British Caribbean islands.
Initially, the major reason so little immigration entered
Venezuela between 1936 and 1941 was that Lopez Contreras was very con-
cerned about the possibility that prospective immigrants might be
Communists. Although his "February Program" indicated the enormous task
which faced the government in its attempt to develop the country, Lopez
Contreras 's first preoccupation seems to have been to control extremist
political activity. He reduced the power of Gomez's staunchest sup-
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porters while viewing the activities of the Communists and the burgeon-
ing left-wing movement with increasing alarm. In March 1937 he exiled
forty-seven political activists of various political tendencies on the
grounds of communist activity. In that same year the Direccion Nacional
de Seguridad y de Extranjeros was established and it is significant that
foreigners were included within the scope of activities of an office
dedicated to national security.
Because of Lopez Contreras's attitude, at a time when thousands
of Spaniards were finding refuge in the New World, the ports of Vene-
zuela were almost completely closed to them. Actually, only Mexico,
and to a lesser extent, Chile and the Dominican Republic made much
effort to receive the refugees. This cautious approach to Spanish
immigration had many subsequent critics in Venezuela, particularly when
Latin America began reaping the benefits of the highly talented refu-
gees. Spanish Republicans were not the only ones refused entry to
Venezuela. Lopez Contreras also suspected that most of the Basque
separatists were Communists. Several authors later made critical ref-
erence to what may have been an apocryphal situation— the refusal to
give visas to some twenty thousand Basques. In fact, by August 1939
there were at least 400 Basques in Venezuela and the annual report of
the Ministry of Agriculture for that year stated that 1,812 Basques
gathered in Marseilles and Bordeaux had been issued visas but had not
been able to book passage to Venezuela.
%U, Memoria y cuenta, 1937 , xxvi and 113-114.
^^See for example, Simon Gonzalo Salas, Inmigracion vasca p
ara
Venezuela (Caracas, 1938) and Ramon David Leon, De agro-pecuario a
petro -
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Another group of potential European emigrants were the Jews.
Following the norms of the times, Jews were frequently considered a
race of people rather than a religious group. Instructions regarding
their possible entry into Venezuela made it clear that they were to
be considered non-whites and therefore not eligible for visas. Un-
doubtedly some Jews with family in Venezuela received visas and, going
by their names, a contingent of Rumanian Jews managed to enter Venezuela
during the 1930s. According to an annual report of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, a boatload of 165 Jews was permitted to land at La
Cuaira in 19'J9. Efforts to obtain a specific commitment from the
government to permit Jewish immigration failed, just as they failed in
other countries in the New World. According to reports from the American
Embassy in Caracas, Lopez Contreras was not personally against such
immigration, if the Jews would buy land and farm it, but even so, the
restrictions against Jews continued throughout his administration. The
only figure which has come to light with reference to Jewish immigration
to Venezuela is 7,500 for the period 1933-1947. The number is low when
compared to the need, but considering the low level of immigration per-
mitted by Lopez Contreras and the circumstances of the war, it is a
respectable one.^''"
lero (Caracas, 1944), 108; Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria, Memoria y
cuenta, 1940 , cxvii. For information on the Spanish Republicans see
Javier Rubio, La emlgracion de la guerra de 1936-1939: Historia del
exodo que se produce con el fin de la II Republica Espanola (Madrid,
1977), I, 193-196. The reference to 400 Basques is found in Rubio on
page 196.
"'"''"See David S. Wyman, Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Cri-
sis, 1938-1941 (Amherst, Mass., 1968) for the problems the Jews con-
fronted in finding refuge. See the list of naturalized foriegners in
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As has been previously noted, the emphasis of the 1936 Immigra-
tion Law was on the development of agriculture and it was toward such
ends that the government directed its major efforts. In 1936 the
Office of Immigration and Colonization was established in the Ministry
of Agriculture. Several agricultural colonies which had been hastily
created to alleviate problems of unemployment and to remove excess
population from Caracas and other major cities were transferred to this
office. In 1938 the government invited the International Labor Office
to send technical assistance to carry out an inquiry into the problems
of immigration and land settlement and to help set up an appropriate
administrative organization. Two officials arrived, one from Geneva and
the other, director of Sao Paulo's Immigration and Land Settlement
Service, from Brazil. One of the results of their collaboration was
the establishment of the Technical Institute for Immigration and Colon-
ization (ITIC). The Institute was given responsibility for improving
agricultural techniques and production and was subsequently granted
many of the agricultural properties which had previously belonged to the
dictator Juan Vicente Gomez. The agricultural colonies under the aegis
of the Office of Immigration and Colonization were also transferred to
the Memoria y cuenta of the Ministerio de Relaciones Interiores for
1936 and 1937 for information on Rumanian Jews. See its Memoria y
cuenta, 1942 for a reference to the 165 Jews permitted to land in La
Guaira. Lopez Contreras's comments can be found in Embassy Caracas,
December 16, 1938, 831.55/50 (original is 831.00/1697) dispatch to the
Secretary of State. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gil Borges , had
said approximately the same thing in response to a letter from President
Roosevelt. See handwritten letter. Embassy Caracas, September 20, 1938,
831. 52-Jewish Colonization/3, to Laurance Duggan. See Judith L. Elkin,
"History of the Jews of Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Michigan, 1976), 125 for
statistics on the entry of Jews.
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ITIC, but by the end of 1938 only the Mendoza Colony was still func-
^ . . 12
According to a subsequent study, La_coW2aci6n_^rj^^
Venezuela. 1830:-,1957. the reason ITIC dropped the other colonies was
because ITIC's major function was to repopulate the interior and re-
vitalize agricultural production. Agrarian reform was not part of its
program. Since the directors of ITIC were convinced that only through
immigration would their goals be achieved, colonies which consisted on-
ly of Venezuelans were allowed to fail. The Chirgua Colony, specifical-
ly established to experiment with the supposed benefits of Nordic immi-
gration also failed because the Danes who emigrated could not or would
not adjust to conditions in the colony. One important factor may have
been Chirgua's distance from an important market. In 1938 Chirgua was
about an hour and a half by car from Valencia which had a population of
about 50,000 persons. The preferred market was Caracas, another four
to five hours distant. More likely, the colony failed for other rea-
sons. All the Danish families, with one exception, were returned to
Denmark at their own request by the end of the year, surely too short
a period of time to have made a sincere effort to adjust. One impedi-
12
For information on agricultural colonies and immigration, see
Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria, Memorla y cuenta for the years 1936-
1939. (Hereinafter the annual reports will be cited as MAC, Memorla
y cuenta and the year.) See also MAC, Direccion de Planif i cacion Agro-
pecuario. Division de Politica Agricola, La colonizacion agraria en
Venezuela, 1830-1957 (Caracas, 1959), 24-27 for comments on the estab-
lishment and functioning of the first colonies, 1936-1938. (The study
will hereinafter be cited only by its title.) See Enrique Siewers,
"Tlie Organization of Iimiiigration and Land Settlement in Venezuela,"
International Labour Review , XXXIX (June 1939), 764-772 and XL (July
1939), 32-55 for information on the mission and its activities.
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ment to adjustment was. without doubt, a much too rosy picture painted
by the Venezuelan official in charge of recruiting the immigrants
.
Other less radical coJonization attempts were not much more
successful. The first effort, in 1936. had been to bring in Spaniards
from Cuba. Restrictive labor legislation had just been passed there
and Venezuelan officials thought the Spaniards would be happy to move
on to Venezuela. Somewhat later, after the creation of ITIC, unemployed
Portuguese petroleum workers were brought in from Curagao. ITIC offi-
cials considered this a coup since the Portuguese were originally agri-
cultural workers and could pay their own way from the nearby island.
No doubt the petroleum companies were also pleased to have them off
their hands. The Institute also sent an immigration agent to Europe
where he appears to have arranged passage to Venezuela for Canary
14Islanders and Basques.
Between the years 1938 and 1942, 2,605 immigrants sponsored by
ITIC entered the country. Most were Spanish or Portuguese, but there
were also a few Cubans, Dominicans, and Brazilians, among others. Not
all were agricultural Immigrants. All foreigners who entered with
inmiigrant visas fell under the supervision of the Institute. For
example, in 1940, of a total of 1,333 ITIC sponsored immigrants, only
344 were agriculturalists. Among the others were: 47 masons; 98 car-
penters; 91 merchants; 34 engineers; 35 sailors; 53 mechanics; 215
1 o
La colonlzacion agraria en Venezuela, 1830-1957 , 31-32. See
also the rather complete reports on the initiation of the colony in Em-
bassy Caracas, June 29, 1938, 831.52/29; Legation, Copenhagen, March 8,
1938, 831/5559/1 and May 28, 1938, 831.5559/2.
"""^See MAC, Memoria y cuenta. 1936 , 214; Memor ia y cuenta, 1937_,
Ixxi; Memoria y cuenta, 1940 , cxxvi-cxix.
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women; and 123 children. The authors of the annual report noted that
the relatively low number of farmers was due to problems in settling
them on the land. Hardly any immigrants were farm laborers because
conditions on the haciendas were so wretched that the immigrants would
not tolerate thera."^^
Immigration continued at a sluggish pace until the end of the
war, most probably because of the- problems of civilian transport. As
we have seen, the 1941 census recorded only 2,220 more foreigners than
the previous census. Although an estimated 28,000 persons had entered
the country in those five years, almost as many had left. Some left
for reasons of business, but others may well have been affected by the
outbreak of the war in Europe.
The annual report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for 1944
indicated that 5,080 foreigners entered Venezuela with permanent, as
opposed to tourist, visas. An additional 2,413 persons had re-entered.
The first figure is almost twice the number for the previous year. The
breakdown by nationality indicated, however, that 1,709 of the foreign-
ers were Americans, who were not actually immigrants in the traditional
sense of the word. Americans, along with the English, Dutch, Swiss,
French, and to a lesser extent, the Germans, were the golondrinas or
transilients of Venezuelan immigration. They went to Venezuela for a
predetermined period o£ time, usually to work for a foreign or multi-
national company, and rarely stayed on. Of those who could be considered
immigrants, 1,074 were Spanish, 868 Portuguese, 284 Colombian, 114
Dominican, and 110 Czechoslovakian. At the same time that these 7,207
'^ITIC, Memoria, 1940, 60-64.
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foreigners entered, over 5,000 left, with a net gain of only 1,533 per-
sons. Americans comprised almost three-fifths of those who left.^^
The next report of the Ministry covered the period from January 1,
1945 to October 18th, when a military coup overthrew the Medina
government. The report then continued with statistics for the period
October 18, 1945 to October 31, 1946. Under Medina, a total of 7,218
persons entered with non-tourist visas in less than ten months. In
slightly more than a year, under the government of the Revolutionary
Junta, presided over by Romulo Betancourt, 8,675 foreigners entered
with non-tourist visas. The figures refute Betancourt 's claim that the
Medina government had no interest in promoting immigration; a higher
weekly average entered under Medina than under Betancourt, according to
the Ministry's report. "'"^
The picture began to change radically in 1947 when trans-
Atlantic maritime and air transportation became increasingly available.
In that year almost 21,000 persons entered on non-tourist visas, and
18
an additional 2,529 foreigners returned to Venezuela. The trickle
was about to become a flood.
As has been seen, despite the new laws and official acknowledge-
ment of the need for immigrants, there was relatively little immigration
16
MRI, Memorla y cuenta, 1944 , 152-154.
"""^MRI, Memorla y cuenta, 1945-1946 , xlvi and 11; Betancourt,
Venezuela, polltica y petroleo , 524-525. Betancourt stated that between
1939 and 1944, only some 3,500 immigrants entered the country, thus ig-
noring the thousands that entered on non- immigrant visas.
"'^^MRI, Memorla y cuenta, 1947 , 11 and liii. The report includes
November and December of 1946. On page Ix the total for 1947 is given
as 32,136 but that does not agree with the breakdown by type of visa given
on the previously cited pages.
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activity during this preliminary period. Most importantly, the Lopez
Contreras government laid the legal and administrative groundwork for
immigration and, it can be fairly said, experimented with the newly
established mechanisms. A report from the Ministry of Agriculture made
it clear that with regard to the agricultural colonies, at least, the
idea was to begin with a small program in order to facilitate any
necessary later adjustments. The Medina government undoubtedly had a
mucli more open attitude about immigration, given the nature of the de-
crees described in the previous chapter and the number of foreigners
who entered Venezuela in 1945. Betancourt's criticism of Medina for
not establishing an "open door" policy was unjustified, as was his
appropriation of the immigration statistics for all of 1945 as proof of
the efforts of his own government. That Betancourt was subsequently
able to accomplish much more than Medina was due more to changing cir-
cumstances in Europe than to government policy.
One aspect of immigration in this period which should be stressed
is the importance of the moderii-day golondrina . The term was originally
used to describe the seasonal agricultural migration between Italy and
Argentina. Although these migrant workers did not contribute directly
to the population growth, a goal of the Argentine government's immigra-
tion policy, they certainly played an essential role in the development
of the agricultural sector of the economy. Venezuela has had much the
same experience with Colombian migrants. But a different type of
"golondrina" immigration began to make Itself felt in the preliminary
stage of Venezuelan inmiigration . This was the temporary (rather than
seasonal) migration of economically active persons, be they profession-
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als. technicians, merchants or common laborers. This type of immigra-
tion, which provides necessary talents and skills as well as workers, is
perhaps best known in the postwar European context of the "guest worker."
Due to the great foreign participation in the economic development of
Venezuela, particularly in the petroleum sector, one could say that in
this early period Venezuela's immigration was characterized, even dom-
inated by "guest workers," people who contributed their talents and
abilities to Venezuela's economic development through the medium of
foreign or multinational companies.
CHAPTER V
MASSIVE IMMIGRATION, 1948-1961
Mass inimigration is not necessarily a question of sheer numbers.
If the receiving society is not populous, a relatively small number of
foreigners can have a disproportional impact. Such was the case in
Venezuela. Even by 1961 the Venezuelan population was only 6,982.524
persons. Because of the immigrants' relatively concentrated settlement
patterns and the fact that so many were economically active, with high
concentrations in certain sectors, the immigrant presence in Venezuela,
particularly in a few urban centers, has been conspicuous, although not
well documented.
By 1948 conditions adversely affecting immigration had disap-
peared in great part, both abroad and in Venezuela. For the purposes
of this study, the year 1961 has been chosen as a terminal date because
it gives sufficient time to see the effects of the last important changes
in immigration policy and coincides with a national census year. The
statistics that will be identified in the text as VENIMSTATS"'" were
created by taking five random samples of the prontuarios (personal in-
formation files) of foreigners which are kept in the Extranjeria. The
samples correspond to a particular year: 1948; 1951; 1955; 1958; and
196L. These years were chosen to pinpoint changes in immigration pat-
terns predicated on changes in policy and other circumstances which
"''Venezuelan Immigration Statistics (VENIMSTATS) . See appendix
B for a more detailed explanation of the sampling technique.
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have been described in previous chapters. Once a particular prontuario
was selected, the person's migratory movement card and Venezuelan
PX^ntuarip, if naturalized, were also retrieved. As there is a time-
lag in registration, not all of the persons who received cedulas in a
particular year actually entered in that year. The usual lag was not
more than six months, with the exception of children and illegal immi-
grants. The 1961 sample included nearly two hundred such cases.
TABLE 2
Time-lag in the Registration of Foreigners
(Percentage)
Year of Entry 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961
Year of Sample 95.2 69.4 77.8 68.9 67.2
Previous Year 2.9 25.1 18.7 24.6 13.3
More than One
Year Previous 1.9 5.5 3.5 6.5 19.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source
:
VENIMSTATS.
The total number of foreigners registered between 1948 and 1961
was 614,425. This figure gives the most accurate indication of the num-
ber of immigrants who came to Venezuela in that period. Nevertheless,
it does not include the children who still had not registered by 1961
or the indocumentados who had not legalized their situation. In con-
trast, the migratory movement statistics for the same period of time
provide an exaggerated impression of immigration since many of the re-
corded entries are actually re-entries made by the same person. The
nat migration figure, 411,250. serves to correct the registration figure
83
TABLE 3
Foreign Migratory Movement, 1948-1961
'^^^^ Entries Departures Net
71,168 34,164 37,004
72,902 46,498 26.404
1950 79,050 51,682 27,368
19^1 74,833 50,826 24,007
1952 85,240 56,562 28,678
1953 102,676 60,599 42,077
1954 113,459 67,623 45,836
1955 137,416 79,874 57,542
1956 136,216 91,436 44,780
1957 150,361 104,305 46,056
1958 138,835 122,970 15,865
1959 141,079 124,233 16,846
1960 127,567 127,946 - 379
1961 110,322 111,156 - 834
Total 1,541,124 1,129,874 411,250
Source: Data taken from Venezuela, Direccion de Identificacion y
Extranjerxa, Estadistlcas , 1975 (Caracas, 1976), "Inmigrantes
,
Transeuntes, Transito, Turista, Residentes" and Anuario estadistico
,
1948 and 1949. The Anuario estadistico. 1957-1963
,
I,
516-517 lists 141,080 arrivals in 1959 and 127.947 departures in 1960.
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TABLE 4
Cedulas Issued to Foreigners, 1941-1961
Year
Number
1941-1947"^
50,712
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
38,319
35,866
40,150
34,236
33,052
^^^5^ 46:594
^^^^ 75,153
1956 60,311
1957 65,397
1958 53,361
1959 31,673
L960 28,958
1961 26,599
Total, 1948-1961 614,425
Source: Venezuela, Direccion de Identif icacion y Extranjerla,
Estadisticas, 1975 (Caracas, 1976), "Cedulas Expedidas desde 1941 hasta
Diciembre 1975."
''This figure represents progressive registration of all foreigners
whicli started in 1941. By 1948 retroactive registration was essentially
comp Leted.
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which does not reflect subsequent departures. The 1961 census revealed
a total of 541.475 foreigners in the country, a figure which included
both children and an unknown number of indocumentados . ^ Considering
TABLE 5
Immigration by Selected Nationalities, 1948-1961
(Percentages)
Nationality 1948 1951 1955 1958 1 961
American 12.8 6.0 3.1 6.8
Argentine
.1
. 5 1.4 1.3 1.2
British 3.3 1.8 .5 1.3 .8
Colombi.in 4.9 4.2 1.3 7.6 12.8
Costa Rican 1.3 .4 .1 .3 .1
Cuban 4.0 .9 .2 2.6 13.2
Dutch 1.3 .5 .6 .9 .7
French 3.3 1.8 .3 .8 .3
German 1.0 2.7 1.9 1.4 1.7
Hungarian 1.4 .4 .1 .3 •k
Italian 27.5 35.5 34.3 16.2 18.3
Lebanese
.7 .1 1.5 1.0 1.6
Lithuanian 1.0 .1 * * *
Polish 5.4 .1 k * .3
Portuguese 4.4 5.5 12.2 9.0 9.0
Russian 1.3 .2 .2 *
Sirian * .1 .8 2.0 2.4
Spanish 16.0 33.4 37.2 41.3 26.1
Stateless 1.9 .5 * .4
Others 8.4 5.3 4.3 6.8 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: VENIMSTATS. The total number of foreigners registered in
each year is as follows: 1948 = 38,319; 1951 = 34,236; 1955 = 75,153;
1958 = 53,361; 1961 = 26,599.
^For example, only 41,613 Colombians were registered by 1961,
but 95,485 were counted in the 1961 census. See the text, table 19 .
The census also included 63.093 foreign children under the age of fif-
teen who would not have had cedulas .
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the data available and their limitations, it is safe to say that be-
tween 1948 and 1961, Venezuela received some 800,000 foreigners who
stayed or intended to stay a minimum of six months. This figure in-
cludes both unregistered children and illegal aliens.
The nationalities of the immigrants changed over time, in part
because of Venezuelan policy shifts, in part because of altered condi-
tions in the countries of emigration. In 1948 the immigration of ref-
ugees, while not numerically the most important, was the most striking.
Without counting the Cubans and Costa Ricans who emigrated because of
|)olitical problems in their respective countries, and without being able
to indicate precisely the number of Spaniards who were refugees, over
fifteen percent of the 1948 iimnigration consisted of refugees. (See
appendix B, table 38 for a complete listing of immigration by nationality
.iccording to the samples.) Poles, Russians, Rumanians, and Lithuanians
vyere the most numerous of these refugees. Some fled for religious
reasons or to escape communism. Others, due to population shifts
within the Third Reich and postwar boundary changes found themselves
stateless persons. Over fifty percent of the refugees admitted as
stateless persons were actually born in Poland, while other important
contingents were born in Germany or Rumania. According to one source,
some 17,300 refugees entered Venezuela between 1947 and 1951, aided by
the Intergovernmental Coimnlssion for Refugees or the International Ref-
ugee Organization which replaced it (see table 6). To this must be
added some 5,000 Spanish refugees, most of whom came aided by their
own organizations or the IRO. Others received aid from the Venezuelan
government, if only in the form of an immigrant visa. By 1951 refugee
87
immigration ceased to have any numerical importance. Some Hungarians
were admitted after the uprising in 1956, aided by the efforts of the
Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration (ICEM)
. By 1961 over
seven thousand Cubans had settled in Venezuela, most of whom opposed
the recently established Castro government."^
TABLE 6
Refugee Immigration to Venezuela, 1947-1951
Year 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 TOTAL
Number 2,800 9,000 1,500 2,700 1,300 17,300
Source: Anthony Bouscaren, International Migra tions since 1945
(New York, 1963), 14.
In 1948, the Italians were the leading contingent among the
Immigrants, followed by the Spanish and the Americans. The Colombians
and the Portuguese were a much smaller percentage of the total, yet
over time these five nationalities formed 78 percent of the total
samples, which compares well with the fact that these five groups formed
80 percent of the total foreign population according to the 1961 national
census. The Spanish increased their share of the immigration to almost
forty percent in 1955, overtaking the Italians. After 1955 Colombian
immigration began to increase significantly, while Italian immigration
3
For an excellent account of the emigration of the Spanish
refugees see Rubio, La emigracion de la guerra civil de 1936-1939 , 3
vols. For references to Venezuela, see vol. I, 193-196; vol. II, 468-
469 and 744. See also Vicente Llorens, La emigracion republicana , vol.
I of El exilio espanol de 1939
,
general ed. Jose Luis Abellan (Madrid,
1976), 186-189. For a general account of European refugee immigration in
Venezuela see Rosa Graciela Espinel, Estudio de los refugiados europeos
en Venezuela (Caracas, 1970).
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dropped by more than fifty percent. Portuguese i^agration climbed
sharply in 1955 and remained at a relatively high level. American
immigration declined from its high point in 1948, reaching its lowest
absolute level in 1961.
The policy initiated in 1954 which facilitated the issuance of
visas to Spaniards, Portuguese and Italians under the age of thirty-
five is responsible for the increase in Spanish and Portuguese immigra-
tion. Italian immigration declined despite the policy change because
of increased Italian migration within the boundaries of the European
Common Market countries and to Switzerland. The proximity of these
countries as well as the better benefits which they offered led to a
marked decline in Italian overseas migration.'^ Colombian immigration,
never specifically encouraged by the Venezuelan government, increased
significantly only after 1955. The date would seem to indicate that
the violencia was not a primary factor in provoking emigration as the
worst of it had already taken place. Thedeteriorating economy probably
played a more direct role in the movement of Colombians towards
Venezuela. Even the phenomenon of illegal migration, that is crossing
the border without the proper visa, does not appear to have become
important until 1957. Nearly two-thirds of the Colombians registered
in 1961 entered Venezuela without a visa, and of that number, over
seventy percent entered after 1957.
For an analysis of postwar Italian migration see Guiseppe
Lucrezio Monticelli, "Italian Emigration: Basic Characteristics and
Trends with Special Reference to the Last Twenty Years," International
Mi gration Review
,
I, N.S. (Summer 1967), 10-24. The entire issue is
devoted to the Italian emigration experience.
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TABLE 7
Year of Entry of Colombian Tndocumentados Registered
in the 1961 Sampli^^
Year of Entry 1940-47 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Number 5 3 2 3 0 3 3 2
~2
Year of Entry 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 TOTAL
Number 4 7 22 13 10 80
Source: VENIMSTATS.
The extension of the new visa policy to those seeking visas
from the consulate in Beirut led to increased Syrian and Lebanese Immi-
gration. The fall of Peron in Argentina and his subsequent stay in
Venezuela may well be the cause of the Argentine immigration which be-
came noticeable in 1955. Cuban immigration increased substantially
with the overthrow of the Batista regime and Castro's subsequent adher-
ence to communism. It should be noted that one-half of those bearing
British or Dutch passports in 1948 were not born in Great Britain or
Holland but rather in one of their Caribbean colonies. In 1958 the
same was true of one-half of the persons bearing British or French
passports
.
Regional data collected and processed for the Spaniards, Portu-
guese and Italians indicate that significant contingents of immigrants
came from specific areas of these three countries. Slightly more than
one-third of the total Spanish immigration was from the Canary Islands,
followed closely by Immigrants from the provinces of Galicia. One-
third of the Portuguese immigrants were from the island of Madeira.
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TABLE 8
Selected Regional Data for Spaniards, Portugu
and Italians
ese
Canary Islands
Total: Spain
Madeira
Total: Portugal
Selected Italian Provinces
Agrigento
Palermo
Siracusa
Bari
Potenza
Salerno
Ave 1 lino
Naples
Caserta
Campobasso
Fros inone
L' Aquila
Rome
Teramo
Milano
Udine
Total
Total: Italy
1 Q A O 1951 1955 1958 1961 TOTAL
42 186 85 125 105
160 334 372 413 261^ U X
10 24 25 29 44
44 55 122 90 90 Am
3 0 7 5 11 26
4 5 6 3 10 28
9 15 3 3 6 36
13 32 26 17 20 108
10 11 17 8 3 49
15 24 35 4 13 91
1 14 28 6 11 60
10 1 5 2 5 23
2 5 10 3 0 20
7 9 26 1 8 51
6 8 10 4 2 30
21 39 16 3 6 85
14 10 5 7 5 41
5 12 14 7 9 47
10 8 3 3 3 27
8 22 13 7 3 53
138 215 224 83 115 lib
275 355 343 162 183 1318
Source: VENIMSTATS,
Almost sixty percent of the Italians came from the provinces listed in
table 8, with the largest number coming from Bari, a southern province
on the Adriatic coast. Not quite sixty percent came from central Italy,
particularly the province of L' Aquila, just north of Rome; the remain-
der came from the north, with a large concentration from the province
of Udine, near the border with Austria and Yugoslavia.
Among the immigrants, men outnumbered women by a factor of
three to one in the first three sample years, but because of the change
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in policy in 1958 which lin.ited immigration to immediate family members,
the proportion changed dramatically by 1961, when six women registered
for every four men. The age of the immigrants at entry shows a constant
decline from 1948 through 1958. In 1961, however, in the cohort over
fifty there was a significant increase which reflected the arrival of
either the wives or the parents of the men who had previously migrated.
The increase in the cohort 0 to 16 is only partially a reflection of the
new policy; a number of children who had arrived earlier finally reached
an age to require a cedula in 1961. More than half of the children
registered in 1961 had arrived prior to 1960 (see appendix B, tables
39 and 40).
The civil status of the immigrants also changed over time. Im-
mediately after the War, the number of married immigrants was the highest,
although married men outnumbered married women by a factor of two to one.
Single immigrants reached their apogee in 1955 when men under the age of
thirty-five could easily obtain visas. The change back toward more
married immigrants which the 1961 sample shows is due to the family re-
union policy which facilitated the arrival of wives and parents. It
should be noted that married women outnumber married men in that year by
a factor of two to one. Many of the single immigrants registered were
the children of immigrants rather than persons who had made autonomous
decisions to migrate (see appendix B, table 3'))-
At the time of entry, between fifty and seventy percent of the
immigrants had no children. Of those who had children, about seventy
percent had only one or two. An exception was found in sample year
1961 when the percentage dropped to less than sixty. The greater number
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of children per immigrant in that year was probably due to the belated
arrival of wives whose husbands had emigrated years before but who had
gone back to visit on one or more occasions before the wives emigrated.
Thus the husbands would have had fewer children when they entered than
their wives had at a later date.
The assumption that fathers (or single men who subsequently
married women from the old country) made one or more visits to their
native countries before the arrival of their wives is substantiated by
the number of trips made outside of Venezuela by the immigrants. Of
those who arrived between 1948 and 1958 and who stayed on in Venezuela,
some sixty percent made one or more such trips (see appendix B, table
4X).
As could be expected in a Catholic country whose immigrants came
primarily from other Catholic countries, over eighty percent of the
immigrants professed themselves Catholics. In 1948 this percentage was
the lowest, principally because of the relative importance of American
immigration, which tended to be Protestant, in that year. Orthodox
immigration was primarily Russian. Jewish Immigration is undoubtedly
under-represented, either because Jews declared no religious affiliation
or passed themselves off as Catholics. As was noted in the chapter on
immigration policy, consuls could not directly authorize visas for Jews,
but it is doubtful that Jewish immigrants knew that. They may simply
have felt it politic or expedient not to declare their Jewish faith, 5
See Elkin, "History of the Jews of Latin America," 77-80. In an
interview, one Jewish immigrant who had been in a displaced persons camp
explained that he gave his religion as Catholic because he thought it
would be more acceptable to officials of a Catholic country. He was not
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The increase in Moslem immigration was related to the increased number
of Sirians and Lebanese, despite the fact that the consul in Beirut was
advised to give visas to Christians.
TABLE 9
Religious Affiliation of the Immigrants, 1948-1961
(Percentage)
RELIGION 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961
Catholic 80.5 90. 7 95.4 88.7 90.2
Protestant 15.1 7.5 3.2 7.8 5.7
Orthodox 3.2 .4 .6 1.0 1.1
Jewish
.3 .2 .1 .5 1.3
Confucian
.2 * *
.2 *
Moslem
.2 *
.2 .9 .5
Maronite *
.2 *
.4 .2
Buddhist * *
.2 .1 .2
None
.5 1.0 .3 .4 .8
Source: VENIMSTATS.
Although by 1954 attempts to select immigrants on a basis of
occupational preferences were supplanted by criteria of age and nation-
ality, in general the same occupations prevailed throughout the period.
Of the 3,425 immigrants in the samples who were not listed as family
members, twenty percent identified themselves as farmers or farm workers,
Another twenty percent were masons, carpenters, or unskilled workers
who mostly found employment in the construction industry. Slightly over
ten percent were in commerce, identifying themselves as either merchants
aware that Jews generally were not given visas. Immigrant interview,
Caracas, March 23, 1976.
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or employees. See eight percent were general mechanics (see appendix
B. table 42 for specific information on occupations).
TABLE 10
Selected Declared Occupations, 1948-1961
(Percentages)
Declared Occupation 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961
Agriculture
Construction
Commerce
Mechanic
8.5
12.5
8.5
10.1
19.4
19.2
7.2
6.3
16.8
24.7
5.7
4.8
19.0
10.6
8.1
4.7
5.1
3.0
8.4
2.4
Family Members 19.4 22.2 21.2 33.4 61.3
Others 41.0 25.7 26.8 26.2 19.8
Source: VENIMSTATS.
As can be seen from Table 10, significant shifts took place in
the percentage of immigrants within a particular occupational activity.
Both agriculture and construction-related activities increased and then
declined substantially during the period. It is worth noting that al-
though there certainly were cases of fraud, particularly in agriculture,
when visas were available on a basis of occupational needs in Venezuela,
the percentages for 1955 and 1958 indicate that when visas were not based
on occupation, farmers were still a significant part of the total immi-
gration. That the immigrants did not go into agriculture in the same
proportion once in Venezuela was not necessarily due to their having
Although the specific occupation "commercial employee" was oc-
casionally given, all employees have been processed as commercial em-
ployees because census data indicate that most foreign employees worked
in commerce rather than offices.
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lied about their occupation, but rather to other circumstances which
wiil be discussed in the following chapter.
The percentage of mechanics declined througliout the period,
which is possibly due to increased opportunities for mechanics within
their native countries or in the Coiimion Market countries once their
economies began to recuperate from the ravages of the war. Commerce-
related activities declined slightly from 1948 to 1955, but by 1958 the
process had been reversed. Evidently the commercial sector was less
directly affected by the para.l yzation of construction activities in
1958 and the recession which afflicted the Venezuelan economy in the
early years of the 1960s.
It is interesting to compare the declared occupation of the
immigrants with the distribution of the foreign population in the work
force according to the 1961 census. On a national scale foreigners and
naturalized Venezuelans comprised 14.4 percent of the economically ac-
tive population, or one out of every seven workers. But, as table 11
;
indicates, foreigners were not distributed equally within the work force,
whether taken as a whole or treating only the foreign component.
Of the three occupational areas which can be most directly com-
pared in tables 10 and 11, there is an obvious decline in the percent
dedicated to agriculture and construction and a striking increase in the
percent dedicated to commercial activities. If the percentages in table
10 are adjusted to the economically active total for each year (that is,
subtracting the number of family members from the total and averaging the
percent solely on the basis of economically active immigrants instead of
on the total in the sample) the differences are even more pronounced in
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agriculture and construction, although less so with reference to com-
merce
.
TABLE 11
Foreign Born Participation in the Work Force: 1961 Census
Economic Activity Total Tor^l 7 Pr.v-oTo,. «/J i tar i'oreign a of Foreigners
Econ. Active Foreign of Total Economically
Active
Agriculture, etc. 759,785 39,617 5.2 11.7
Petroleum & Mining,
etc
.
53,540 7,300 13.6 2.1
Artisan & Manu-
facturing, etc.
287,344 77,367 26.9 22 8
Construction, etc. 131,001 35,378 27.0 10.4
Electricity, Gas 6.
Water
23,326 2,341 10.0 .7
Commerce & Finance,
etc
.
297,458 72,465 24.3 21.3
Transport & Com-
munications, etc.
117,648 16,629 14.1 4.9
Services (Public
& Private)
548,298 77,201 14.1 22.7
Not Specified 132,891 10,449 7.9 3.1
Looking for Work
for the First Time
21,140 850 4.0 .3
Source: Noveno censo general de poblacion: Resumen general de la
Republica, Parte A (Caracas, 1966), 214-216.
If the Venezuelan government was indeed trying to up-grade the
labor force by means of Immigration, it would seem, given the predomi-
nance of certain occupations, that they had not accomplished their goal.
Yet, as was previously noted, the impact of immigration depends in great
part on the receiving society. Although most immigrants were not skilled
97
workers, they did on the average have .ore years of for.al schooling
than the Venezuelans. In addition, foreigners had the reputation of
being responsible, hard workers. To quote one co:nmentator : "Foreigners
know their labor and Venezuelans know their labor law" (i.e., their
rights and privileges).^ According to Kritz's analysis of the 1961
census education statistics, the foreigners had an average of six years
of schooling while the Venezuelans had only four. Perhaps more impor-
tant, while seventeen percent of the immigrants had some intermediate or
higher education, only six percent of the Venezuelans did. Although
thirty percent of the foreign population was illiterate, fifty percent
of the Venezuelans were.
TABLE 12
Educational Attainment of the Population over
Ten Years of Age: 1961 Census
Education Venezuelan non-migrant Venezuelan migrant Foreign
Average number of Male
:
3.,6 Male
:
4,,9 Male
:
6,,1
years of education Female
:
3,,6 Female
:
4,.3 Female
;
: 5.,5
Proportion of the Male 3,,5% Male 10.,4% Male 18,,8%
population with some Female 2.,8% Female 6..1% Female
:
:14,.7%
intermediate or
higher education
Proportion Male
:
53. 9% Male
:
39. 5% Male 28.,8%
illiterate Female
:
57. 3% Female 47. 7% Female
:
;31.,8%
Source: Mary Kritz, "Immigration and Social Structure: The Venezuelan
Case" (Ph.D. dissertation, Wisconsin, 1972), 107, 113, 116.
El Universal
,
June 17, 1950. The article was written by Jose
Gonzalez Gonzalez.
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Leaving aside individual talents and abilities which the immi-
grants might have had, the relative advantage which the foreign popula-
tion had in educational preparation is clearly demonstrated in their
distribution in the work force by type of position held (see table 13).
The most striking example is in the category of executives and managers,
where foreigners comprised fifty percent of the total on a national
basis. They formed only twenty percent of the professionals, but that
category includes a large number of teachers, most of whom had no more
than a high school education. Foreigners were proportionately active
in teaching only at the university level, where in the year 1960-1961
they formed 13.8 percent of the total number of university professors.^
Foreigners were also over-represented in commercial activities
as well as the category of artisanal or manufacturing activities when
compared to their total participation in the work force on a national
level. The increase in commercial activities has already been commented
on and the reasons for It will be discussed in the following chapter.
The high incidence in the artisanal and manufacturing category is due
to the inclusion of tailors, seamstresses and construction workers in
that category.
The distribution of the foreign population is somewhat different
when compared only to the foreign work force rather than the national
one. The differences clearly indicate the relatively small size of some
groups within Venezuela, such as executives and managers, and to a less-
er extent, professionals, clerical workers, petroleum and mining workers,
Anuario estadistico, 1957-1963, II, 1237,
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and transportation workers. In a contrary case, the difference In the
percentage involved in agricultural labors clearly reflects the enormous
number (over seven hundred thousand) of Venezuelans working In that
sector
TABLE 13
Foreign Participation as a Percentage of the Total WorkForce and of tlie Total Foreign Work Force, 1961 Census
^ Foreign of Total % of Total Foreign Work
Force
Professional 19.3 7.2
Management 50.2 4.9
Clerical 13.7 6.3
Sales 25.2 17.0
Agricultural workers 5.2 11. 7
Mining & Petroleum workers 6.4
.3
Transportation workers 13.1 5.8
Artisans & Factory workers 23.9 27.4
Other Artisans & Factory
workers 16.6 3.5
Services 17.6 13.7
Not specified 4.9 1.8
Looking for work for the
1st time 4.0
.3
Source: Data derived from
Resumen general de la Republica
! Noveno censo general de la poblacion:
,
Parte A (Caracas, 1966), 184-186.
No published statistics indicate the nationality of the foreigners
in the work force by specific country. The data provided by the samples
must be used with caution since it is based on the immigrant's declared
occupation at entry and an unknown percentage subsequently changed occu-
pations. Still, the percentage of one nationality is so high at times
that even subsequent changes should not have affected that nationality's
predominance. In other cases, the occupation is almost equally shared
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by two natonality groups. Spaniards and Italians tend to predominate
because they predominate as a whole in the total imxnigration. Italians
were particularly prevalent as barbers, butchers, shoemakers, tailors,
masons and unskilled laborers. The Spaniards were important in agri-
culture, and as bakers, chauffeurs, cooks, draftsmen, seamstresses and
servants. The Portuguese were numerically important in agriculture but
in other occupations were significantly outnumbered by other nationality
groups (see appendix B. table 43 for a more complete listing).
According to the samples, there is very little difference be-
tween the Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese in terms of their major
activities except that the Portuguese are merchants rather than mechan-
ics. The six leading activities account for 67 percent of the Italian
and Spanish activity and slightly over eighty percent of the Portuguese.
The statistics would seem to indicate that the Portuguese economy was
not as differentiated as the Italian or Spanish if one can assume that
emigration from all three countries was similar. A surprising statistic
in view of the criticisms made of the agrarian aspect of immigration,
especially in the 1950s, is the relatively high permanency rate among
agricultural workers. The rate is undoubtedly influenced by the fact
that the Portuguese tend to stay in Venezuela no matter what their
occupation, as do Colombians. It may also be related to a successful
change in occupation which allowed the person to stay on, but whether
the success was due to the flexibility of farm workers in adjusting to
a not very differentiated work force in the urban areas or whether it
was due to the farm worker actually having another occupation at the time
of entry is not known. The high permanency rate for housewives is due.
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TABLE 14
The Six Leading Occupations and Permanency by Selected Nationalities
Occ upation
ALL NATIONALITIES
(Total: 4669; 51.8% stayed)
Total Number
Agriculture
Housewife
Mason
Mechanic
Merchant
Unskilled labore
r
628
1204
206
269
215
266
_% of To tal
13.5
25.8
4.4
5.8
4.6
5.7
Occupation
Accountant
Engineer
Housewife
Office worker
Solderer
Superviso r
AMERICAN
(Total: 319; 7.2% stayed)
Total Number % of Total
8
39
87
9
16
9
2,
12,
27,
2.
5.
% Stayed
62,
53.
47.
53.
50.
43.
% Stayed
0
8.7
9.2
44.4
0
COLOMBIAN
(Total: 257; 78.6% stayed)
Occupation Total Number % of Total % Stayed
Agriculture 26 10.1 84.6
Employee (inc. com.) 14 5.4 78.6
Housewife 71 27.6 78.9
Mechanic 12 4.7 75.0
Merchant 19 7.4 52.6
Servant 26 10.1 96.2
ITALIAN
(Total: 1238; 43.9% stayed)
Occupation Total Number % of Total % Stayed
Agriculture 101 8.2 42.6
Carpenter 69 5.6 44.9
Housewife 272 22.0 52.9
Mason 114 9.2 36.8
Mechanic 114 9.2 44.7
Unskilled laborer 170 13. 7 34.7
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TABLE 14 (continued)
PORTUGUESE
(Total: 381; 76.9% stayed)
Occupation Total Number % of Total
Agriculture
Carpenter
Housewife
Mason
Merchant
Unskilled laborer
156
34
71
13
14
22
40.9
8.9
18.6
3.4
3.7
5.8
Occupation
Agriculture 300
Carpenter 67
Housewife 407
Mason 69
Mechanic 84
Unskilled laborer 57_
Source: VENIMSTATS.
SPANISH
(Total: 1464; 61.3% stayed)
Total Number % of Total
20.5
4.6
27.8
4.7
5.7
3.9
% Stayed
80.1
55.9
78.9
69.2
71.4
72.7
% Stayed
58.0
52.2
63.4
59.4
64.3
50.9
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of course, to the fact that so .any of then, ca.e after their husbands
had established themselves In Venezuela. U Is Interesting to note that
'housewife- is the only activity which Americans shared wlti. the other
nationalities in this comparison. There is a definite tendency for
A:nericans to have high prestige occupations. It is also interesting
that the six leading occupations only explain some fifty percent of the
American total, compared with the eighty percent which they explain for
the Portuguese. The Colombians are strongest in the two areas for which
they are noted in Venezuela-agriculture and domestic service. Surpris-
ing is their participation in commercial activities and especially as
merchants. Colombians have a very strong tendency to stay in Venezuela
and it is interesting to note that there is such a difference between
their general average (78.6%) and their average as merchants (52.6%).
Besides their striking level of participation in a few economic
activities, the iiranigrants were also geographically concentrated. While
fourteen percent of the national labor force was foreign in 1961, the
figure rose to thirty percent in the Federal District. In industrial
and commercial activities foreigners formed forty percent of the work
force there and in construction nearly one of every two workers was a
foreigner. The sector least dominated by foreigners was that of elec-
tricity, gas and water. As can be seen in table 15, three sectors pro-
vided employment for seventy-five percent of the foreign work force:
manufacturing and industry, which was heavily dominated by textile
workers who were in fact tailors or seamstresses; commerce and finance;
and services. Interestingly, there is almost no correlation between the
foreigners' distribution in the Federal District work force and the
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percentage of foreigners dedicated to a particular area o£ activity
Within the foreign „„rR force a. a whole. The closest correlation is
in the area of services.
TABLE 15
Foreign Born Work Force of the Federal District: 1961 Census
Economic Activity Number Foreign Total Number % Foreign % of For-
Born in Sector in Sector Born eign Work
Force
Agriculture, etc. 2,717
Petroleum & Mining 758
Manufacturing & Industry 37,007
Construction 14,717
Electricity, Gas 6, Water 1,115
Commerce & Finance 35,789
Transportation & Commun. 9,107
Services 35,527
Not specified 5,043
Looking for work for the 414
first time
TOTAL 142,194
9,843
3,677
88,304
30,835
10,156
87,173
35,852
179,709
28,895
5,012
479,456
27.6
20.6
41.9
47.7
10.9
41.1
24.4
19.8
17.5
8.3
1.9
0.5
26.0
10.3
.8
25.2
6.4
25.0
3.5
0.3
^o^'^ce: Noveno censo general de poblacion: Resumen general de la
Repub]ica Parte A (Caracas, 1966), 214-216.
The incidence of foreigners in the work force of the Federal
District was the most striking but even in other areas of the country
certain types of activities attracted a disproportionate number of
foreigners. The five areas listed in table 16 include almost eighty
percent of the foreigners working in Venezuela in 1961. The Federal
District and Miranda basically reflect employment possibilities offered
by tlie capital city of Caracas. The official metropolitan area of
Caracas includes several districts in the state of Miranda which are
integral parts of the city. The state of Carabobo became the site of
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industrial activities stimulated by the Betancourt government after 1959
Zulia is an important petroleum and agricultural center. Zulia and the
state of Tachira. both located on the border with Colombia, are centers
of Colombian migration.
As can be seen from the table, foreigners predominated particu-
larly in the occupational grouping of executives and managers, although
the percentage declined significantly in the western states. In fact.
TABLE 16
Foreign Participation by Occupational Grouping in Selected
Areas: 1961 Census
(Percentage)
Occupational Grouping Federal District Miranda Carabobo Zulia Tachira
Professional, etc. 23. 4 37. 9 16.2 21.3 14. 7
Executives, managers, etc 65. 6 63. 6 47.2 39.3 26. 8
Office workers, etc. 16. 4 30. 5 9.0 10.2 8. 7
Salesmen, etc. 48. 4 45. 3 23.4 13.7 17. 6
Agricultural workers, etc, 25. 8 8. 5 4.2 15.3 18. 6
Miners, etc. 35. 3 38. 1 24.4 2.2 11. 2
Transportation workers, etc. 25. 4 29. 9 10.1 5.0 10. 7
Artisans 37. 5 37. 1 22.4 18.9 26. 2
Other artisans 30. 7 29. 3 11.2 11.5 28. 5
Services 26. 8 35. 2 12.1 19.3 26. 2
Source: Noveno censo general de poblacion: Resumen general de la
the proportion of foreigners in the work force declined in every case as
one moves away from the capital district. The only exceptions were in
artisanal and service activities in the state of Tachira, and agricultur-
al and service activities in Zulia. The majority of foreigners in these
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occupations were most probably Colombians. Statistics from the 1961
Agricultural Census indicate that in Tachira over ninety percent of the
farms in foreign hands belonged to Colombians as did almost seventy per-
9
cent m Zulia. The high incidence of foreigners in agriculture in the
Federal District was due to the existence of truck farms to provide
vegetables for the Caracas market. Since much of Miranda was rural out-
side of the metropolitan Caracas area, the percentage of foreigners was
much smaller due to the greater number of Venezuelans engaged in sub-
sistence farming. The relatively large presence of Venezuelans in the
actual field production of petroleum is the reason that foreigners were
a minimal percentage of that category in Zulia, whereas office activities
related to the administrative center in the Caracas metropolitan area
explain the higher percentage of foreigners there. Service occupations,
which include barbers, hairdressers, waiters, cooks, doormen, janitors,
and servants, among others, were more dominated by foreigners in Miranda
than in any other area. The situation probably reflected the fact that
the eastward expansion of Caracas (into the state of Miranda) has been
characterized by more affluent neighborhoods where those engaged in
service activities have more employment opportunities at higher wages.
Although one might debate which came first, the decision to set-
tle in a particular area or the availability of employment, there can be
no doubt that the massive arrivals of immigrants in the ports of the
Federal District led to an initially high concentration of foreigners
^Ministerio de Fomento, Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos
Nacionales, III Censo agropecuario , 1961: Resumen general de la Republica,
Parte B (Caracas, 1967), 29-52.
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there. A lack of information on cnploy.ent possibilities elsewhere and/
or a lack of funds for further transportation n>ust have added to the
tendency to stay in the capital district. The fact that this area was
the conm,ercial center of the country and that government revenues ear-
marked for public works were spent primarily in Caracas meant that the
area was also the prime center of employment in the country (see appendix
B, table45for arrivals by port of entry). With time, however, the
immigrants dispersed slightly.
TABLE 17
First Location in Venezuela Compared with 1961 Census Results
(Percentage)
Area 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 1961 Census
Federal District 54.0 68.9 78.2 68.9 61.7 55.1
& Miranda
Anzoategui 3.0 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.6
Aragua
.8 4.1 2.8 2.7 5.0 4.0
Carabobo 23.2 6.1 3.5 2.7 6.0 4.7
Falcon 3.4 .4 1.3 1.2 .9 1.5
Lara
.5 2.9 .9 1.5 2.1 2.4
Tachira 1.1 .9 .8 3.2 3.6 8.3
Zulia 10.8 7.5 4.3 11.5 10.7 10.9
Total 96.8 92.5 93.8 94.0 92.4 89.5
Source: VENIMSTATS and Noveno censo, Resumen general de la Republica,
Parte A (Caracas, 1966), 52-53.
As previously noted, Americans, Colombians, Italians, Portuguese,
and Spaniards comprised eighty percent of the foreign population in
Venezuela in 1961. Thus, their geographical distribution should explain
the major patterns of immigrant settlement. Americans and Colombians
show the most distinct patterns, the former closely associated with areas
of petroleum activity and the latter with agricultural and domestic ser-
108
vice activities. The American presence was particularly noticeable
the Caracas metropolitan area due to the centralization of administra-
tive activities there and also in the petroleum producing areas of
Anzoategui and Zulia. Colombians formed eighty-eight percent of the
foreign population of Tachira and forty-six percent of Zulia's. A
third significant concentration of Colombians lived in the Caracas area.
About sixty percent were women and they undoubtedly worked as domestic
servants. Three-fourths of the Spaniards and Portuguese lived in the
Federal District or Miranda. The Italians were the most dispersed, al-
though some fifty percent lived in the capital area. All three nation-
alities had relatively important aggrupations in Anzoategui, Aragua,
Carabobo, Lara, and Zulia. The state of Bolivar, the heart of the
Guyana region, appears to have been the only area of significant re-
migration by 1961. Not an initial area of important immigrant settle-
ment according to the samples, by 1961 over 9,000 foreigners lived there
and it was an important secondary area of Italian settlement (see appen-
dix A, table 31 for specific information).
When the Venezuelan government began promoting immigration in
1936, it was with the expectation that the immigrants would settle per-
manently in Venezuela. Besides the need for specific skills, Venezuela
at that time felt the need to increase the size of her small population.
Despite rapid growth of the autochthonous population by the 1950s, which
obviated in great part the need for immigration to expand the population,
the success of the program was often judged by the immigrant's decision
to stay in Venezuela, preferably as a naturalized citizen. Such a de-
cision is based on many factors of a personal, economic, or political
109
nature and these factors will be discussed in the following chapter.
The data available which refer to permanency are analyzed below.
In general terms, the immigrants showed an increasing tendency
to stay in Venezuela, but. according to the sample data, the tendency
cannot be described as very strong. It should be kept in mind that
permanency was measured through the year 1975.
TABLE 18
Permanency in Venezuela: Samples 1948-1961 (Percentage)
Permanency 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961
Stayed 41.7 41.8 50.4 51.4 57.6
Left 54.9 52.8 44.7 41.5 32.1
Died in Venezuela
.6
. 7 0.0 0.0 .2
Unknown 2.8 4.7 4.9 7.1 10.1
Source: VENIMSTATS.
Concentrating on the five predominant nationalities, it is ob-
vious that the Americans are least likely to stay, followed by the
Italians and then the Spanish. Colombians and Portuguese are the least
likely to leave and all groups, except the Americans, show an increased
tendency to stay after the institution of the family reunification poli-
cy in 1958 (see appendix B, table 46). A comparison of this sample data,
valid through 1975, with the registration tabulations of the Extranjeria
for 1961 and the 1961 census figures shows interesting similarities and
divergences
.
The Portuguese maintained the most stable presence in Venezuela
from 1961 to 1975. The fact that there is little difference between the
census and sample permanency rates indicates that few Portuguese children
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TABLE 19
Comparison of Permanency Rates: 1961 and 1975*
Nationality Registered 1961 Censu77967
American 54,126 12,820 23.7
(1975)
6.7
Colombian 41,613 95,485 229.5 65.6
Italian 186,373 120,838 64.8 41.3
Portuguese 53,462 41,934 78.4 73.1
Spanish 203,722 165,739 81.4 58.2
Aorll 21 c V: --t,^^^^ ^^'^ yuuxxanea m Hi Macional.p i 23, 1962. See appendix A, table 30 for census figuTisT^ThTIensusof course, includes persons who do not have cedulas.
Venezuela ?n975'dyj'f^'k °" ^E^^umber known to be inm 1975 divided by the total number of that nationality countedm the various samples. Since the whereabouts of as much as 10% o^thesample (see table 18) is unknown, the percentages are undoubtedly unde^!estimated, particularly for Colombians.
were in Venezuela. The abnormal permanency rate of the Colombians is.
as was previously explained, the result of having been able to count a
number of Colombians in the census who were not registered in the Extran-
jeria. Wiile some of them were undoubtedly children, the others must
have been indocumentados
. The decline in the presence of Americans is
natural given their reasons for being in Venezuela. At least one-third
of those who stayed were housewives and probably married to Venezuelans.
The decline in the numbers of Italians, and to a somewhat lesser extent,
the decline of Spaniards, was most likely due to the unsettled economic
situation of Venezuela from 1958 to about 1963 and to Increased possi-
bilities of migration within Europe. It should be made clear that the
comparison of registration figures and census results is somewhat un-
reliable since the persons concerned are not necessarily the same, as
Ill
the census includes children. The ^nmnif. to rr. uinc sa ple is much more precise as it
refers to the same person followed over time.
Women showed a slightly greater tendency to stay in Venezuela
than men did, with the exception of those who registered in 1958. One
reason for this tendency is that most women were not autonomous immi-
grants-they migrated because the father or husband had already migrated
and subsequently called for them. Since there is such a distortion in
the ratio between married men and married women in the samples, it is
obvious that most married men came without their families. Interesting-
ly, the permanency rate for married immigrants is much lower than that
for single persons, although it increases over time. This datum indi-
cates that well over half of the married men did not settle permanently,
it was not until 1961, when married women outnumbered married men by a
factor of three to one, that the permanency rate for married immigrants
approached sixty percent. Before that date, if married men decided to
return home, the decision affected only the male permanency rate because
the family most likely had not yet emigrated. Colombian immigration was
the exception to this general rule as the distribution of men and women,
single or married, was practically the same in the samples. Such a dis-
tribution indicates that many Colombian women made autonomous decisions
to migrate and they settled permanently. It should also be noted that
although Italian women showed a greater tendency to stay than did Italian
men, it was well below the average for Colombian, Portuguese and Spanish
women, and even below the average for women as a whole (see appendix B,
tables 47-51).
In terms of age, children under 17 had the highest tendency to
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stay in Venezuela, again reflecting the fact that .any carried
.en did
not bring their families to Venezuela until they had firmly established
themselves. Of the two major age cohorts, the younger one (17-26) had
a distinctly higher tendency to stay. Even so, Italians in that age
bracket were much less likely to remain than Colombians, Portuguese or
Spaniards. The cohort over fifty years of age showed the least tendency
to stay, which was probably due to the increased difficulty of older per-
sons to adjust to a new and foreign environment (see appendix B, tables
52 and 53).
The ability to earn a better living is a fundamental factor in
the decision to settle permanently when immigration occurs for economic
reasons. Among the occupations with sufficiently numerous practitioners
to make a valid judgment, none seems to have offered outstanding possi-
bilities. Agricultural activities demonstrated the highest permanency
rate, but it was only 62.7 percent. Considering that the general per-
manency rate was 51.8 percent, the difference is not outstanding.
Housewives and mechanics were slightly above the average and merchants
and carpenters slightly below. Those least likely to stay were unskilled
laborers (43.2%) and engineers (20.7%). When occupations are analyzed
by nationality, however, it becomes apparent that the permanency rate was
often affected by the dominance of a particular nationality. Over forty
percent of the engineers were Araericais, whose permanency rate was negli-
gible; in fact, only two of the thirty-nine American engineers in the
sample stayed. Although 43.2 percent of the unskilled laborers stayed,
the lowest rate of any of the major occupations, 170 of the 266 laborers
were Italians and only 34.7 percent of them stayed. Among the masons.
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over fifty percent were Italians and only 36.8 percent remained in
Venezuela. Thus, because of Italian dominance, the average for the
occupation as a whole was brought down. Even the permanency rate for
agricultural workers (62.7%) was significantly lower for the Italians-
only 42.6 percent stayed. Only one occupation was not affected in a
consistant manner by the presence of a particular nationality. Colom-
bians have a strong tendency to stay in Venezuela, but not when they
are merchants. Their average there is the same as the general average
for merchants. Portuguese merchants, however, share the same strong
tendency to stay that the Portuguese demonstrate in general (see table
14 and appendix B, table 55).
In terms of occupation, even when analyzed by nationality, the
occupations associated with construction activities—carpenters
,
masons,
and unskilled laborers—all demonstrated a lower permanency rate.
This would indicate that construction activities were the least stable
source of employment for the immigrants, or, the immigrants involved in
them were those least able to adapt themselves to hard times and other
employment possibilities. Construction activity is perhaps the most
volatile indicator of general economic conditions. It is the first to
show growth and the first to slow down. As previously mentioned, when
Perez Jimenez was overthrown in 1958, the construction industry was
paralyzed. By early 1961, unemployment in that sector had reached al-
most forty percent and undoubtedly would have been even higher if so
many foreigners had not left the country when they lost their jobs 10
"""^In the 1961 census 131,001 persons listed construction as their
economic activity, but only 81,565 were actually employed. See Noveno
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As indicated above, the deciqinn ^M kLu s o to become naturalized was also
important in judging the success of the inimiPr^ nn i-Lu mmig atio policy. As measured
against total l^igratlon, the rate uas quite low. reaching only 23.7
percent in the 19.8 sample. However, a .ore accurate view of the rate
of naturalization Is obtained by analyzing only the permanent In^lgrant
population.
TABLE 20
Naturalization Rates by Sex and Year of Sample
'eT^ Total -l"'- y^'""' ^^^^-^^ ^^-t. oflear i Immie. Perm. Tmrm-o p^»-^
les
1948 23.7 56.8 57.2 55.9
1951 18.6 44.5 47.6 36.0
1955 17.2 34.1 37.5 25.2
1958 17.4 33.9 41.8 19.6
1961 16.7 29.0 41.6 20.6
Source: VENIMSTATS. Naturalization rates are measured from date of
entry through 1975.
As can be seen, when analyzing only the permanent immigration,
the naturalization rates are doubled, but even so, at their highest,
they do not reach sixty percent. That figure pertains to the 1948 sample
in which refugee immigration was the most important. Although men and
women became naturalized in almost equal proportions in the 1948 sample,
the picture changed radically in the later sample years. In the 1958
and 1961 samples, the percentage of men who became Venezuelan citizens
was twice that of the women. On the whole, only a third or less of the
Censo de la Poblacion, Resumen general de la Republica, Partes B y C
(Caracas, 1967), 560-566.
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permanent immigrants changed their nationality.
TABLE 21
Naturalization Rate by Selected Nationalities
Nationality Total in Samples Total Perm. Total Nat. % of Total
^—
.
Perm.
Colombian 308 202 43 21.3
Italian 1,318 544 137 25.2
Portuguese 401 293 70 23.9
Spanish 1,540 897 350 39.0
Source: VENIMSTATS.
With regard to original nationality, the Spanish were most likely
to change their nationality and the Colombians least likely. Since both
groups benefited from legislation which facilitated naturalization for
native speakers of Spanish and neither lost citizenship in the country
of birth, the lower rate for the Colombians may possibly be explained
by a predominance of a migrant rather than immigrant mentality among
them. That is, even though the Colombians had a higher rate of per-
manency than the Spaniards, the movement across the land border could be
viewed in much the same way as movement across a political boundary with-
in Colombia. It is also probable that the legal pressures which other
foreigners experienced as a result of a change in the labor law in 1973
11
did not affect Colombians to the same extent (see appendix A, table
Article 18 of the 1936 Labor Law limited foreign employment to
25 percent of the work force in a particular establishment. Decreto No.
1.563 (December 31, 1973) expanded that limitation to 25 percent of the
total salaries could be paid to foriegners. The directive did not affect
domestic or agricultural workers, and therefore did not affect Colombians
as much as it did other foreigners, who were pressured by their employers
to change their nationality so that the firms could comply with the decree.
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37 for naturalizations, 1940-1979).
TABLE 22
Naturalization Rate by Permanency and Selected Occupation.
Occupation Total Permanent Total Naturalized % Nat. of Total
"
~
^ ———
— Perm.
Agriculture 394
Housewife 549
131 33.2
155 23.9
Mason 97 3^
Mechanic I43 79
Commerce I74
-^oi 5g_Q
Unskilled laborer 115 27 23 5
Source: VENIMSTATS.
Among the numerically most important occupations declared upon
entering Venezuela, the highest naturalization rates are found among
mechanics and those active in commerce. Of the occupations listed in
the table, these are the two most likely to have been affected by the
1973 change in the labor law.
Interestingly, there is not a complete correlation between
naturalization and permanency. In the 1955 sample, nearly twenty per-
cent of those who became Venezuelan citizens subsequently left the
country and never returned. Indeed, slightly more than ten percent of
all naturalized citizens did not stay in Venezuela. Among the four na-
tionalities discussed, the Spanish were the most likely to leave, followed
by the Italians.
CHAPTER VI
IMMIGRATION GOALS AND REALITY: THE INITIAL CONSEQUENCES
Proponents of immigration assumed that the newcomers would in-
crease the population, expand the consumer market, provide new skills
and diffuse new knowledge. They would stimulate industrialization and
expand agricultural production. In short, immigration would provide a
quick, sure means to achieve rapid modernization. This conviction was
based on the "proof offered by the classic countries of immigration-
the United States and Argentina.
Not so clearly understood were the changed circumstances which
had come about since Argentina and the United States had received the
bulk of their immigration. The world economy had begun to change after
1930 and more importantly, social and economic conditions in Europe
after World War II were generally not comparable with conditions in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Perhaps the most funda-
mental change, in Europe and even Venezuela, was the gradual disappear-
ance of laissez faire as government policy in social and economic spheres
Nevertheless, the Venezuelan government in great part either ignored or
was ignorant of the sweeping economic, demographic and social transforma-
tion taking place in the country after 1936. The government continued
to have faith in the inunigrant's ability to effect significant changes
in the country's development and particularly during the Perez Jimenez
dictatorship, seemed to view immigration as a catalyst to be added at
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"in CO .he ing.edlen.s lor development. I„ order ,o evaluate the valid-
ity of government policy and the contribution of the immigrants, it be-
comes necessary to measure immigration goals against the Venezuelan
reality after 1936.
As we have seen, the s.all size of the Venezuelan population was
seen as the single most important obstacle to development. Without a
larger population agriculture could not expand, there would not be
enough trained workers for industrial growth, the consumer market would
be too limited, and Venezuela's uninhabited border regions would leave
her at the mercy of her more populous neighbors. In the years between
1936 and 1961 some 850,000 foreigners entered the country with visas
which permitted them to stay. Considering that the population in 1936
was only about 3,500,000, the number of foreigners would seem substantial,
but during that same period of time the native population more than
doubled, reaching almost seven million persons.
The reason for this rapid increase lay not so much with the birth
rate, which had always been fairly high, but rather with the precipitous
decline in mortality. The birth rate reached 45 per thousand, but mor-
tality declined from 21.1 in 1936 to 10.8 in 1961. The decline was due
to various factors, such as the government campaign, begun in 1945, to
eradicate malaria, and the widespread installation of sewer systems and
potable water. Heart disease replaced gastro-enteritis as the leading
cause of death. Infant mortality decreased substantially. Life expec-
tancy at birth rose from less than thirty-six to nearly sixty-one years.
Thus, by the 1950s immigration was no longer necessary as a prime means
to increase the population. The Venezuelan population explosion was
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welJ underway. By 1961 the immigrants comprised only seven percent of
the total population and their children born in Venezuela accounted for
a mere five percent of the autochthonous growth.^
Interestingly, in view of the stated hope that intermarriage
would "improve" the native stock, between 1948 and 1956 (data are lack-
ing for the years 1957-1961), some eleven thousand marriages took place
between Venezuelans and foreigners, three-quarters of them between
Venezuelan women and foreign men. During that same period, however,
there were 8,519 marriages in which both partners were foreigners. The
tendency toward marriage between foreigners increased throughout this
period, reaching fifty percent in 1956, although it dropped to forty
percent by 1967 when statistics became available once again (see appen-
dix A, table 32). The strong tendency of Spanish and Italian women to
TABLE 23
Marriages by Selected Nationalities, 1953 and 1956
Men/Women Ven.
1953
Col. It. Span. Ven.
1956
Col. It. Span.
Venezuelan 26,595 231 12 65 32,258 237 25 125
Co Lombian 236 158 2 219 122 4
Italian 268 5 213 19 398 8 419 72
Spanish 170 1 1 185 283 9 3 673
Source: Anuario estadlstlco, 1953 and 1956.
See Paez Cells, Ensayo , 31 and 35 for the birth and death rates.
Three different tables are given, trying to correct errors in registration;
Paez Cells calculated that mortality in 1961 was only 7.4 per thousand.
See Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, Direccion de Salud Publica,
Departamento de Demografia y Epidemiologia , Anuario de epidemiologla y
estadistica vital, auo 1961 (Caracas, 1963), II, 3 for causes of death.
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n.arry men of their own nationality continued into the 1970s. Colombian
women, on the other hand, tended to marry Venezuelans more often than
Colombians. The intermarriages of the men prove little, since there
were many more single Italians and Spaniards, but obviously the single
women from these countries preferred to marry compatriots. In the case
of the Colombians, there were equal numbers of single men and women and
both evidently preferred to marry Venezuelans. Aside from personal pref-
erences, relative notions of status probably influenced these choices.
Spanish and Italian women would have viewed their compatriots as having
greater prestige than most Venezuelan men. Italian and Spanish men would
have seen more benefit in marrying local rather than Colombian women
and the Colombians of both sexes would also have benefited more by
marrying Venezuelans and thus forming local ties.
During this same period of time. 1948-1961. over 60,000 children
were born to couples in which at least one parent was a foreigner. Al-
most 100,000 children were born to parents both of whom were foreigners.
These figures refer only to legitimate births. Of the total number of
children born in Venezuela during those years. (3,711.017) slightly
more than fifty percent were born out of wedlock. Of this number, less
than two percent were born to foreign mothers. No statistics are avail-
able before 1975 as to the nationality of the foreign women who gave
birth out of wedlock, but in that year Colombian women were responsible
for 85 percent of the illegitimate births. It is probably no coincidence
that the Increased number of illegitimate and recognized births regis-
tered after 1956 coincided with increased illegal Colombian immigration
(see appendix A, tables 33-34 for detailed information on births). With-
12X
Ls un-
LC
out papers a woman can have children and even register them, but she
cannot marry. Since the nationality of the father in such cases i.
known, one cannot be sure what percentage were foreigners. One acerbic
commentator on inm^igration wrote that the only nexus formed between
Venezuela and the adventuring immigrants who arrived during this period
was the "unfortunate balance of children without fathers. There can
be no doubt that men separated from their wives for years and unmarried
men who were unsure of their future had concubines in Venezuela.
Given the autochthonous growth, one might expect that the goal
of populating rural areas could be achieved without immigration. On the
contrary, internal migrations increased in absolute numbers and by 1961
some 1,500,000 persons were living outside their state of birth (see
appendix A, table 25). Intrastate migration from rural to urban centers
was even more impressive. By 1961, 67.5 percent of the population was
urban and 47.2 percent (3,549,223 persons) lived in cities with more than
10,000 inhabitants. George Hill, who had studied rural conditions in
1945, made another study in 1958 and reported that the only significant
improvements which had been made in rural areas were in health care and
highway connections, although the latter were still not sufficient. The
economic situation of the campesino had not changed significantly, nor
2
For the nationality of mothers of children born out of wedlock,
see Berglund Thompson and Hernandez Caliman, Estudio analltico
,
100-101.
The quote is from Ramon Diaz Sanchez, "La evolucion social de Venezuela,"
in Venezuela independiente, 1810-1960 (Caracas, 1962), 354. Births out
of wedlock are divided into two categories, illegitimate and recognized
( reconocldo ) . In the latter case, the father officially acknowledges the
paternity of the child who may legally bear his name. Having a child in
Venezuela is a fairly sure means of obtaining legalization of status if
one is indocumentado
,
as the government is loath to deport the father or
mother of a Venezuelan child.
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had agricultural techniques or access to schooling. Hill believed that
if anything, conditions were relatively worse in 1958 than in 1945 be-
cause of the progress made in urban areas.
By the 1950s, immigration was no longer a feasible means, if it
ever was, of populating rural areas. Conditions were too backward, and
as one journalist pointed out, if the Venezuelans could not face them,
how could Europeans be expected to do so?.^ The 1961 census showed that
some fifty-five percent of the foreign born population lived in the
Caracas Metropolitan Area. On a national basis, eighty-eight percent of
the foreign born population lived in population centers with more than
2500 inhabitants, the 1961 census standard for urban dwellers.
TABLE 24
Distribution of the Population by Nationality and Area
Population % Urban % Intermediate % Rural %
Total Population
7,523,999 100 4,713,626 100 370,219 100 2,450,154 100
Naturalized
64,604 .9 60,164 1.3 896 .3 3,544 .1
Foreign
461,584 6.1 403,176 8.6 10,088 2.7 48,320 2.0
Source: Noveno censo, Resumen general de la Republica, Parte A (Cara-
cas, 1966), 45.
Paez Cells, Ensayo , 48. George Hill, Jose Antonio Silva
Michelena and Ruth Hill, "La vida rural en Venezuela," Revista de Sanidad
y Asistencia Social , 24 (enero-abril , 1959), 149.
4Diario del Qccidente
,
August 28, 1950.
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This spatial distribution of immigrants occasioaed innumerable
complaints by those who felt that the prime reasons for fomenting immi-
gration were to settle uninhabited areas and to develop agriculture.
These comments were countered by articles pointing out how difficult it
was to get access to land, how expensive it was to clear, how insecure
land titles could be, and how difficult living conditions were in the
interior. As one newspaper article put it, in the cities foreigners had
access to housing, schools, police services, social security, public
markets, movies and sports activities. In the interior the immigrants,
and the Venezuelans, got nothing except by their own efforts.^
Besides health and climate conditions, one of the major reasons
the immigrants did not move into rural areas was the difficulty in ob-
taining title to the land. If the title was available, often the money
for purchase was not. The government was supposed to assist the immi-
grants who did not have sufficient funds to buy land or seeds, tools,
and housing. To do this was the responsibility first of ITIC and later
IAN, but despite the billions of bollvares which the two institutes re-
ceived, little land had been given either to foreigners or Venezuelans
by 1957. According to a study made in 1959 only 1,573 persons had re-
For complaints, see among others, The Caracas Journal , February 13,
1948; Panorama
,
May 19, 1953; Ultimas Noticias , February 18, 1955; La
Esfera
,
November 3, 1955; La Religion , November 9, 1955. For defense see
among others. El Naclonal
,
September 24, 1948; El Universal , September 28,
1951; El Heraldo , October 4, 1952; El Universal , October 23, 1952,
August 12, 1954 and October 2, 1958. Criticism about immigrants not
working in agriculture dropped off after 1952; either there was a gen-
eral acceptance of the problems involved or it was decided that it was
not politic to mention it, considering the glowing success of Turen.
See the text, 124.
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ceived land from IAN and only 509 of them were foreigners.^
The Turen colony was the showpiece of the Perez Jimenez regime,
as well it should have been considering the money invested in it. Work
had begun on the colony, located in the state of Portuguesa in 1950. By
1957, over seventy percent of the entire budget of IAN had been spent
on Turen; its cost averaged out to a staggering 5,051 Bs . per hectare.
Turen, with 24,556 hectares, encompassed almost seventy percent of the
total land of the colonies under the jurisdiction of the Institute. The
next largest colony. El Cenizo, did not compare with Turen in size.
Venezuelans owned sixty-seven percent of the land parcels in the various
colonies, but in Turen, the premier colony, the percentage dropped to
fifty-nine. The foreigners in Turen were in a privileged position,
owning fifty-eight percent of the large parcels and only twelve percent
of the mini-parcels (under ten hectares). Among all the colonies of the
Institute, seventy-five percent of the Venezuelans had parcels under
twenty hectares while only thirty-five percent of the foreigners did.
The writers of the previously mentioned study were of the opinion that
the disparity between the holdings of the Venezuelans and the immigrants
was due to the belief that the former were not prepared to administer
their properties as well as the foreigners were. Foreigners were to
act as models, and when the Venezuelans had learned, by imitation, how
to run their smaller acreages they would be given larger ones.^
The Agricultural Census of 1961 showed that 7,855 foreigners,
^La colonizacion agraria en Venezuela , 99.
''ibid., 71-106.
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including slightly over three thousand Colombians, were owners of agri-
c:ultural lands. The most important European land-owning groups were
Lhe Spaniards (1,825) followed by the Portuguese (1,029) and then the
Italians (902). Colombians were concentrated in Tachira, Zulia, Apure,
Barinas and Portuguesa; Spaniards in Carabobo, Guarico, Lara, Miranda,
Portuguesa and Yaracuy. More than half of the Portuguese were in the
Caracas Metropolitan Area, with another significant group in Aragua.
The Italians were concentrated only in Miranda and Portuguesa; they were
more equitably distributed in the other states. All other foreigners
(1,004) were tabulated together; the highest concentration was in
Portuguesa.
^
Interestingly, among the foreigners the biggest acreages, over
20,000 hectares, were mostly owned by "others." This was probably due
to large investments which were made in agriculture to produce for the
expanding food industry. One such major investment was made by Nelson
A. Rockefeller to provide products for his CADA supermarket chain.
Among the four nationalities specifically identified, the Por-
tuguese were characterized by small landholdings ; over seventy percent
owned less than three hectares. This is in keeping with their concen-
tration in the metropolitan area and their activities as truck - farmers
.
The Spanish, Italian and Colombian holdings were fairly equitably dis-
tributed by size, except that the Italians had nearly as many holdings
over 500 hectares as the Spanish and Colombians together. Surprisingly,
8
Ministerio de Fomento, Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos
Nacionales, III Censo agropecuario , 1961: Resumen general de la Republlca ,
Parte B, 29-52.
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a relatively large percentage of the Italian holdings (11.8%) were an
acre or less while few Colombians owned such small parcels.
Besides the difficulties in obtaining land, general conditions
in the interior were not conducive to attracting immigration. In 1937
Diaz Sanchez described the l lanos as suffering from a mortal wound,
anihilated by thirst, hunger and malaria. "In winter (the rainy season)
it remains practically isolated, at the mercy of malaria, without doc-
Maza
tors or medicine, without schools or hospitals."^ In 1951, D.F.
Zavala characterized agricultural work in the interior as a nightmare,
to be escaped as quickly as possible. Although DDT campaigns had effec-
tively eliminated the scourge of malaria by that time, no other impor-
tant changes had been implemented."''^ Even today flood control is an
annual problem and sanitary installations are still insufficient.
There are more doctors, clinics and schools, but still not enough.
There are more people, but they are increasingly congregated in urban
areas
.
According to an observer, however, one of the bright spots in
this dismal picture was the arrival of some few thousand Europeans,
particularly the Italians and the Spanish. The immigrants often estab-
lished services which the towns had lacked, such as hotels, restaurants,
bars, shoeshops, meat markets, carpentry shops, and barbershops. A
study sponsored by the Pan American Union in 1953 noted that before the
9Ramon Diaz Sanchez, Transicion; Politica y realidad en Venezuela
(Caracas, 1937), 140-141.
"'"'^D.F. Maza Zavala, Paradojas venezolanas , 151-153.
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wro.e
.Ha. U one went
.0 Barlnas, Calabo.o, Cuanare or Acarl.ua one
could see the benefits which the migrants had brought.
On the whole, however, the l:™„igrants preferred urban areas.
Besides the a.enltles of urban living,
.any of the. had skills which
were
.ore suited to the e.ploy.ent possibilities of the cities. Both
ITlC and lA. officials admitted that they found agricultural l..igrants
the hardest to place and In fact, the great majority they selected were
not agricultural workers. Inunlgratlon was also needed In the cities;
skilled artisans, construction workers and mechanics all found ready
employment in urban centers. Much as most Venezuelans might have
accepted this immigrant presence in the cities, they viewed as intoler-
able immigrant activities in commerce, particularly street vending, in
bars, the sale of lottery tickets, in most kinds of menial labor such
as dish-washing, or as drivers of public transportation.
As early as 1950, in the Caracas area, foreigners were said to
own most of the butcher shops and fruit stands; the Portuguese were
taking over the bars and restaurants; the Italians and the Portuguese
^^El Universal, March 17, 1950; Bultron. Las Inmlgraciones en
Venezuela
.
103; El Universal
.
October 2. 1958.
12
The Caracas Chamber of Commerce, speaking for all the Chambers,
particularly objected to petty commercial activities. See El Universal
.January 4. 1952. See also El Nacional
.
March 18, 1950 and El Universal.
September 13, 1950.
Lng
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were predominating as taxi drivers and construction workers. Pour out
of every five conunercial establishments in Sabana Grande, the new shop-
ping district, were supposedly in foreign hands." Within a few years,
the Italians were characterized as good workers, especially proficient'
as artisans, barbers, cooks, masons and bakers; the Canary Islanders,
who were originally known for their prowess as farmers, had become arti-
sans; the Portuguese were criticized for selling liquor and monopolizi.
public transport; the Austrians and the Germans were praised for thei,
efforts in industry. These were the grand stereotypes of the Immigrant
workers and as with most stereotypes, there was some truth to them.
In 1957 Mariano Picon Salas noted the influence of the immigrants,
particularly the Portuguese and the Italians, on the architecture of
Caracas. He described some streets as having been converted into living
reminders of Portugal, with their small hotels, restaurants and grocery
stores. The North American influence could be seen in certain sectors
with their supermarkets and gas stations straight out of Houston, Denver
or Wichita. Picon Salas stressed the great changes which had been
wrought in the small provincial capital that had been the Caracas of the
1940s. He was fascinated, or perhaps appalled, by the enormous construc-
tion machinery which "with the face of a tiger and the tail of a giant
dragon," could erase the past in seconds. He noted that although it
might have been Venezuelans who contracted the work, it was accomplished
"""^El Nacional, March 18, March 22, and July 20, 1950 and El
Universal
.
September 13, 1950.
14
El Universal
.
February 22 and March 4, 1952.
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thanks to the Italian artisans and construction superintendents, th
Portuguese construction workers, and the Spaniards who drew up the
plans.
e
are
Although there are few statistics available, the Italians
generally credited with being the dominant factor among the foreigners
involved in construction. According to Oscar Tenreiro, between 1941
and 1961, the population of Caracas increased by some one million per-
sons and the amount of housing by over 200,000 units. At least twelve
percent of the planning and financing, and approximately fifty percent
of the construction was done by Italians. Certain sectors of the city,
such as Los Chaguaramos, bear an Italian stamp, having been built by
and for Italians."*"^
The government supposedly encouraged immigration for industrial
or agricultural purposes but a lack of concomitant economic planning
meant that many immigrants found employment most readily in construction
or commerce. The construction industry was a lucrative source of wealth
and employment. Government expenditures by the Ministry of Public Works
rose from 27 percent of the national budget in 1936 (the highest level
until 1944-45) to 44.2 percent in 1956-57 (see appendix A, table 27). The
Italians at first got the short end of the stick in the game of commis-
sions and contracts, but with the passing years they became more expert.
Among foreigners, Italians became the most active buyers of land in
Caracas, purchasing twice the number of lots that the Spaniards did. One
"^^Mariano Picon Salas, Comprension de Venezuela (Caracas, 1976),
222-224.
"""^Cited in Rafael Pineda, Italo-Venezolano ; notas de inmigracion
(Caracas, 1967), 470.
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Italian, Felipe Gagliardi, became the "favorite" of the Perez Jimenez
regime and a don of the construction industry."''^
Another area of great immigrant participation was commerce.
Immigrants were attracted to this sector because it was a relatively
easy way to earn money and not because of any strong predilection on
their part. The increase in petroleum revenue meant an increase in the
circulation of money, fueled by government expenditures on public works.
Per capita income rose to 2,590 Bs. by 1961, a trend which led to an
ever increasing demand for goods. This, in combination with high prices,
made commerce the leading economic sector after petroleum. Starting in
1947, when the effects of the Second World War on international commerce
had been alleviated, imports accounted for half of the goods sold in
18
Venezuela. Since the amount imported increased substantially over the
years, it is difficult to be sure that the increase from a particular
country was related to the presence of its nationals in Venezuela. The
Ibid., 475. That Gagliardi was the "favorite" mentioned in the
book was confirmed by Pineda in an interview in Caracas in March, 1976.
For comments on construction at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of
the 1950s, see Accion Democratica, Comite Ejecutivo Nacional, Venezuela
bajo signo del terror, 1948-1952: Libro negro de una dictadora . Facsimile
ed. (Caracas, 1974), 205-206. Reports of real estate sales can be found
in the following: El Universal
,
September 10, 1953; October 20, 1954;
June 17, 1955; La Calle, April 11, 1956.
"""^Tomas Enrique Carrillo Batalla, "Desarrollo economico de Vene-
zuela," Economia y Ciencias Sociales ; revista trimestral de la Facultad
de Economia de la Universidad Central de Venezuela, Ano IV (septiembre-
diciembre, 1961), 26-36. For good treatments of the economy during this
period (1948-1961) see United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin
America, "Economic Developments in Venezuela in the 1950s," Economic
Bulletin for La tin America , 5 (March, 1960), 21-61; Orlando Araujo,
"Caracterizacion historica de la industrializacion de Venezuela," Econo-
mia v Cienciaa Sociales ; revista trimestral de la Facultad de Economia
de la Universidad Central de Venezuela, Ano VI (octubre-diciembre, 1964),
5-27 and Economic Development In Venezuela (Baltimore, 1961).
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exception is Italy, whose exports to Venezuela increased sevenfold be-
tween 1950 and 1958. The only countries which exported more were the
United States and Great Britain (see appendix A, table 28). Foreign in-
vestment did not follow the same trend, however, as Italy ranked seventh,
with a total of some forty million bollvares
. There can be little doubt
that the Italian presence in Venezuela affected both imports and invest-
ments, and as the Italian community grew smaller, so did the trade and
19direct investments.
The United States has been the principal source of imported goods
since the 1920s. Indeed, the Commercial Treaty between the United States
and Venezuela, signed in 1939 and renegotiated in 1952 was often cited
as a primary deterrent to industrial development. Drawn up at a time
when Venezuela had no industry to speak of, the low duty on a plethora
of products made it impossible for local industry to compete. Goods
produced in Venezuela were not noted for their quality and they were
equally if not more expensive than imported goods. Part of the reason
imported goods were so expensive was the high mark-up on merchandise.
Caracas supports so many commercial establishments because few of them
have profit margins under fifty percent. Instead of one merchant selling
twenty items with a five percent profit on each, ten merchants sell two
items each with a margin of fifty percent. Caracas was notorious, even
in 1940, for being a tremendously expensive place to live, and none of
Statistics on trade can be found in the various years of the
Anuario estadlstico and are partially reproduced in appendix A, table 28.
Information on investments appears in the Memoria , then later the Informe
economico of the Banco Central de Venezuela.
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the practices which made it so expensive have changed in the ensuing
years
.
The reason local goods were equally as expensive as imported ones
was due to high labor costs, low productivity and little sense of com-
petition. Even though the industrial index appeared to show great
growth during the 1950s, it was the result of its small measuring base
and the enormous gains in construction and water and electricity. Pe-
troleum was the only efficient industry. Industry developed very
irregularly and without overall planning because the government did not
define a protectionist policy. The protection of certain goods was left
to the "will, understanding or caprice" of bureaucrats in the appropri-
ate ministries. Also, the government had no plan for facilitating cre-
dits to industry, and important commercial interests, long linked to the
import-export trade, were opposed to the growth of local industry. By
1961 the secondary sector was producing only one-fifth of the national
20
wealth while the tertiary sector produced more than twice as much.
Since few immigrants were willing to work as farm laborers be-
cause of the terrible conditions and low pay, it is not surprising that
most of them drifted into relatively lucrative commercial activities,
transportation, and construction. Perhaps more immigrants with industri-
ally applicable skills would have worked in that sector had it been
possible to develop manufacturing without having to compete with imports
^°In addition to the works cited in note 18, see American Advisory
Economic Mission, Report to the Minister of Finance , 4-6, 16-49, 272-273
for conmients on high prices and the causes; the quote is from Araujo,
"Caracterizacion historica," 11. For comments on the Commercial Treaty,
see Asociacion Pro Venezuela, Labor nacionalista (Caracas, 1965), 52-54.
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and the multinationals established within the country. It was not until
the government of Romulo Betancourt (1959-1963) that a concerted attempt
was made at unified national industrial planning, with protection for
local industry and credits for small and medium sized industries
.
Unemployment was a periodic problem during this period. The
economy, subject to fluctuations in the price of petroleum, could not
expand quickly enough to provide sufficient numbers of new jobs because
there was no concomitant government economic planning. Due to the
periodic competition for jobs, Venezuelans complained about the foreign-
ers who worked as taxi or bus drivers, street vendors, or in bars. None
of these jobs required skills which Venezuelans did not have or could
not readily acquire. Therefore it seemed inappropriate that immigrants,
touted as the bearers of new skills and knowledge, should be employed
in such activities.
One reason that Immigrants worked in menial jobs was the lack
of employment information. Both ITIC and IAN tried to place foreigners
who had immigrant visas. ITIC frequently placed advertisements in the
ntwspapers in an attempt to find employment. The ads read as though
they were announcements for auctions: 3 gardeners; 2 cooks; 6 carpenters;
11 mechanics. One immigrant recalled that ITIC had fed and housed him
22
for the requisite fifteen days and then placed him— in the street.
A national employment agency existed for a few years in the late
21
Unfortunately, there is no indication in the published indus-
trial censuses as to the nationality of workers or owners, therefore immi-
grant participation in this important sector cannot be evaluated as yet.
^"El Nacional, May 13, 1949.
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19A0S. It was to provide placement both for Venezuelans and foreigners.
An official of the agency noted, however, that it was easier to find
employment for a foreigner than a Venezuelan because the former tended
to have a specific skill whereas the latter was the proverbial "jack
of all trades. "^-^
The National Commission on Immigration established various local
coimnittees to report on job opportunities, but communications were slow
and coordination with IAN was weak. The Commission stopped functioning
in late 1949. The National Agrarian Institute reported that it had
placed 25,942 of the 73,201 immigrants received between 1949 and 1960,
but failed to specify their employment. The Institute set up employment
offices for immigrants in the reception centers in Caracas and El
Trompillo, an hacienda near Valencia, but both reception centers ceased
functioning in the early 1950s. Afterward, placements were made from the
Institute's headquarters in Caracas.
During their study in the state of Portuguesa, officials of the
Pan American Union asked immigrants what they most needed from the govern-
ment. The answer was help in getting jobs. As the government was un-
willing or unable to do much in this area, various private agencies
stepped in to fill the gap. Several consulates and cultural centers of
the emigrants provided such services. Most important was the role played
by the Catholic Church. As early as 1949 a placement service was func-
tioning in the Archbishop's Palace in Caracas. In 1951 the Catholic
23
La inmigracion en Venezuela , II, 32-40.
9 /
IAN, Informaciones estadisticas sobre las principales activl-
dades realizadas por el I.A.N. , 1-7-49—31-12-60 (Caracas, n.d.).
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Commission on Migration was formed. A branch was established in
Venezuela in 1953 which took over placement and offered a variety of
social services to the immigrants, including a day care center for the
children of working immigrant mothers.
The most publicized employment office, however, was the Plaza
Bolivar. It is a small, elegant, nineteenth-century plaza, with flowers
and tall trees, birds and small animals running freely, benches and
chairs to sit on and occasional concerts by the municipal band. The
center of the Plaza is dominated by a magnificent equestrian statue of
Simon Bolivar where floral wreaths are left in continuing homage to the
Liberator. One can imagine the reaction of the Caraquenos who saw this
oasis of tranquility and beauty turned into a hiring hall! The immigrants,
perhaps unaware of the Plaza's patriotic importance, but no doubt
appreciative of its beauty, congregated there daily, conversing in a
babble of tongues, while they awaited the arrival of potential employers.
The fact that the PJaza was also known to the immigrants as the "Plaza
26
of Tears" is poignant proof that at times they waited in vain.
25
Buitron, Las inmigraciones en Venezuela , 76. For information
on Church aid to immigrants see The Caracas Journal
,
August 29, 1947; El
Nacional, June 20, 1953; La Esfera
,
January 4, 1954; El Nacional , August 19,
1954, El Universal , November 19, 1954 and February 21, 1957. The
Church also sponsored the first "Immigrant's Day" in 1954, an activity
later sponsored by the Asociacion Pro-Venezuela. This association, formed
in May 1958, had as one of its goals the integration of the foreigners
resident in Venezuela, by encouraging the formation of cultural centers
and promoting the naturalization of foreigners when accompanied by a
sincere desire to obtain Venezuelan citizenship. Other cultural groups
VN^hich had been previously formed also aided their compatriots.
^^For references to the role of the Plaza Bolivar, see, among
others, El Nacional
,
May 13, 1949 and May 18, 1950; El Universal , May 17,
1950. In a graphically written article published in El Universal , Sep-
tember 28, 1951, Jose Gonzalez Gonzalez noted the problems the immigrants
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An example of successful self-placement was revealed in the course
of an interview with a refugee immigrant who arrived in November 1948.
He and his family were sent to El TrompiUo. He made his "escape" after
a month by signing a piece of paper forfeiting his right to the forty
bolivares he would have received if he had accepted agricultural employ-
ment. The immigrant, an engineer by profession although an agricultural
worker by visa, lost no time in getting to Caracas with his family.
There he began his career by selling food in the streets. He graduated
to a floor cleaning business, joined in the "dance of the millions" with
his own construction business, and when that sector went into a decline
in 1958, he shifted into manufacturing, newly protected from foreign
competition and with government credit available.
Besides the lack of employment information, foreigners were at
times hampered In their attempts to find work by the provisions of Arti-
cle 18 of the 1936 Labor Law. Very advanced for its time, the law gave
labor the right to organize, provided for profit sharing, social securi-
ty, and an eight-hour work day. Article 18 stipulated that no more
than twenty-five percent of an establishment's work force could be foreign
and that foreigners could not act in supervisory positions over Venezue-
lans. The provision was evidently sparked by problems within the petro-
leum industry which was heavily foreign at the time. No thought was
given to the possible effects the law might have on immigrants, probably
were having in finding work, citing the long lines in the employment
offices of IAN, the Archbishop's Palace, the Casa de Italia and the Plaza
Bolivar. The cause, according to Gonzalez, was the lack of a government
policy aimed at creating jobs for both immigrants and Venezuelans.
27
Immigrant interview, March 23, 1976.
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because there were so few of them in 1936. The provision regulating
the percentage of foreigners was fairly liberal with respect to similar
provisions in other Latin American countries such as Mexico and Colombia,
although no such provisions existed in countries of large-scale immigra-
tion such as Argentina or the United States.
The law had its defenders and its detractors. The general ob-
jection was that it curbed economic growth by not permitting employers
to select the best worker and it theoretically limited the economically
active Immigrants to twenty-five percent of the Venezuelan labor force.
In fact, the law was frequently violated. The 1950 census showed that
almost twenty-one percent of the work force in the Federal District was
foreign, but the limit was exceeded in petroleum, manufacturing and
construction. In fact, foreigners comprised 40.5 percent of the con-
struction workers. In 1953 the Ministry of Labor made a survey of the
construction industry in the Caracas metropolitan area and found that
thirty-six percent of the workers were foreigners. The majority worked
as masons, masons' helpers, carpenters, master builders, painters and
plumbers. Sixty-five percent of the firms surveyed were violating the
law. Every year the Ministry inspected establishments around the coun-
try and every year at least one-sixth of them were in violation of the
law. In 1961 the percentage rose to almost one- third. Very few fines
were imposed however, even after a special decree was issued in 1959
9 Q
See, for example, Juan Uslar Pietrl's comments in El Nacional ,
October 8, 1954. See also Carlos Marti Bufill, Nuevas soluciones al
p roblema migratorio (Madrid, 1955), 86 for restrictions in other Latin
American countries.
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raising the amount of the fines for non-compliance. The normal pro-
cedure was to give the firm time to adjust its work force or to justify
the presence of the foreigners, but no follow-up statistics were pub-
lished.^^
The largely undifferentiated employment structure often led to
competition between foreigners and Creoles for jobs, provoking bitter-
ness and signs of xenophobia. The competition was particularly strong
in construction, transportation, shoemaking and repairing and commercial
activities. Some of the bitter feelings were a result of the belief
that one purpose of immigration was to teach the Venezuelans new skills.
Instead, the immigrants were involved in activities which the Venezuelans
were capable of doing, although perhaps not with such single-mindedness
.
The mass of the immigrants did not have new skills but rather old ones
well-honed, such as carpentry, brick-laying, barbering, and cooking.
Their general level of education was barely that of the sixth grade and
some thirty percent were in fact illiterate. But most of the immigrants
had grown up in or moved to areas where exposure to new ideas was possi-
29
Information on labor law violations can be found in the various
years of the Memoria y cuenta of the Ministry of Labor in the section
"Direccion del Trabajo." One reason foreigners were hired in violation
of the law was that employers found their productivity higher than that
of the Venezuelans. In a study done by the International Labor Organiza-
tion in 1949, employers cited four reasons why Venezuelan output was
lower: (1) a lack of vocational training; (2) poor nutrition and poor
health; (3) alcoholism; and (4) no sense of thrift. See its Freedom
o f Association and Conditions of Work in Venezuela . . . , Its Studies
mid Reports, New Series, No. 21 (Geneva, 1950), 161-162. The increase
in the fine for violating the law can be found in Decreto No. 540
(January 16, L959). The Ministry of Labor also established an employment
division in tlie 1950s in its Division de la Mano de Obra, but it was able
to place very few persons because it often could not recommend qualified
workers
.
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ble. Many of them had served apprenticeships of one kind or another.
The mere fact that they chose to emigrate, especially those who did not
receive immigrant visas, meant that they had the steadfastness which
would enable them to succeed or they would not have left their native
countries. Such natural selection also operated among the majority of
the Venezuelans who migrated from the interior, but their average level
of education was only fourth grade and their exposure to new ways of
thinking and doing things was often precipitated by their contacts with
foreigners. It was not an integral part of their native environment.
One of the functions of education is to provide such exposure,
be it through formal schooling or vocational education. In great part,
this was not done in Venezuela. In 1936 over sixty percent of the popu-
lation was illiterate; by 1950 the figure had dropped to forty-nine per-
cent, but because of the growth of the population, there were more
illiterates in 1950 than in 1936. Educational facilities continued to
expand during the period 1950-1961, but not as rapidly as did the school-
age population. The proportion of illiterates among the population over
the age of ten continued to decline, dropping to thirty-five percent by
1961, but again absolute numbers increased; there were 1,734,791 illit-
erates. An indicator of the unequal development of the country can be
seen in the fact that eighty-three percent of the children in urban
areas were in school as compared with only fifty-six percent of those
living m rural areas.
•^^
Noveno censo de la poblacion, Resumen general de la Republica
Parte A
,
108-110. When asked why they were not in school, 27 percent
said they could not afford to go and 23 percent said either there was
no space in the school or there was no school.
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Another continuing problem was the incredibly high drop-out rate
of the students. For example, in 1956-57, there were 242,203 children
enrolled in the first grade. By 1961-62, when they should have been
finishing primary school, only 80,979 were still enrolled. By 1966-67,
when this same group of students should have been in their last year of
high school, only 19,061 remained, producing a drop-out rate from first
3
1
to last of ninety-two percent.
Using education statistics from the 1961 census greatly obscures
the real growth of the educational system in the intercensal period.
During the ten years culminating with the overthrow of Perez Jimenez on
January 23, 1958, the enrollment of students in primary school rose from
an index of 176.15 to 272.6, an increase of about sixty-five percent.
By the school year 1960-61, the index had risen to 415.19, an increase
32
of sixty percent in only three years. Obviously the democratic govern-
ment was aware that it could not and should not count on foreigners to
be "mobile schools," but rather should provide actual schools to educate,
form and prepare Venezuelans for the future.
There were relatively few foreign children in Venezuela and, as
has already been noted, since they were not required to have cedulas ,
very little is known about them outside of census information. One
indicator of their presence in Venezuela is their enrollment in the
school system. In 1956-57, almost 22,000 were enrolled in primary and
-^-
^Anuarlo estadlstlco, 1957-1963 , II, 1140 and 1150; Anuario
estadistico 1967 , 509.
32
-Anuario estadistico, 1957-1963 , II, 1139
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secondary schools, constituting only 2.8 percent of the former and 6.2
percent of the latter's enrollment. The sex ratio was the same for both
Venezuelans and foreigners, being about one to one in primary and two
to one (male to female) in secondary school. A striking difference is
that only 17.2 percent of the Venezuelans were enrolled in private pri-
mary schools whereas fifty percent of the foreign children were. The
contrast was not as great on the secondary level, mostly because, accord-
ing to the 1961 Annual Report of the Ministry of Education, there were
proportionately more private secondary schools than primary. Forty-four
percent of the Venezuelans attended private high schools and sixty-four
percent of the foreign students did so. It is interesting that the total
foreign (excluding naturalized) population between the ages of five and
fourteen was 43,880 in February 1961 when the census was taken, and there
were 28,951 foreign children enrolled in primary and secondary school.
That meant that some sixty-six percent attended school, whereas the
Venezuelan figure for the same age cohort and enrollment is sixty-five
percent, indicating that there was no significant difference in the de-
33
sire of the two groups to obtain schooling.
Some of the private schools were actually bi-national or foreign
In vocational studies on the secondary level, foreign students
formed 4.3 percent of the total enrollment in 1960. Of all students en-
rolled in these technicical schools, one-half were enrolled in commercial
courses and one-third in industrial ones. Foreigners formed 6.7 percent
of the students enrolled in normal schools in the school year 1960-61.
Normal schools produced teachers for the primary grades and are equiva-
lent to a secondary level education. The pedagogical institutes are the
equivalent of American teacher-training colleges. All data cited can be
found in the Ministry of Education, Memoria y cuenta, 1957 (Caracas,
1959) and 1960 (Caracas, 1961).
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schools. Although the students could usually follow the program of
studies dictated by the Ministry of Education and therefore be eligible
to continue in the national universities, a major purpose in the estab-
lishment of such schools was to provide the course of studies required
for university admission in the native country. Such was the case in
such schools as the Escuela Agustin Codazzi (Italian), Alexander von
Humboldt (German), the Colegio de Francia and the Colegio Americano.
But once having graduated from such a program (in which both Venezuelans
and foreigners could study) a student could not go to a national univer-
sity without revalidating his high school diploma. This meant passing
a series of exams on relevant subject material in Spanish and complying
with the requisite civics courses.
There is evidence to indicate a significant amount of foreign
involvement in private schools. Article 70 of the 1955 Education Law
prohibited a foreigner from being the director (principal) of a school,
although naturalized Venezuelans had no such impediment. The 1957
Annual Report of the Ministry of Education noted that foreign directors
of schools had until the 1957-58 school year to rectify the situation.
The report reminded directors that only Venezuelans by birth could teach
materials related to Venezuelan civics, history and geography or Spanish.
Tlie Ministry also indicated that a situation in which a majority of a
34
school's personnel was foreign was not acceptable.
No such restrictions appeared to be in effect at the university
level, perhaps because the number of foreigners teaching on that level
was never more than twenty percent of the total. In 1960-61 there were
34
Ministry of Education, Memoria y cuenta, 1957, 61.
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397 foreigners (excluding naturalized Venezuelans) among a total of 2,884
professors. Spaniards were the most numerous, followed by Argentines and
Italians. The sudden growth of university level education which took
place after 1957 was in part responsible for the number of foreigners
employed, because the proportional increase of foreign professors was
higher than that of Venezuelans. In 1957-58, only 10.616 students were
enrolled in the five existing universities and the Pedagogical Institute.
In 1960-61 the number had increased to 26,477 students, including 1,502
in the two new public universities and an impressive 2,157 in the Peda-
gogical Institute. Unfortunately, the drop-out rate was also high at
the university level, calculated at slightly over sixty percent, and
career patterns, with the exception of economics, had not appreciably
changed over the years. Only thirty-six of the 1,689 students who
graduated in 1960 were foreigners, but it is possible that the children
of foreigners either studied abroad or had become naturalized before
graduating from the university and therefore were counted as Venezuelans.
As can be seen, the government made little effort between 1948
and 1958 to educate, train or prepare Venezuelans for productive roles
in the development process of the country. One reason so little atten-
tion was paid to public education may be that the public schools, es-
pecially the universities, were viewed by the dictatorship as hotbeds of
undesired political activity. Just as the Perez Jimenez regime has been
accused of fomenting immigration to stifle union activities, so it is
possible that it decided to rely on skilled immigrants rather than
-^
^nnuario estadlstico, 1957-1963
,
II, 1228-1286; Ministry of
Education, Memoria y cuenta, 1961 (Caracas, 1962), E451, E478, E479.
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develop the educational system, which was a potential source of opposi-
tion.
Since their relatively low level of educational preparation meant
that Venezuelans were at a disadvantage when competing for jobs, and the
high concentration of foreigners in the Caracas metropolitan area meant
that they were highly visible, it is only natural that occasional out-
bursts of xenophobism occurred there. The Portuguese, although not the
most numerous of the immigrant groups, tended to be the recipients of
such attacks because of the type of work which they did. The government
seemed to be of two minds about their presence; their entry was facili-
tated after 1954 by instituting the authorization of temporary visas
without previous consultation yet IAN never considered them as candidates
for immigrant visas. When criticisms were made about the activities of
certain Portuguese immigrants, the government blithly explained that it
could not be true as there were no Portuguese Immigrants, thus hiding
behind a semantic front. Government health service officials criticized
the Portuguese, particularly those from the Azores, for being illiterate
and with few notions of personal hygiene. Various articles in the press
criticized them for monopolizing public transportation and selling liquor,
for living in abominable conditions and for not bringing their families.
They were also viewed as the golondrinas of the immigration to Venezuela.
The public believed that a Portuguese would spend four or five years in
Venezuela, make his money and then leave, handing over his business to
a relative recently arrived from the old country.
When the government began to insist that immigrants bring over
their families within a specified period of time, Extranjeria officials
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made scapegoats of the Portuguese. Though severely pressured, by 1961
only about sixty percent of the Portuguese had brought over their fami-
lies. The reason was undoubtedly that offered by their diplomatic repre-
sentative—they did not earn enough money, despite the fact that they
had a reputation for being extremely hard workers. They were, by and
large, unskilled. They were the only group of foreigners which attrac-
ted a derogatory name. To call someone a "Portuguese" indicated that
the person was uncouth and profoundly ignorant. To "work like a Portu-
guese" was the equivalent of the American expression to "work like a
slave." Despite attempts to create a more favorable public image by
calling attention to their qualities as hard workers who saved their '
money (unlike the Venezuelans) and were devoted to their families, the
old image lingered on. Oddly enough, despite this shabby treatment on
the part of the Venezuelans, it is the Portuguese who have the highest
permanency rate of the major European immigrant nationalities in the
36
country.
At times the normal tensions of rapid urban growth plagued the
36
For comments in the press, see, among others. El Nacional
,
July 2
and 17, 1945; March 18, 1950; El Universal , March 22, 1950 and February 22,
1952; El Heraldo
,
April 30, 1950. For comments on the use of "Portu-
gues" as a depreciatory remark, see El Nacional
,
July 7, 1950; El Univer-
sal
,
January 24, 1953 and Miguel Acosta Saignes, Historla de los Portu-
gueses , 2d ed. (Caracas, 1977), 8. See the Comision Nacional de Inmigra-
cion, Boletln, Afio II, No. 12 (June 1949) for comments on the health and
literacy of the Portuguese. In a report prepared by the immigration
health services in Caracas, with a total of 173,082 immigrants checked
between 1947 and 1955, the majority of the cases of mental retardation
and dwarfism were found among the Portuguese, but no specific numbers
were given. Among all immigrants, the largest percentage suffered from
syphilis, but that was only .9 percent. The next largest group (.37
percent) suffered from goiters. See Juan Gambus and Lino Tovar, La
salud de los inmigrantes (Caracas, 1956).
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capital city. According to some journalists, immigrants were responsible
for placing greater demands on the already inadequate housing situation,
providing more mouths to feed, and placing greater burdens on the over-
extended network of social services, such as they were. But the real
problem lay in the increase in crime. Since rapid urban growth was
accompanied by immigration, some Venezuelans viewed immigrants as the
cause of the increase in crimes, instead of placing the blame on over-
rapid urbanization. According to one reporter, creole criminals were
in shortpants until the distinguished foreign professors taught them
differently. Immigrants were accused of introducing the drug traffic
and white slavery, organizing prostitution on a large scale, and in-
creasing the relatively low rates of armed assault, homicide and suicide.
By 1948 it was common to see the nationality of a foreigner headlined in
articles on crime, something which had occurred only rarely before.
Occasionally a journalist would piously note that not all foreigners be-
haved so badly, and then would proceed to attack the selection methods
of the government which permitted hardened criminals to migrate to
Venezuela.
In truth, the number of foreigners involved in misdemeanors and
serious crimes never reached ten percent of the total (see appendix A,
37
See, among others, Diario del Occidente , March 18, 1950; Ulti-
mas Noticias
,
May 23, 1953 and El Universal
,
April 5, 1959. With reference
to prostitution in the Caracas metropolitan area, one study claimed that
between 1954 and 1959, 47.5 percent of the women treated for venereal
diseases were foreign and in 1960, 65 percent of the prostitution cases
registered In police files concerned foreign women. See Carlos Julio
Alarcon, "Estudio sobre la prostitucion en el Area Metropolitana , " in
Estudio de Caracas, vol. VII, t. 2 (Caracas, 1971), 573-575.
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tables 35 and 36). Considering that the percentage of foreigners over
the age of fourteen was far greater than that of the Venezuelans, the
Incidence of crime among the foreigners was relatively much lower than
among the Venezuelans on a per capita basis. However, given that the
foreigners were there at the invitation of the Venezuelan government,
it is not surprising that the crimes they did commit were adjudged more
harshly. Besides breaking the law. the crimes were abuses of hospital-
. 38ity
.
The press often opposed outbursts of xenophobism, as well it
should have considering that the newspapers were a primary means of
giving expression to it. Several articles explaining the origin of the
word "musiu" used the opportunity to decry xenophobism, making it clear
that it was an "un-Venezuelan" sentiment. Other articles recognized
that the press's own use in headlines of the nationality of a foreigner,
especially in connection with criminal affairs, prejudiced that entire
foreign community. Luis Esteban Rey, a prominent journalist and mili-
tant in Accion Democratica
, wrote a stirring column against xenophobism
in 1950. He emphasized that foreigners provided Venezuelans with an
excellent opportunity to learn new habits and skills. He noted that
38
According to the 1961 census, there were 468,160 foreigners
over the age of fourteen and 3,616,492 Venezuelans. (Resumen general
de la Republica, Partes B y C , 343.) Using the statistics available
in appendix A, table 35 for the year 1961, the difference in the crime
rate between Venezuelans and foreigners is approximately thirty percent.
One of every 662 Venezuelans committed a serious crime while only one
of every 1,002 foreigners did so. The notion that foreigners have a
higher crime rate than natives is a common misconception. See G. Beijer,
"Modern Patterns of International Migratory Movements," in Migration ,
ed. J. A. Jackson (Cambridge, 1969), 52-53.
wha. appeared to be Xa.iness on .He pa.t of .he Venezuelans was si.ply
a lack of education. Responding to complaints that the foreigners were
congregating in the cities, Rey pointed out that if Venezuelans were
fleeing conditions in the ca^. u was illogical to expect Europeans,
Who caxne to Venezuela to improve their economic situation, to endure
then.. As a final note he added that newspapers and reporters had a
responsibility to see that a healthy competition between creole and
foreigner did not degenerate into xenophobism.
The worst outbreak of xenophobism took place with the overthrow
of the Perez Jimenez regime on January 23. 1958. The previous year
Perez Jimenez had decided not to jeopardize his chances of staying on
as president of Venezuela. Instead of the election which should have
been held in December 1957, Perez Jimenez offered a plebiscite. The
voters could choose to continue with Perez Jimenez as president or not.
All citizens over the age of eighteen were permitted to vote, and in a
surprise move, foreigners with more than two years' residency in the
country were also permitted to vote. El Heraldo, the regime's newspaper,
defended the extension of the vote to foreigners by citing their great
contribution to the country's development. The day after Congress
approved the legislation for the plebiscite, lists of supporters of the
regime began to be published in El Heraldo
. The first foreign community
39
See, for example. El Nacional
,
March 6 and August 18, 1947,
October 18, 1948, August 5 ("Venezuela, Empresa Abierta" by Arturo Uslar
Pietri) and November 6, 1950, August 9, 1952; La Esfera
,
August 14, 1952,
March 2, 1953; El Universal
, June 22. 1954, October 31, 1956; Panorama
.
September 26, 1951; Diario del Occidente
.
August 28. 1950. A particu-
larly strong example of xenophobic writing can be found in the articles
written by Julio Ramos in El Universal
.
February 5 and April 6, 1956.
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which expressed its support of Perez Jin.enee was the Costa Rican. but
pride of place went to the Italians. A letter of support on the part
of the Italian community appeared on the front page of El Heraldo on
November 11. 1957. The first signature was that of Felipe Gagliardi.
Other signatures, running into the thousands, appeared day after day.
Quite conveniently, they often appeared in alphabetical order, last
name first, and at times included the names of well-wishers who were
dead. Other supporters of Perez Jimenez included practically all govern-
ment employees, most other iimnigrant communities, all kinds of busi-
nesses and almost the entire population of the state of Tachira, where
Perez Jimenez was born. Perez Jimenez won the plebscite, but the actual
participation of foreigners in the voting is unknown. When he was over-
thrown on January 23, 1958, one of the first acts of the street mobs was
to burn the office of El Heraldo in retaliation for its support of the
dictator
.
In various articles published in the press after January 23rd,
the Italian community made it known that Gagliardi not only had threatened
to have numbers of them deported if they did not vote in favor of
Perez Jimenez, but that he had also connived with the Italian Ambassador
to concoct the list of names which had appeared in El Heraldo . The
names had been taken from the registration files in the consulate.
Gagliardi later claimed that Laureano Vallenilla Lanz had forced him to
put pressure on the Italian community, without doubt in return for the
favors he had received in the awarding of government construction con-
tracts. The Italian Ambassador claimed that Perez Jimenez was to blame
for having given the foreigners the right to vote. The Italian community
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repudiated this defense and made it known that the Ambassador was persona
non ^^rata. He was recalJed to Rome shortly thereafter/^
Because of the public support supposedly offered to Perez Jimenez
by the foreign community, there was sporadic looting and burning of
foreign homes and businesses, but an active campaign by public officials
in defense of the foreigners soon ended the problem. The Italians, of
course, had suffered the most. According to an interview with the
Ambassador, two Italians had been killed, six or seven wounded, and some
one hundred businesses destroyed. Nearly fifty claims were filed with
the Embassy for some 800,000 bolivares and the Ambassador estimated that
total damages would be about 150 million bolivares .
One result of the outburst of anti-foreign feeling was an in-
crease in return migration, although such migration was probably more
affected by the worsening economic situation. Return migration is a
normal part of the immigration process and does not necessarily imply
failure on the part of the immigrant. On the contrary, some of it is
due to the achievement of pre-determined goals, usually the saving of a
certain amount of money sufficient to make a go of it in the old country.
Others return as a result of unemployment, sickness, or an inability to
40
See various issues of El Heraldo between November 9 and
December 6, 1957 and Pineda, Italo-Venezolano , 465-470. See also
comments in the press after the overthrow of Perez Jimenez, on various
aspects of the plebiscite which concerned the activities of Gagliardi
and for statements from the foreign communities. For example, El
Nacional
,
January 24, 28 and February 1, 1958; Ultimas Noticias ,
January 27, 30, 31, February 2-4, 21, 22, 25 and 27, 1958.
^
"^Ultimas Noticias
,
January 31, 1958.
151
adjust to the environment, whether for reasons of climate or culture.
A bread-winner's return will naturally cause the return of his family.
The economic considerations involved in return migration relate
not only to the success of the immigrant in Venezuela, but also to
economic conditions in his native country. Thus, for example, the
Italians tended to return either because they had earned enough money to
set themselves up in business in Italy, or because, with the creation
of tlie European Common Market and the economic revival of Europe, Ital-
ians could migrate within the boundaries of Europe. There they not only
earned good wages but had access to pension and welfare benefits not
available in Latin America. Italian overseas emigration dropped consid-
erably after 1955 and return migration increased. In Venezuela, the
Italians had an overall permanency rate of only forty-six percent. The
Portuguese and the Spanish had much higher rates: seventy-five and sixty
percent, respectively. These higher rates can be explained in part by
the fact that neither Spain or Portugal belonged to the Conmion Market,
and their economies were not as robust as the Italian.
The overall permanency rate for foreigners as measured in the
samples was only forty-nine percent. As has been seen, nationality seems
to have been the dominant factor in the decision to stay or to leave.
Among the five major nationality groups, the Portuguese and the Colom-
bians were the most likely to stay, followed by the Spanish, the Italians,
and the Americans. There had been occasional articles in the press not-
ing that the immigrants were not staying in Venezuela, but the shift of
Italian immigration toward Europe plus the increasing return migration
of Italians from Venezuela seem to have prompted serious consideration of
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the situation. The Caracas Chamber of Commerce produced a series of
articles, starting in May 1957. trying to demonstrate that the reason so
many foreigners left was that they had not assimilated to the Venezuelan
milieu. The reason for this failure was that they tended to live in
Venezuela as though they were still in their native country. They formed
small, insulated communities, sent their children to schools where the
curriculum was that of the old country, had newspapers in their own
language (The Caracas Journal
, later The Daily Journal
, La Voce d' Italia
and 11 Corrleri dl Caracas were the best known), had radio and television
programs in their own language (an hour here and there), and belonged
to exclusive clubs. The Chamber of Commerce was particularly upset by
the proliferation of private foreign schools, because this meant that
not even the children of immigrants would assimilate. Although it may
simply be a coincidence, the timing of this campaign, which lasted
through August, would seem to make it more than the usual raising of
public consciousness. By this date, even the business community had be-
gun to weary of Perez Jimenez and it is possible that the whole campaign
was simply an indirect criticism of the regime which was so closely
42
associated with immigration.
42Out-migration was of course a constant factor throughout this
period. According to the VENIMSTATS data, approximately ten percent of
each sample left within two years and twenty percent within four years
of having arrived. Articles appeared in the press commenting on the
reasons for the return, citing unemployment, the earning of sufficient
money, and the desire to rejoin the family. Press articles usually ac-
knowledged tliat due to the cost of living in Venezuela, it was cheaper
for the immigrant to maintain his family in the old country than to bring
it to Venezuela. See, among others, El Nacional , January 20, 1950; El
Heraldo, May 11, 1950 and April 24, 1953; El Universal , May 20, 1955;
Diario del Occidente
,
May 22, 1956; La Religion , May 23, 1956. The cam-
paign mounted by the Chamber of Commerce can be found in La Esfera and
The only quantitative information available on the foreigners'
reasons for leaving was compiled by the National Agrarian Institute and
refers only to those who held immigrant visas. According to its records,
thirty percent left because of the education needs of their children;
twenty-six percent because they felt isolated; twenty percent because
they had no pension benefits; twelve percent because they had saved all
the money they needed; eight percent left because of discrimination and
four percent for reasons of health or the climate. The information covers
the period 1949-1960. These immigrants were fortune's favorites, be-
cause the Venezuelan government felt some responsibility for them and
therefore unemployment was not listed as a reason for leaving. The
records of the Italian consulate show a different picture. During 1962,
when the economy was still in recession, the Consulate had to repatriate
333 persons; forty-three percent for reasons of sickness; forty-seven
percent for reasons of penury, five percent because they were told to
leave the country and five percent for other reasons.
At the other end of the continuum were the immigrants who stayed,
but even they caused some anguish. Either they did not become natural-
ized, or they naturalized for "personalist" reasons, which usually meant
they did it to get a job or to keep one. The naturalization process was
Ultimas Notlclas
,
May 7, 1957; Diario del Occidente, May 22, 1957 and
El National
,
May 31, 1957. The criticisms were repeated with minor vari-
ations in July, August and September of that same year.
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IAN, Informaciones estadlsticas , 1-7-49—31-12-60 . See also
Luis Oscar Telleria, La experiencia migratorla venezolana (Madrid, 1961),
80-81. The information on Italian repatriations was compiled by the
author from the repatriation register in the Italian Consulate in Cara-
cas .
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fairly simple, particularly for native speakers of Spanish who only had
to state their desire to become Venezuelans; other foreigners had to
comply with more paperwork. Nevertheless, relatively few foreigners took
the step. By 1961 only twelve percent of the foreign population was
naturalized. Of the samples taken, valid through 1975, the 1948 group
has the highest rate, 24.1 percent, and that is the group with the highest
number of refugees, who could never go home again. The other four sam-
ples average slightly more than seventeen percent. There was a sudden
spurt in naturalization after 1973, because Article 18 of the Labor Law
was amended to read no more than twenty-five percent of the total salaries
could be paid to foreigners. Since they tended to be concentrated at the
higher end of the salary scale, employers pressured them to become natur-
alized so that they could be listed as Venezuelans (see table 20 and
appendix A, table 37).
According to Gino Germani, author of several excellent studies
on the impact of immigrants in Argentina, a number of factors influence
immigrant assimilation and the tendency to naturalize, including: (1) the
power structure of the receiving society; (2) the immigrant's position in
that structure; (3) his location in the stratification system of both his
native society and the receiving one; (4) differences in the two cultures
and their relative prestige; (5) the degree of segregation of the immigrant
population; and (6) the cultural homogeneity of the immigrants, including
their solidarity, their attitudes, their level of education, the strength
of their original national identification, the degree of acceptance which
they find in their new country, and especially the degree of social mo-
bility which they experience in the receiving country. But first and
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foremost for German! is the factor of the relative size of the immigrant
and native population. If the receiving society is small, as was the
case in Venezuela, and the immigrants many, which was the result of their
congregation in a few areas, the native population can hardly assimilate
the newcomers, and in fact will be hard put to maintain its own identi-
.
44
ty.
In Venezuela, two other major factors operated to influence immi-
grant assimilation. One was the inchoate sense of national identity on
the part of the Venezuelans—a result of their limited contact with for-
mal schooling and the long years of dictatorial government which did its
best not to mobilize public feeling for any reason. The second factor
had to do with the relative advantage to the immigrant of maintaining his
nationality in a country not known for its political stability. In times
of strife, such as in the aftermath of the overthrow of Perez Jimenez,
no one stopped to ask a foreigner if he were naturalized. From 1945 to
1961 there were five irregular changes of president and two electoral
ones. The leftist guerilla movement kept the country seething for much
of the 1960s. In addition, naturalization did not give the foreign citi-
zen appreciably more rights than he already had. He might vote, but he
could never be elected a deputy or senator, nor could he be appointed
cabinet minister or governor of a state. There seems to be a certain
fear of politically liberating the naturalized foreigner. Twice in the
late 1970s a constitutional amendment was presented to the Congress to
extend the political rights of naturalized foreigners. Both times the
issue was bitterly debated. Proponents pointed out that the political
'^'^Gino Gerraani, "Mass Immigration," 308-309.
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rJglita of uaLuraii/.Lid Venezuelans are amuuK ti.e most lin.iied in Lhe
Western Hemisphere; in this ronLext, Henry Kissinuer became a by-word.
Opponents pointed out ( b.it loreigners often do not become naturalized
lor reasons of conviction but rather from necessity, and they would be-
come a danger to national security if allowed to i)enetrate secrets of
state. Apparently a lingering suspicion exists that if left to tlieir
own devices, foreigners would take over the country. The amended Labor
haw and the Cartagena agreements on foreign investments have driven many
ol them to become naturalized and many Venezuelans believe that this new
citizenship means little or nothing to the recipient. Germani noted that
in Argentina the Immigrants did not regard Argentine culturi; as superior
and to be adopted, and therefore did not value Argentine citizenship.
Interviews with immigrants indicated that this was often the case In
45Venezuela as well.
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The question of naturalization procedures has been raised sev-
eral times. Discussion of a new naturalization law in the mid 1950s pro-
voked several press articles which warned that the new law should be more
rigorous because too many people were becoming naturalized for reasons of
expediency. One suggestion was to require that foreigners pass an exam-
ination on Spanish and the rights and duties of Venezuelan citizens. With
reference to the Spanish exam, La Esfera (June 8, 1955) noted that three-
fourths of tlic Venezuelans would fail such an exam, therefore it was ri-
diculous to require foreigners to pass one. Although such examinations
were required in the new law passed in 1955, the regulatory decree was
not issued until 1964, when proof of having passed an examination, in
Spanish, on Venezuelan history, geography and civics was required for
purposes of naturalization. The government does not offer citizensliip
classes but three books are available to aid in the preparation for the
exam, including the Manjjai ji^e ve^nezoj^ para extranjeros, now in its
fourth edition and published by the Asociacion Pro Venezuela. According
to i'tneda, the exam was viewed as difficult by various Italians he inter-
viewed, not because of the questions so much as the fact that the immi-
grants had no more than a third or fourth grade education and did not have
the time to study. See iiis 1 talo-Venezolano , 445-446. According to a
report in "7° Dia" (the Sunday supplement to El Naci onal) between fifty
to sixty-five percent of those who present the exam do not pass (March 2,
1^80). Not everyone is obliged to present it, however, and in 1979,
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Oddly enough, the recent wave of inm^igratlon to Venezuela, sparked
by the sudden increase in petroleum prices since 1973, has caused many
people, foreigners and Venezuelans alike, to view the immigration of the
postwar period through the golden haze of nostalgia. This may help ease
what are the normal tensions between first generation immigrants and the
inhabitants of the receiving country, although the growing acceptance of
the "old" immigration may make it more difficult for those who have just
arrived. It is significant that the word "muslG" is no longer used now
that the new immigrants are mostly Latin Americans rather than Europeans.
The "musia" is passing into history. It is still too soon to evaluate
his contributions, but it would seem that the experience, for both the
'Vnusiues"and the criollos
, has been a fruitful one, even though neither
may be wholly content with the results so far.
only about 2,500 persons did so. If one has completed some level of
education in Venezuela, or has lived in Venezuela for more than ten
consecutive years or is over fifty years of age, the examination is
waived. Despite the fact that it was nominally easier to become a citi-
zen in the 1950s, evidently there were cases of bribery and fraud.
Felipe Gagliardi was quoted as saying that it was cheaper to make a
Venezuelan than to give birth to one in a clinic. See Arturo Aguilar,
Tierra sin justicia; historia y polltlca contemporanea (Caracas, 1958),
49. Aguilar stated that in 1958 Venezuelan citizenship cost only 700
bollvares
, as compared with 1,200 bolivares earlier in the decade. He
did not speculate on the reason for the decline in the cost of the bribes.
With reference to the constitutional amendment to extend the political
rights of naturalized foreigners, thus allowing them to become state
governors, ministers or members of Congress ten years after the date of
naturalization, it was not approved. For discussions of the issue, see
El Nacional, November 30, 1977 and December 2, 1979, among others.
CHAPTER VII
SOME IMMIGRATION HYPOTHESES AND THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE
In 1965 Everett S. Lee attempted to remedy the lack of a general
theory of migration by presenting a number of hypotheses which he be-
lieved would go far to explain the volume of migration, the development
of migration streams and counterstreams and the characteristics of mi-
grants. His hypotheses have been utilized here as a convenient schema
for summarizing the Venezuelan immigration experience in the period 1936-
1961.
Lee's first hypothesis is that the volume of migration within a
given territory varies with the degree of diversity of the areas includ-
ed in that territory. This hypothesis stresses economic incentives in
the place of destination. Lee mentioned the opening up of new lands for
settlement, sudden attractions such as the discovery of gold in Califor-
nia, and industrial opportunities which cause migration from one place to
another. Although the Venezuelan government, particularly through its
official immigration program, gave potential immigrants the idea that
agricultural lands were awaiting them, the real attraction for most iirani-
grants was the revenue generated by petroleum production, as opposed to
employment possibilities in the industry, which in fact were limited.
Venezuela's reputation of being El Dorado was revived as petroleum money
"'"Lee, "A Theory of Migration."
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provided the magnet which drew the immigrants.^
This pole of attraction stood in sharp contrast with the magnets
of coffee production in Brazil, wheat and cattle in Argentina, and the
industrial opportunities of the United States. In Venezuela, the immi-
grants by and large did not go into agriculture or the petroleum indus-
try but rather helped to develop the secondary and tertiary sectors of
the economy. Even in the secondary sector, however, the immigrants had
more impact on transportation and construction than on manufacturing.
There were no fiery steel mills to consume the immigrants, just as there
were no sweatshops in the textile industry. Indeed, the small consumer
market meant that clothes were usually made on an individual basis rather
than for a mass market. Immigrants worked as tailors and dressmakers
rather than cutters and sewers. Agriculture was the economic activity
in which the harshest conditions of labor were to be found, but with the
exception of the Colombians, it was the Venezuelans, not the foreigners,
who suffered under them.
A second hypothesis is that the volume of migration varies with
the diversity of people. According to Lee, where there is little differ-
ence among people— racially, ethnically, educationally, financially—we
may expect a lesser rate of migration since all such people would evolve
at more or less the same rate. This hypothesis did not hold true in
Venezuela. Of the five major groups of immigrants, only the Americans
were significantly different in the above named respects. The Portuguese,
2
In one of the few literary treatments of immigration in Venezuela,
Jose Antonio Rial, himself a Spanish refugee, made this point time and
again. Indeed, the word "iman" used in the title means magnet. See
his Venezuela iman (Barcelona, 1974). The book was originally published
in Caracas in 1955.
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Italians. Spaniards and Colombians were all from the Latin tradition,
predominantly Catholic, with languages so similar as to cause few prob-
lems in communication, and their educational and financial conditions
differed in degree rather than in kind. In truth, this very similarity,
combined with the great spacial and social mobility within urban areas,
helped lessen considerably the normal problems associated with first
generation iiranigration. No ethnic ghettos were formed and there were no
outstanding ethnic or racial differences which could be successfully en-
flamed.
A diversity of people implies specialization and Lee stated that
"it is a common finding that immigrant groups specialized in particular
3
occupations." Such specialization implies a social stratification among
the immigrants and often leads to discrimination. While there are no
global statistics on Immigrant participation in the work force by specif-
ic nationality, the VENIMSTATS data did corroborate certain ethnic ten-
dencies which are stereotypes in Venezuela (see appendix B, tables43 and
44). Although the Venezuelans may associate certain nationalities with
high or low status employment and thus classify an ethnic group as having
high or low social status, public attitudes seem to have predated the
arrival of the immigrants in most cases.
As we have seen in chapter II, northern Europeans were thought
to be intrinsically superior to southern Europeans, despite the failure
of two colonization attempts with the northerners; a nineteenth-century
German colony and the 1938 colony of Danes. Venezuelans preferred
^Lee, "A Theory of Migration," 289,
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Italians to peninsular Spaniards because they were outgoing, unprejudiced
and supposedly put down roots, whereas the Spaniards (but not the Canary
Islanders) were reputed to be latent colonialists who thought they were
superior to the Venezuelans. The Portuguese, as we have seen, were the
scapegoats of immigration failures. They were also the only ethnic
group about whom the Venezuelans seemed to have formed an opinion sub-
sequent to their arrival, as the public opinion poll of 1948 showed only
eighteen percent opposed to Portuguese immigration.'^ The prejudice
against Jews, on the other hand, was widespread; over eighty percent
opposed their immigration. Nevertheless, most persons polled probably
had no contact with Jews as there were few of them in Venezuela and they
were concentrated In the capital. Therefore the attitudes toward Jews
must have been acquired culturally, not from experience. Colombians dur-
ing this period were not in the public consciousness very often and en-
joyed the position of "brothers" rather than foreigners, as did the
Canary Islanders.'^ The last major group of outsiders, the Americans,
were viewed ambivalently by the Venezuelans. Respected for their know-
how, they were also disliked for their attitude of indifference toward
Venezuela and things Venezuelan—with the exception of petroleum. Nearly
4
For a vivid account of the depreciatory treatment of the Portu-
guese, see Rial, Venezuela Iman
,
passim.
5
With reference to Venezuelan attitudes toward the Spaniards, as
opposed to the Canary Islanders, Maria Rosa Alonso wrote that the Span-
lards were not well-liked because of their manner of speaking, whereas
the islenos spoke with practically the same accent as the Venezuelans.
See her Residente en Venezuela (Merida, 1960). 17. Martin de Ugalde
wrote that when he once asked a proprietor if he had any foreigners
working for him the man replied, "Musiues no, pero islenos si, " ("Foreign-
ors no. but Islanders yes.") See his Cuando los peces mueren de sed:
reportajes (Merida, 1963), 92.
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.enty-five percent of those polled in 1948 did not want American ir
gration. It is probable that the temporary nature of the presence of
individual Americans went far to mitigate negative feelings. Also.
Venezuelans make a difference between being anti-imperialist and anti-
American. The latter sentiment is expressed very rarely.
Despite occasional indications of xenophobia, the Venezuelan ex-
perience with mass immigration was remarkably free from the usual con-
flicts between the native population and the first generation of immi-
grants. This may well be the result of the concomitant changes taking
place in the country as a result of the shift from an agricultural-
based economy to one based on petroleum exploitation, accompanied as it
was by massive internal migration. There were as many internal migrants
in Caracas as there were foreigners. Together they outnumbered the na-
tive residents. However, since the international flow of migrants was
flexible, adjusting itself to changes in the economy, and no political
group lent itself to an anti-foreigner line, there was little incentive
or opportunity for the Venezuelans to express xenophobic sentiments. Even
when democracy was restored and the labor unions once again became an
important political force, opposition to further immigration was expressed
solely in terms of economic problems without stirring up hatred
against the foreigners already in the country. This acceptance of the
immigrants may change if foreigners, even the naturalized citizens, try
to participate as actively in the political life of the country as they
have in economic and social spheres. Politics is the one area of na-
tional life which the Venezuelans have reserved for themselves.
A third hypothesis is that the volume of migration is related to
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the difficulty of surmounting the intervening obstacles. The greatest
obstacles which Lee cited are distance and political restrictions, wheth-
er on the part of the countries of emigration or immigration. Dis-
tance is a relative factor as its importance as an obstacle depends on
the means of transportation available and their cost.' As such, distance
will be discussed below. Political restrictions have had varying im-
portance in the twentieth century. Although immigration to Venezuela has
been limited at times by the government, recently, at least, such re-
strictions have been almost useless, as the growing indocumentado popu-
lation attests.
Under Juan Vicente Gomez (1908-1935), internal conditions became
stable and the economy received an enormous stimulus from the exploita-
tion of petroleum, but the Gomez regime did nothing to encourage immi-
gration. It is not clear if this was due to Gomez's indifference to
developing the country or his wariness of adding volatile foreign elements
to a population so recently pacified. Certainly the repeated promulga-
tions of the Foreigners' Law, whose basic aim was to control the activity
of foreigners in Venezuela, would seem to indicate that the latter was
a primary concern. Whatever may have been the case, it is an area which
merits further study.
Under the governments of Lopez Contreras and Medina, immigration
was hesitantly encouraged. Political considerations and the paralyzation
of oceanic passenger transport during the Second World War had the effect
of limiting the number of immigrants who arrived. From 1947 to 1958,
active government support for immigration plus vastly expanded transpor-
tation facilities conibined to remove the major obstacles to immigration.
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In the early 1950s, the governments of Spain and Italy also made it
easier for their nationals to obtain the necessary documents to emigrate.
As we shall see, however, the decline in immigration after 1957 had more
to do with changes in economic conditions, both in Venezuela and in
Europe, than with the restrictions imposed by the Venezuelan government.
A fourth hypothesis is that the volume of migration varies with
economic fluctuations. The effect of business cycles on migration has
many aspects, but according to Lee, a crucial consideration is how they
affect evaluation of positive and negative factors at origin and destina-
tion. Economic factors are also relative. In the late 1940s economic
conditions in Venezuela were far superior to those of Italy or even
Europe, but by the mid 1950s, the economic revival of Europe was a fact.
Italians then began to compare opportunities in Italy or Europe with
those offered by Venezuela, and although the economy of Venezuela was
still expanding, the Italians began opting for intracontinental rather
than inter-continental migration. The Spaniards and the Portuguese did
not have the same possibilities in Europe, thus their trans-oceanic mi-
gration continued.
Another hypothesis related to the volume of migration is that it
will tend to increase with time and the progress of a country unless
severe checks are imposed. Lee pointed out the attraction of advanced
areas over backward ones, both on the international level and between
rural and urban sectors within a particular country. He stated that
developed countries should draw immigration and have a high level of in-
ternal migration due to the level of diversification in the economy.
Venezuela was in an anomalous position with respect to the major countries
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of en>igratlon. It was no more advanced, generally speaking, than Italy,
Spain, Portugal or Colombia. That which Venezuela seemed to offer,
thanks to its petroleum riches, was unlimited economic opportunity in an
underdeveloped marketplace. One Italian immigrant commented that he had
received visas for the United States and Venezuela, and had chosen to go
to Venezuela. His reason was that he preferred economic opportunity to
economic security. When asked what they liked most about Venezuela, many
of the immigrants cited "freedom." When urged to be more specific, al-
most all of the men characterized that freedom as being economic in na-
ture. Several mentioned that their skills were unexceptional by stan-
dards in the United States or Europe, but with little or no competition
in Venezuela, they had been able to exercise them with great success.^
The check imposed on continued immigration in Venezuela would
therefore seem to be economic in nature and not so much the result of
policy restrictions. And, as previously indicated, the check was not
solely the result of a contraction in the Venezuelan economy. Alterna-
tive migration possibilities, such as those offered by the Common Market
countries and Switzerland, began to check Venezuelan Immigration even
before the economy began to contract. Also, with no significant change
in the policy of restricting immigration, the economic bonanza which
occurred as a result of the Increases in petroleum prices since 1973 has
occasioned another massive wave of immigration, much of it without the
proper papers. It would seem that the stimulus of a burgeoning economy.
^Immigrant interview, Caracas, February 18, 1976. See the Bib-
liography for a complete list of immigrant interviews.
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particularly in the midst of other stagnating ones, outweighs the nega-
tive factors of governmental restrictions on inmiigration.
With regard to migration streams and counterstreams
, the basic
hypotheses are that migration tends to take place in well-defined
streams and the efficiency of the stream, that is, the net redistribu-
tion of population, depends upon whether the push and pull factors are
positive or negative. Well-defined streams of migration certainly exis-
ted in the immigration to Venezuela, in part because of the ethnic pref-
erences expressed in immigration policy. Spanish immigration was
characterized by migrants from the Canary Islands and later the prov-
inces of Galicia. One third of the Portuguese came from the island of
Madeira. A significant proportion of the Italian immigrants came from
the provinces of Bari, Salerno and L'Aquila (see table 8). Indeed, ac-
cording to Pineda, of the 7,500 inhabitants of Padula in the province
of Salerno, 2,500 live or have lived in Venezuela.^ There is no doubt
but what the phenomenon of chain migration occurred in Padula, as it did
in other places.
The efficiency of the migration stream is high if push factors
are negative. This would be the case for refugees, for example, and in-
deed their permanency rate in Venezuela is very high. Efficiency of the
stream also tends to be high if the intervening obstacles, such as avail-
ability and cost of transport or the difficulty of obtaining a visa, are
great. Availability of transport acted as a brake on immigration only
in the immediate postwar years when the demand for passage was consider-
ably greater than the space available. In Italy, a blackmarket for
^Pineda, Italo-Venezolano , 11,
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tickets developed. Prior to the early 1950s, the indocuHer^ in
Venezuela was much more likely to be a Spaniard, particularly a Canary
Islander, than a Colombian. Besides the complicated paperwork involved
in getting a passport, the illegal sailings from the Islands were con-
siderably cheaper than the regularly scheduled departures. Although
cost is a relative concept, by the mid 1950s, passenger costs on the
shipping lines servicing Venezuela and the various European countries of
emigration were sufficiently low as to encourage movement between the
two areas. In addition, emigrants from the member countries of CIME re-
ceived financial aid to pay travel costs involved in reuniting families.
If one compares the arrival of persons with the number registered as new
immigrants, it is apparent that many immigrants had sufficient funds to
make repeated voyages (see appendix B. table 41). With regard to visas,
once obtained there was usually little difficulty in renewing them or
obtaining a new one. Even when re-entry visas supposedly were issued
only when the immigrant returned with his family, many immigrants managed
to return without their families.
The efficiency of the stream is also affected by economic consid-
erations; if the economy is in a prosperous phase, the efficiency is high;
if not, it is low. American migration to Venezuela is a good indicator
of this phenomenon. The level of American migration to Venezuela dropped
considerably after 1958 and the out-migration was such that there were
fewer Americans in Venezuela in 1971 than there had been in 1961.
The same held true for the Italians. The Colombians, on the other hand,
increased their presence considerably in that same period of time, a
circumstance due to the worsening condition of the Colombian economy.
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Lee's final series of hypotheses concerned the characteristics
of n.i,rant populations. He began by stating that migration is selective
and not a random choice of the population at origin. Selection is posi-
tive when the migrants are responding primarily to positive factors at
destination. That is, they are not economically constrained to migrate
but do so in order to improve their position. This would be the case
for the personnel of the multi-national companies. It should be remembered
that fifty percent of the managerial positions in Venezuela were
filled by foreigners at the time of the 1961 census. Selection is nega-
tive when migrants are responding to negative factors at origin, such as
political expulsions or economic or social failure. In the case of the
refugees received between 1947 and 1951, since most of them were selec-
ted by Venezuelan immigration officials, there were fewer cases of un-
successful integration than would have been the case if Venezuela had
simply accepted any and all refugees. According to Lee, the degree of
positive selection increases with the difficulty of the intervening ob-
stacles. He cited the rigors of the voyage to America prior to the
twentieth century and the distance of migration as two factors which
operated to positively select immigrants. Neither factor played an im-
portant role in the post World War II Immigration to Venezuela. Although
transportation iimnediately after the war was uncomfortable and at times
overcrowded, it was certainly not comparable with the steerage conditions
the nineteenth-century immigrants had to confront. Distance, as men-
tioned previously, is a relative concept. It is not simply a question
of the speed of transport but also a psychological one. If an immigrant
has little or no knowledge of his destination, as was certainly the case
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for nineteenth-century immigrants to Venezuela, and probably was a fac-
tor for those who emigrated to Venezuela immediately after World War II,
the distance will seem even greater than it is, since the move will be a
journey into the unknown. Both distance and the rigors of transportation
played a positive role in the selection of immigrants to Venezuela in the
nineteenth century and may explain in part the positive image which
Venezuelans had of foreigners, an image which undoubtedly facilitated
the reception and integration of immigrants after the war.
Lee noted that there is a heightened propensity to migrate at
certain stages of the life cycle. He cited entry into the labor force
and changes in civil status as often coinciding with migratory movement.
Typically, immigrants are thought to be young single men. Perhaps that
was the case when there were no governmental restrictions on immigration
and the journey itself was more rigorous. In the Venezuelan case, immi-
gration after World War II was characterized by older (27 to 40 years of
age) as opposed to younger (17 to 26 years of age) married men. No doubt
the war distorted the typical patterns. In 1955, when immigration was
essentially unrestricted, it was characterized by a predominance of
single men, but there was no appreciable difference in number of immi-
grants in the previously mentioned age cohorts. After 1958, the family
reunion policy caused immigration to be characterized by married women
and the number of single men and women approached parity. The younger
age cohorts (0 to 16 and 17 to 26) comprised slightly more than half of
the newly registered immigrants, and there was a substantial increase in
the cohort over fifty years of age, although many of those immigrants did
not settle permanently. Between fifty to seventy percent of the immigrants
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had no children, and among those who did, approximately seventy percent
had only one or two. Since most of the inmugrants came from countries
with high birth rates, it would seem that the tendency to migrate was
strongest among those with fewer children. Considering the prevalence
of the 27 to 40 cohort, the high percentage of immigrants with no chil-
dren, or only one or two, may well be an indication of positive selec-
tion at origin, particularly considering the nature of the birth control
measures available at that time.
A final hypothesis is that the characteristics of the migrant
population will be intermediate between the characteristics of the popu-
lation at origin and that at destination. Examples offered by Lee in-
clude characteristics of fertility and education. While this hypothesis
may be true for the internal migrants in Venezuela, judging by fertility
and education, it was not true for the foreign population. As will be
recalled, the educational attainments of the international migrants were
higher than those of the internal and non-migrants in Venezuela (see
table 12). Judging by the VENIMSTATS data and the birth rates for
Venezuela and the major countries of emigration, it would appear that
the fertility rate for Venezuelans was significantly higher than for
foreigners, with the possible exception of the Colombians.
As has been seen, immigration in Venezuela in the period 1936-
1961 did not follow any well-defined pattern. It was not comparable to
the massive immigration of the nineteenth century nor was it a product
of selective immigration policies predicated on the welfare-state con-
siderations which have become the norm since World War II. Despite the
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original rationale for fomenting immigration, the immigrants have not
been able to effect significant changes in the development of the coun-
try; rather, their impact has been limited by factors inherent in the
country's social, economic and political structures. According to Jorge
Ahumada, Venezuela is characterized by social dualism, which he defined
as "the coexistance of traditional and modern institutional structures,
and/or the functioning of modern organizations according to traditional
norms." Ahumada noted that the rapid economic growth of Venezuela
since 1936 has played an important role in this cultural dualism, caus-
ing values and attitudes to change at differing rates. The fact that
most of the resultant economic change had its origin abroad (that is, was
the result of changes initiated by the transnational companies) also
fostered cultural dualism. He added that because these great changes
were initiated by foreigners using imported techniques, capital, and
organization, "it was not necessary to break down the power structures,
create entrepreneurs, increase knowledge, create a favorable attitude
g
toward saving, wcark and economic rationality ... ."
During the years covered by this study, Venezuela was locked into
an import-export economy and the revenues derived from the exploitation
of petroleum made it possible for the country to grow economically with-
out having the technical or attitudinal capacity for it. As a result of
the neglect of the education system and the pre-existing economic struc-
Q
Jorge Ahumada, "Hypotheses for Diagnosing Social Change: The
Venezuelan Case," in A Strategy for Research on Social Policy , eds
.
Frank Bonilla and Jose A. Silva Michelena (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 7-
10.
ture attuned to the import-export trade, immigrants failed to alter
significantly the established norms they encountered. The immigrants of
the postwar period might have had the potential for effecting substantial
changes in Venezuela, as was the case in Argentina in an earlier age,
but they were soon overtaken by events. The Venezuelan population ex-
plosion, massive internal migrations, large capital investments by both
the state and transnational companies, the utilization of sophisticated
imported technology, and the growth of mass communications which often
depended on foreign, particularly American, models—all served to lessen
the impact that the massive arrival of foreigners might have had. Immi-
grants were only one of the many factors producing change in the period
1936 through 1961.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
173
Much of the material published in Venezuela which is listed
this bibliography was either mimeographed, reproduced by a printing
company or issued by a government office or ministry. In the latter
case, all material which bears the name of an individual author has
been listed under that person's name, but not in the section dedicated
to Venezuelan official publications. In that section will be found all
government serial publications used in this study, listed under the
name of the organization which was last responsible for its publication.
Only the actual years consulted have been listed.
In the section dedicated to Venezuelan immigration materials,
only the materials predominantly concerned with immigration are listed.
Other publications which touch on the theme will be found in the sec-
tion dedicated to general material on Venezuela.
With the exception of the DIEX statistics (Estadisticas
,
1975 )
and the Estudlo analltlco del servicio nacional de Identificacion y
Extranjeria
,
by Humberto Hernandez Caliman, all material published in
Venezuela can be found in one of the following libraries, all of which
are located in Caracas.
Biblioteca Central, Universidad Central de Venezuela
Biblioteca Nacional de Venezuela
Biblioteca, Banco Central de Venezuela
Biblioteca, Fundacion John Boulton
Biblioteca, Minlsterio de Agricultura y Cria
Biblioteca, Minlsterio de Foraento
174
175
SOURCES CONSULTED
Unpublished Materials
A. Archives
1. Archive del Dr. Enrique Tejera Paris (ATP), Caracas
,
This archive contains official memoranda and
correspondence related to Dr. Tejera Paris 's activities
as chief of the immigration mission in Italy, 1946-1947.
It has an index of materials.
2. Archive del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Di-
reccion de Consulados (ADC), Caracas.
These files are arranged by year. Numbers are
assigned arbitrarily. Documents are listed in an index
available only in the archive. The documents refer to
all activities of the consulates, but not all of the
documents referring to immigration are on file. After
1950 consular officials communicated directly with the
Ministry of Internal Affairs with regard to visas and
duplicate records were not always sent to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
3. Archives de la Direccion General de Identificacion y
Extranjeria (Prontuarios
,
Dactiloscopla and
Movlmiento Migratorio), Caracas.
These files contain information on all foreigners
registered in Venezuela and were the source for the
VENIMSTATS data. See appendix B for details.
4. U.S. Department of State, Political and Military Records
Relating to Internal Affairs of Venezuela, Deci-
mal Files, 1935-1949. National Archives, Wash-
ington.
B. Interviews
1. Former Government Officials
Colonel (ret.) Tomas Perez Tenreiro, Director of Ex-
tranjeria, 1953-1958. Caracas, March 1976.
Dr. Enrique Tejera Paris, Chief of the Immigration
Mission, Italy, 1946-1947. Caracas, May 1976.
176
2. Immigrants (All interviews were held in Caracas.)
January 20, 1976, Italian male, b.
January 21, 1976, Italian male, b.
January 26, 1976, Italian male, b.
agency
.
January 27, 1976, Italian female, 1
February 2, 1976, Portuguese male,
grocery store.
February 3, 1976, Portuguese male,
February 18, 1976, Italian male, b,
worker
February 20, 1976, Spanish male, b
March 20, 1976, Hungarlan male, b.
1899, unemployed.
1913, manufacturer.
1931, owner, travel
1. 1923, housewife,
b. 1925, owner,
b. 1918, merchant.
1925, construction
1923, taxi driver.
1923, technician.
1915, manufacturer;March 23, 1976, Polish male, b
construction.
March 27, 1976, Lebanese male, b. 1916, merchant.
May 5, 1976, Spanish male, b. 1929, merchant.
May 6, 1976, Spanish female, b. 1931, concierge.
May 7, 1976, Italian female, b. 1929, university pro-
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OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN STATISTICS
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In this appendix the reader will find statistics taken from
various volumes of the national population censuses and the Anuario
estadlsticq
.
A word of caution is offered with reference to such offi-
cial statistics. Because of deficiencies in official recordkeeping,
the annual reports of government ministries are not always reliable and
often omit the kinds of information which would be useful in recreating
the past. The noted economic historian, Eduardo Arcila Farias, has re-
counted his bitter experiences with the archives of one ministry which
had contracted him to write their centennial history. In his introduc-
tion to the work Arcila Farias wrote that the "Memorias" should be called
"Amnesias" because they lacked more than just typographical consistency.
He ascribed the sad condition of the ministry's archives to a lack of
space and a lack of trained personnel. He claimed that the lack of ac-
cess to some archives, no matter the excuse offered, is due to the non-
existance of the archive. He described the weeding of archives as "a
euphemism for the whole-saling (venta a mayor ) of old documents.""^
Another study found it necessary to warn its readers that govern-
2
ment statistics are often "unavailable or unreliable or in conflict."
Since the basic statistical information is not always available or is
not correct, the few secondary sources which deal with social and econo-
mic conditions are at times superficial and contain errors. Discrepan-
cies in the statistics, even in primary sources, are not usually due to
Eduardo Arcila Farias, Centenario de Ministerio de Obras Publicas
Influencia de este ministerio en el desarrollo, 1874-1974 (Caracas, 1974),
17-18.
2
The Economic Development of Venezuela ; the report of a Mission
organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(Baltimore, 1961), 16-17.
typographical errors but rather derive from inadequate handling of
raw statistical information.
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TABLE 25
Net Inter-state Migration, 1936-1961, by Zones
iTimarily Petroleum:
State 1936-1941 1941-1950 1950-1961
Zulia
Anzoategui
Monagas
30,558
5,213
16,355
49,492
27,608
3,424
25,802
4,547
-15,848
Primarily Industrial:
State 1936-1941 1941-1950 1950-1961
Federal District 50,352
Miranda
-21,418
Aragua
-10,347
Carabobo
-5,972
Bolivar
-464
-2,514
14,424
904
-6,389
0 / , 9 /5
67,472
24,777
23,147
15,144
Primarily Agricultural:
State 1936-1941 1941-1950 1950-1961
Barinas
Portuguesa
Cojedes
Guarico
Yaracuy
-1,387
5,091
-5,270
-2,791
-14,865
1,538
11,393
-4,069
203
-18,361
1 S 991
17,322
-1,678
-203
-4,606
Primarily Mountainous:
State 1936-1941 1941-1950 1950-1961
Tachira
Trujillo
Merida
-1,680
-13,452
-12,141
-19,072
-35,980
-19,217
-43,567
-33,750
-15,743
Arid and Semi-Arid:
State 1936-1941 1941-1950 1950-1961
Falcon
Lara
Sucre
Nueva Esparta
-13,622
-532
-8,602
-14,829
-20,924
-27,256
-41,256
-6,367
-42,522
-24,112
-57,980
-9,323
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TABLE 25 (continued)
Intense Rainfall or Drought Followed by^ten^r^R^IKfilin
^^^^ 1936-1941
_______J^^41:J^50 1950-1961
^P"""^ 3,668
_7 o
Federal Territories 7,073
-4^122
-o,u/b
-7,478
^QA«^^°o^''^o
^^^"^^ M ovimientos migratorlos en Venezuela (Caracas,
1968), 92-98. Cuadro No. 3-7 has been included in the agricultural
section of this table.
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TABLE 26
nues, Selected Sources, 1938-1961 (in thousands of
YEAR
1938
TOTAL
340,345
IMPORT DUTIES
115,397 33.
0
.9
PETROLEUM
89,605
~%
26. 3
INCOME TAX
—
—
I
__
1939 350,854 134,621 38.,4 83,419 23. 8 ._
1940 330,070 124,683 37.,8 72,928 22. 1 —
1941 359,263 98,132 27.,3 112,405 31. 3 ——
1942 291,821 71,321 24.,4 65,441 22. 4 —.-
1943 340,227 83,852 24.,6 76,088 22. 4 —.-
1944 541,879 85,830 15. 8 242,357 44. 7 41,286 7. 7
1945 659,638 125,512 19. 0 267,327 40. 5 70,318 10. 7
1946 855,519 146,786 17. 1 273,221 31.,9 185,732 21. 7
1947 1,281.002 238,926 18. 7 434,788 13.,9 219,111 17. 1
1948 1,776,433 306,669 17. 3 720,452 40.,6 368,066 20. 7
1949 1,979,622 344,288 17. 4 599,760 30.,3 575,371 29. 1
1950 1,917,006 341,486 17. 8 613,948 32.,0 373,932 19. 5
1951 2,266,542 356,440 15. 7 864,053 38. 1 503,621 22. 2
1952 2,407,751 381,878 15. 9 822,474 34. 2 647,531 26. 9
1953 2,533,578 378,475 14. 9 826,407 32. 6 738,346 29. 1
1954 2,631,800 407,019 15. 5 900,527 34. 2 675,684 25. 7
1955 2,992,085 429,455 14. 4 1,034,436 34. 6 783,661 26. 2
1956 4,380,007 433,947 9. 9 2,193,623 50. 1 944,747 21. 6
1957 5,404,725 483,585 8. 9 2,680,861 49. 6 1,206,116 22. 3
1958 4,706,036 524,041 11. 1 1,361,764 28. 9 1,597,557 33. 9
1959 4,943,468 567,570 11. 5 1,637,924 33. 1 1,985,039 40. 2
1960 6,147,448 419,146 6. 8 1,631,673 26. 5 1,805,226 29. 4
1961 7,067,291 348,006 4. 9 1,573,984 22. 3 2,339,233 33. 1
Source: Anuarlo estadistico, 1957-1963 (Caracas, 1964), II, 820-821.
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TABLE 28
Imports from England, France, Holland, Italy, Spain and the
United States; Selected Years (in thousands of Bolivares)
COUNTRY 1950 1955 1958 1961 1963
England 135,394 231,277 341,755 186,908 221,516
France 49,544 86,151 117,351 116,508 93,843
Holland 23,546 79,897 109,373 80,052 91,779
Italy 46,522 91,981 304,857 203,068 147,696
Spain 13,292 11,386 14,929 28,091 24,493
United States 1,343,447 1,894,446 2,697,044 1,909,988 ;L, 981, 765
Source: Anuario estadistico, 1957-1963 (Caracas
. 1964), II, 1104-1109.
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TABLE 29
Total Population, Foreign and Naturalized Population, According to the
National Censuses, 1936-1971
YEAR TOTAL POPULATION FOREIGN NATURALIZED
'i FOREIGN
BOR.\*
1936 3,491,159 45,484 1,542 1.34
1941 3,850,771 47,704 2,224 1.29
1950 5,034,833 194,145 12,622 4.10
1961 7,523,999 461,584 64,604 6.99
1971 10,721,522 463,738 105,430 5.30
So^^'^e: IX censo general de poblacion: Resumen general de la Nacidn
"^'^'^^ (Caracas, 1966), 45 and X censo de poblacion v vivienda:
'
Venezuela, resumen general (Caracas
,
1974) ,74.
^
*Children born abroad to Venezuelan parents are not included in any
or the calculations except Yotal Population."
TABLE 30
Selected Nationalities: Foreigners and Naturalized Citizens According to
the Censuses, 1936-1971
YEAR .AMERICANS COLOMBIANS ITALIANS PORTUGUESE SPANISH
F N F N F N F N F N
1936 1,782 84 18,895 549 2,579 73 26 2 5.506 240
1941 3,488 87 16,532 447 3,034 103 648 2 6,523 436
1950 10, 920 641 41,349 3,704 43,404 593 10,798 92 35,594 2,181
1961 12,305 515 88,357 7,128 113,631 7, 207 40,356 1,578 134,982 30,757
1971* 11,2 77 180,144 38,249 60,430 149,747
Source: IX censo general de poblacio'n: Resumen -eneral de la Nacidn :
Partes B v C (Caracas, 1967), 333-334 and X censo de poblacion v vivienda
.
Venezuela: resumen general (Caracas, 1974), 24-25 and 76-77.
*There is no breakdown which indicates how many persons were born
abroad to Venezuelan parents (the total was 10,773) or how manv were
naturalized citizens (the total was 105,430) according to the country
of birth.
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TABLE 31
Selected I.'ationalities bv Plac c of Res idence: Census 1961'''
Place American Co loir.bian Italian Portuguese Scanisr.
i 0 1 a i
Foreign
Venezuela 12, 305 88,357 113,631 40.356 134,982 461.58-
Federal District 1,090 7,095 44.350 22.540 79.035 178,758
Anzoategui 1,741 251 3.816 576 2 . 319 11,993
Apure 8 2, 798 348 121 3.566
Aragua 34A 691 7,213 2, 50-4 5.133 19.035
Barinas 60 2,492 1.075 34 289 -.311
Bolivar 617 309 3,341 ^01 1,410 8,569
Carabobo 649 916 8,189 2 . 390 5 . 965
Coj edes 4 29 361 80 408 1,029
Falcon 458 380 1,771 756 1,602 6.771
Guarico 95 196 2,190 -i88 1 , 768 5,559
Lara 38 769 3,303 819 3,194 10,360
MeriJa 33 3,281 1,046 58 540 5.534
Mi r P n H
P
3,474 2,036 18,562 7.645 23.573 o7 . 590
Monagas 516 78 1,157 170 552 3.663
I'iueva Esparta 27 185 44 278 652
Portuguesa 21 137 2,652 148 1.251 5.225
Sucre 60 64 986 258 1,102 3 , --1
Tachira 50 38.580 697 115 547 40,629
Truj illo 10 1,009 1,533 136 461 3. 665
Yaracuy 12 195 1,208 226 1,606 .,185
Zulia 2,958 26.174 9,528 888 3.746 52,982
Territories i 63 850 120 39 82 1.596
Dependencies
Source: IX censo e^neral de r)oblaci5n: Resumen reneral ae l£ r =nuD-
lica. Parte A (Caracas. 1966J. 52-55.
"Does not include naturalizea foreigners.
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TABLE 32
Marriages by Nationality, 1948-1956
•L Cd L iotai Number of Marriages Total
1
V-F or F-F Percent F-F
1948 21,700 939 38.9
1949 23,702 1,312 40.9
ly JL) 25,094 1,301 36.7
1951 24,874 1,672 36.5
1952 26,112 2,007 43.3
1953 29,108 2,513 42.4
1954 30.863 2,805 42.7
1955 30,446 3,178 47.3
1956 35,960 3,702 50.8
Source: Anuario estadlstico, 1948--1956. In 1967, when the statis-
tical breakdown was resumed, there were 53,150 marriages, 6,060 in-
volving at least one foreigner and the percent which were between two
foreigners dropped to 39.8. See the Anuario estadlstico, 1967
.
"'"V-F = Venezuelan—Foreign; F-F = Foreign—Foreign.
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TABLE 33
Legitimate Births by Nationality of the Parents, 1944-1961
YEAR TOTAL FV-MV FF-MF FV-MF-^ FF-MV'^ Perce
ForeJ
1944 64 S9 'I A 9 7A9DZ , / DZ C O 1 321 908 2.7
1945 UO , jM D A A 719DO > / xZ /on 313 832 2.3
1946 7 9 m 7/ Z
, U J / 613 388 994 2.6
1 947 7 7 9n 9/ / » zUz 8o4 617 1,144 3.3
X 7 H O fl7 f«71
, ZZU 1 C 7 O1 ,5 / z 571 1,308 3.9
1 949 y J , DOD Q 1 i^Q 9 O 17 7z , 1 / 7 616 1, 301 4.2
1 9^0 IDA A 7 QQ HA 9yy
,
udz O 1 7 C3,1/5 740 1 ,496 5.1
Tin 1m Qn 9lU J , oUz o ^ o o3 , DZO 975 1,963 5.9
1 9 S7 XXo , J /
Z
1 r>Q c; A QlUo , _)bo 4 , 563 1 ,057 2, 184 6.7
X/7 , JZ
J
1 1 Q Alllies
,
DXi c /onJ , 4oy 1 , 284 3, 939 8.2
1 Q "^A 111^ ITTX J J
,
X J J IOC /, n QXZ J
,
Wo ^ 0 9 1
_> , y zi 1,241 2 , 563 7.1
LyDD X J J
,
U X y 1 /. 9 7 n 9X^ J , / Uz A n n oD , yyy 1 /or1 , 4 36 2 , 883 7.3
1956 147, 790 135,518 7,518 1,621 3,133 8.3
1957 137,848 112,520 8,456 1,331 2,877 9.1
1958 131,625 116,987 9,512 1,963 3,163 11.1
1959 146,331 128,742 10,802 2,487 4,300 12.0
1960 153,686 133,065 13,184 2,423 5,014 13.4
1961 158,080 136,577 13,768 2,372 5,363 13.6
Source: Anuario estadistlco
,
1944-1963.
"^Father Venezuelan, Mother Venezuelan
2
Father Foreign, Mother Foreign
3
Father Venezuelan, Mother Foreign
4
Father Foreign, Mother Venezuelan
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TABLE 34
Illegitimate and Recognized Births by Nationality of Mother. 1944-1961
ILLEGITIMATE &
YEAR TOTAL BIRTHS RECOGNIZED TOTAL PERCENT MF^
1944 147,207 82,684 56. 1 82,303 381 0 .4
1945 154,489 86,143 55. 7 85,797 346 0 .4
1946 165,302 91,270 55. 2 90,883 387 0 .4
1947 173,746 93,899 54. 0 93.379 520 0 .5
1948 183,590 95,919 52. 2 95,328 591 0 .6
1949 198,773 103,087 51. 8 102,417 670 0 .6
1950 212,096 107,623 50. 7 106,773 850 0 .7
1951 224,533 114,185 50. 8 112,958 1,227 1 .0
1952 230,703 114,331 49. 5 113,096 1,235 1 .0
1953 250,942 122,921 48. 9 121,195 1,726 1 .4
1954 262,134 127,001 48. 4 125,443 1,558 1 .2
1955 272,432 117,415 43. 0 116,115 1,300 1 .1
1956 278,072 130,282 46. 8 128,651 1,631 1 .2
1957 284,080 158,896 55. 9 155,600 3,296 2 .0
1958 291,747 160,122 54. 8 156,170 3.952 2 .4
1959 324,739 178,408 54. 9 173,815 4,593 2 .5
1960 338,199 184,513 54. 5 179,158 5,355 2 .9
1961 344,989 186,909 54. 1 177,888 9,021 4 .8
Source: Anuario estadistico
,
1944-1963.
"'"Mother Venezuelan
2
Mother Foreign
3
Percent Mother Foreign
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TABLE 35
Crimes Committed by Venezuelans and Foreigners, 1943-1961
YEAR MATTnWAT THTAT COMMITTED BY FOREIGNERS % OF TOTAL
1943
i- > 1/1 34 1.6
1944 36 1.4
1945 9 1 ft/.i.
, lOH 57 2.6
1946 37 1.4
1947 9 'iQ 9 45 1.7
1948 9 A 7 73 2. 7
1949 9 9r>AZ
, ZUO 59 2.6
1950 1 9 "^AJ-
,
Z J'i oU 4 .
8
1951 Z
,
JO J 7 Q 3.2
1952 9 7 'aA yo 3.5
1953 liz 4 . J
1954 J 1 ZUJ 1 A Aloo J . 1
3,418 222 6.4
1956 4,134 240 5.8
1957 4,273 275 6.4
1958 4,036 282 6.9
1959 5,666 425 7.5
1960 5,867 394 6.7
1961 5,933 467 7.8
Source: Anuario estadlstico
,
1943-1963.
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TABLE 36
Misdemeanors: Percent Committed by Foreigners and
1956-1961
N;^f~iiT";=il "i "7 c^A P-f ^ A -7 T-vii(a.LUi.cix±Zt=U L»l L IZGHS <
YEAR NATIONAL TOTAL PERCENT FOREIGN PERCENT NATURALIZED
1956 204,859 7.6 0.0
1957 212,544 7.2 0.0
1958 156,270 7.4 0.1
1959 186,650 8.3 0.0
1960 187,023 9.2 0.0
1961 196,103 8.3 0.0
Source
:
Anuario estadistico, 1956-1963.
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TABLE 37
Naturalizations, 1940-1979
""°^ber Year Number
1940 164 1960 12,703
1941 113 1961 7,731
1942 193 1962 5,457
1943 178 1963 4,541
1944 168 1964 3,985
1945 211 1965 3,077
1946 286 1966 5,535
1947 373 1967 5,811
1948 400 1968 5,375
1949 580 1969 5,630
1950 639 1970 5,513
1951 1,319 1971 3,664
1952 2,355 1972 9,815
1953 2,731 1973 7,067
1954 4,512 1974 12,378
1955 6,296 1975 24,411
1956 6,671 1976 20,315
1957 8,167 1977 17,685
1958 4,859 1978 10,060
1959 4,325 1979 8,299
1975;
Source: MRI
El Nacional,
,
Memoria y cuenta, 1954 to 1960; DIEX, Estadisticas
"Septimo Dia ," March 2, 1980.
VENEZUELAN
APPENDIX B
IMMIGRATION
(VENIMSTATS)
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The data identified as VENIMSTATS in the text were gathered by
means of a series of samples of the prontuarios (personal information
files) of foreigners. The prontuarios are located in the Departamento
de Prontuarios in the Direccion General de Identif icacion y Extranjeria
(commonly referred to as the Extranjeria) in Caracas. Five general
samples and one sample of Italians only were taken. Each sample con-
sisted of 1000 cases, with the exception of the 1961 sample which had
only 999 cases. The general samples were geared to specific years
which were chosen to pinpoint changes in immigration policy.
Year 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961
Universe 38,319 34,236 75,153 53,361 26,599
The universe refers to the number of cedulas issued in a par-
ticular year. Cedulas are identity cards which are necessary in order
to work (legally) and for a variety of daily activities. Each cedula
bears a distinct number and the prontuario which is elaborated at the
time the cedula is issued is filed under that number. The general
samples were taken by compiling a list of the numbers issued in a par-
ticular year and then using the Rand Corporation's Random List of Num-
bers to select individual prontuarios . Since cedula numbers are assigned
sequentially, a randomly selected sample gives an accurate picture of
the universe. Once a particular prontuario was selected, the person's
migratory movement card was also retrieved, as well as his Venezuelan
prontuario if he became a naturalized citizen. The prontuarios selec-
ted were marked to avoid recording their information more than once.
The Italian sample, which has not been used in this study, was
elaborated in the same fashion but Included all Italians who entered be-
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tween 1945 and 1961. Of the numbers produced by using the random list,
only those belonging to Italians were pulled. This data has also been
processed and will be used in a future study on the Italians in Vene-
zuela.
The information coded from the prontuarios is identified on the
following pages. Many of the codes used were the codes used in the
Extranjerla at the time.
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VENIMSTATS SAMPLE FORM
VARIABLE
COLUMNS
Number of the sample 1-4
Nationality of immigrant (coded) cJ - 6
Country of birth (coded)
/ — o
Size of place of birth (coded) (Name recorded in log) 9
Region of the country (Provinces of Italy; Canary 10 - nIslands; Balearic Islands; Azores; Madeira)
Year of birth (last two digits) 12 - 13
Sex (coded)
14
Race (coded)
Civil status (coded)
-^^
Religion (coded)
-^j
Political affiliation (coded) (not meaningful) I8 - 19
Change in civil status (coded) 20
Nationality of husband/wife (coded) (not meaningful as 21
not specifically given)
Number of children at time of entry 22
Age of oldest child (coded) 23
Last country lived in (coded) 24 - 25
First place of residence in Venezuela (coded) 26 - 28
Last place of residence in Venezuela (coded) 29 - 31
Number of changes of residence 32
Year began to live at last address (last two digits) 33 - 34
Occupation (coded) 35 - 38
Last occupation abroad (coded) (not meaningful)* 39 - 42
First occupation in Venezuela (coded) (not meaningful)* 43 - 46
Last occupation in Venezuela (coded) (not meaningful)* 47 - 50
Number of changes in occupation (not meaningful)* 51
Occupation for longest period of time (not meaningful)* 52 - 55
Property (coded) (not meaningful) 56 - 57
Port of entry (coded) 58 - 59
Year of entry (last two digits) 60 - 61
Country in which visa was authorized (coded) 62 - 63
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VARIABLES (cont.)
Type of visa (coded)
Year of first departure from Venezuela (last two digits)
Longest unbroken period of time in Venezuela (un-
broken—six months' or less absence)
Year in which resident visa obtained (last two digits)
Year of naturalization (last two digits)
Reason for leaving (coded)
Number of trips out of Venezuela
Year of final departure (last two digits)
Type of immigrant (coded)
*This information has been characterized as not meaningful because
it was not usually recorded on the prontuario
.
By resorting to the
information given on the migratory movement cards it was possible to
obtain some information but its reliability is somewhat dubious. In
any case no information was available on such a large percentage of
immigrants that the data has not been reproduced here. The other vari-
ables which are characterized as not meaningful suffer from the same
problem. Hardly anyone admitted to a political preference; the only
immigrants with property were persons who entered years before they
finally registered and not all of them admitted to having property.
COLUMNS
64
65 - 66
67 - 68
69 - 70
71 - 72
73 - 74
75
76 - 77
78
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VEN IMSTATS
All VENIMSTATS percentages are rounded to the nearest decimal
and therefore totals may be slightly more or less than 100.0 percent.
'es
When statistics are based on permanency the universe change
for each sample year due to the lack of information on the whereabouts
of a certain number of immigrants.
1948 permanency based on 964 cases (of 1000)
1951 permanency based on 944 cases (of 1000)
1955 permanency based on 949 cases (of 1000)
1958 permanency based on 923 cases (of 1000)
1961 permanency based on 889 cases (of 999)
With regard to selected nationalities, permanency is based on
the following:
Nationality Tl948p -ri95ip ^1955^ Tl958p Tl961p
American 128 124 60 59 31 31 68 58 55 47
Colombian 49 41 42 37 13 9 76 60 128 110
Italian 275 271 355 332 343 327 162 153 183 155
Portuguese 44 44 55 53 122 117 90 86 90 81
Spanish 160 156 334 317 372 351 413 396 261 244
Other 344 328 154 146 119 114 191 170 282 252
The table indicates that no definite information is known with
reference to the whereabouts of 6.7 percent of the Americans, 16.6 per-
cent of the Colombians, 6.1 percent of the Italians, 5 percent of the
Portuguese and 4.9 percent of the Spanish in the sample. This lack of
information is due to the person having left the country without filling
out a migratory movement card or still being in the country but with a
cedula unrenewed since 1968 (they are to be renewed at the most every
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five years; some are to be renewed every year). According to recorded
information on the prontuario
.
15 of the persons in the samples died in
Venezuela; the number may be higher because deaths are often not re-
ported to the Extranjeria.
The following symbols are used with permanency percentages:
P = still in Venezuela in 1975.
-5 = left Venezuela permanently within five years of arrival.
+5 = left Venezuela permanently more than five years after
arrival
.
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TABLE 38
Number of Foreigners by Nationality and Year of Registration
(Sample: 4999)
Nationality* 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 Total
Albanian 1 1
American 128 60 31
Andorran 1J- 1
Arabian 9 9
Argentine 1 1 4 1
Australian 1X 1X 9
Aus tr ian 6 2 3 1X X z.
Belgian 2 1 1 3 7
Bolivian 1 3 4
Brazilian 1 1 2 4 8
British 33 18 7 13 8 79
Bulgarian 1 1
Canad ian 4 5 1 2 3 15
Chilean 6 2 5 5 3 21
Chinese 2 3 3 7 3 18
Colombian 49 42 13 76 128 308
Costa Rican 13 4 1 3 1 22
Cuban 40 9 2 26 132 209
Czechoslovakian 8 2 ^ _ 10
Danish 4 1 1 _ 1 7
Dominican 1 1 1 4 1 8
Dutch 13 5 6 9 7 40
Ecuadorian 3 7 3 4 6 23
33 18 3 8 3 65
German 10 27 19 14 17 87
Greek 7 2 1 5 4 19
CiWfi t pma 1 an 1 - 1
Guayanese _ _ 1 - 1
Haitian _ 1 - 1
Honduran _ — - 1 1
Hungarian 14 4 1 3 - 22
Indian 1 1
1
c.
Iranian _ 1 - -
Israeli _ — — 4 2 o
Italian 275 355 343 162 183
2
1,318
Japanese 2 1
9
5
11Jordanian 2
Lebanese 7 2 15 10 16 50
Le Lonian 3 1 1
5
11
1
Lithuanian 10 1
Luxemburgian 1
1 1
Mai'tinique
Mexican 5 4 5 2
2
2
2
18
4
Moroccan
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TABLE 38 (continued)
Nationality* 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 X (J LdX
iNxcaraguan 2 4 2 — 1 9
Norwtjglan 1 — - 1 2
rdxescinian 1 — — 1
13Panamanian 4 5 1 2 1
Pfiruvian 1 2 1 4 3 11
Philippine 1 — — — 1
roiisn 54 — — 3 57
Por tuguese 44 55 122 90 90 401
Puerto Rican 1 — 1 2
Rumanian 8 1 2 11
Rus s ian 13 2 2 ~ 17
San Salvadorean 1 2 3
Sirian 1 8 20 24 53
^ n n "i o ViOpdnXoll J 1 /. ill /TO413 261 1,540
Swiss 4 1 2 2 3 12
Trinidadian 1 1 2
Turkish 1 1
Uruguayan 3 1 4
Yugoslavian 8 3 1 3 2 17
Stateless 19 5 4 28
1000 1000 1000 1000 999 4,999
Source: VENIMSTATS
.
*It should be noted that the nationality of the foreigner is not
always the same as that of his country of birth. This is particularly
true of those persons bearing British, French and Dutch passports. For
example, only seventeen of the thirty-three persons bearing British
passports in 1948 were actually born in England. Some persons, for
example the Trinidadians and the Guayanese, claimed the nationality of
a country not yet independent at the time. Puerto Ricans have American
citizenship.
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TABLE 39
Sex and Civil Status of the Immi^grants by Sample Years (Percentage)
1948 Single Married Widowed Divorced Total
Men 31.8 40.1 0.9 0.9 73.7
Women 5.8 19.1 1.1
. J
1951
Men 36.4 38.5 0.5 75.4
Women 6.9 15.8 1.9 24 6
1955
Men 43.9 29.1 0.5 / J . D
Women 10.1 15.4 0.8 0.1 26.4
1958
Men 37.1 24.9 0.3 0.1 62.4
Women 12.8 23.3 1.2 0.3 37.6
1961
Men 23.8 16.7 0.3 40.8
Women 20.9 34.9 2.9 0.4 59.2
Source: VENIMSTATS .
TABLE 40
Age Cohorts by Year of Sample (Percentages)
% of
Age Cohort 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 Total Total
0 to 16 0.6 3.8 5.7 7.3 19.2 366 7.3
17 to 26 27.1 34.8 41.9 41.5 32.9 1782 35.6
27 to 40 48.7 42.4 42.0 38.5 26.9 1985 39.7
41 to 50 17.3 14.0 7.7 7.9 9.3 562 11.2
Over 50 6.3 5.0 2.7 4.8 11.6 304 6.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 4999
Source: VENIMSTATS.
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TABLE 41
Trips out of the Country by Permanency and Year of Sample
Number of Trips
Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 or
more
Stayed
5+
149
0
0
92
239
84
55
42
53
22
13
29
34
17
17
15
3
17
14
2
8
7
0
7
4
1
2
25
3
10
1951
Time
Number of
0 1
Trips
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 or
more
Stayed
5+
170
0
0
113
157
104
49
34
94
37
16
42
19
7
19
14
5
10
3
1
3
1
1
8
1
0
9
11
6
10
1955
Time
Number of
0 1
Trips
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 or
more
Stayed
_
c
- J
5+
179
0
0
170
169
106
82
19
81
36
6
29
15
3
12
8
1
9
4
1
2
2
2
2
3
0
0
6
2
1
1958
Time
Number of
0 1
Trips
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 or
more
Stayed
- 5
5+
216
0
0
172
180
75
57
35
55
40
11
21
7
3
4
7
3
2
2
1
5
2
0
3
3
2
1
8
6
2
1961
Time
Number of
0 1
Trips
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 or
more
Stayed
- 5
5+
296
0
0
174
148
45
45
39
22
24
11
7
10
11
4
7
6
3
1
2
2
1
4
1
5
3
1
12
4
1
Source: VENIMSTATS.
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TABLE 42
Declared Occupation at Time of Pn 1" T*\7 Hv ' Sample
Occupation 1948 1951 1955 1958 X ^ U X i u Lax
Ar tis t 6 4 4 8 1 23
Lithographer * it * 2 2
Decorator 3 2 * A 5
Designer 1 * * A 1
Model 1 * * 1 2
Sculptor it * >v 1 1
Musician 1 1 it 2 2 6
Fainter (House) 6 3 7 4 1 21
Graphic artist * it 1 * A 1
Binder it it 1 * A 1
Engraver it it 1 * A 1
Typographer 3 it 1 2 A 6
Airline stewardess 1 it A A 1
Airline pilot 1 2 * A 3
Navigation technician 1 * A 1
Aeronautical engineer it 1 .1.7C 1
Banker it it it 2 2
Bank manager it it 1 it A 1
Administrator of property 1 it * it A 1
Financier 1 it 1 A 2
Lawyer n/. 1 it 2 4 9
Agronomis t 2 1 it 1 7
Commercial administrator it 1 TV A 1
Architect ^1 oI it A 3
Geometrician QJ 1 9 1X A 7
Dentist A n 9 X J}
Economist J. it it 1X 2
Pharmacist X ± it 1X 3
Geologist 9 cJ 11 it A »(J
AGeophysicist oJ X if A
Hydrologist it X ?k 1
Engineer J / Q 1 7X / 16xu 99
Laboratory technician 2 A 9£. A 4
Mechanical engineer 1
itn X H
Electrical engineer it 1 * A
1
1
Chemical engineer 1 X
8
9
17Meuicax QocLor 6 1X * 2
Veterinarian 1 1 n •» A 2
Dental technician 1 it 1
A 2
Optometrist it 1
A
A
1
1
Industrial chemist k it 1
Civil Engineer 1 it
A A
1
1
8
Chemist 4 1 1 1
Radiologist
Topographer 2 1
it
it
1
1
A
A
1
4
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TABLE 42 (continued)
Occupation 1948 1951 1955 X V J u J- -7 ox i o tax
Tinsurance agent 1 k * 1 k 2
Travel agent k * 1 1
Storekeeper 1 k * 3 4
Merchant 63 46 31 49 47 236
Coramission agent A * 1 * 1 2
Manager 1 1 * * 1 3
Commercial employee 22 26 23 32 37 140
(includes category employee)
Entrepreneur 1 * * k 1
Store manager * * * k 1 1
Marketing expert 2 * 1 2 5
Commercial agent 3 1 2 3 1 10
Commercial salesman ic 1 2 1 4
Radio-telegraph operator 1 * * 1 2
Telephone operator 3 k * k 3
Telephone technician it k k 1 1
Telegraph operator 2 k k k 2
Mason 60 62 40 5 211
Cement layer 2 2 k 4
Construction engineer A 1 k k 1
Stonecutter •k k 1 k 1* 1
Builder 8 5 k 1 2 16
Urban developer -I- 1 « A 1
Stucco worker JL, •Ir/V i k if 1X
Granite worker 7% 1 1
Driller 4 1 k 1 /:0
Baseball player i Z
5
Bull fighter 1 JL7» f\ k 1
Teacher 1 C,D 7 7 12 38
Governess JL oJ 1X * 5
Language teacher K 1 k * k 1
Primary school teacher 1 1 k k 9
5Music teacher X 1J. 2 k 1
Photographer * 3 2 5 1
k
11
Movie technician * k
X
TV J- 1
1Security guard Is k k 1
Military k * 1 1
1
4
2
Naval engineer
Sailor
*
5
3
3
1
3 4
5
19
Boat captain * * 1
* 2
4
Public employee
Armorer •k
2
*
*
*
2
1 1
1
Potter •k *
* 1
*
Alpargata-raaker
Carpenter
Tanner
Candy-maker
1
41
1
•k
*
50
*
k
70
1
2
*
32
3
8
k
*
1
201
5
2
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TABLE 42 (continued)
Occupation 1948 1951 1 QS5X ^ _J J 7JO xybi Total
Locksmith 3 1 1 5 A 10
1
1
Found ryman * * 1 A A
Harness-maker * * 1 A
Soap-maker 1 k * A A 1
1
Marble-worker * 1 * A A
Metalurgist 1 1 * 1 A 3
Miner 7 k 1 A 1 9
Seamstress 12 6 7 10 9 44
Mosaic-worker 1 * A A 1
Nickle-plater 1 * A A 1
Baker 5 11 1 5 A 28
Pastry-maker 1 2 * A A 3
Fisherman 2 2 1 A A 5
Perito 1 Vc * A A 1
Tailor 9 10 14 5 4 42
Saddle-maker * * 1 A 1
Weaver * 1 A A 1 2
Glazier 1 * A 1 A 2
Shoe-maker 10 14 18 9 A 51
Farmer 84 183 152 156 48 623
Farm laborer 1 11 16 14 3 45
Lumberman it 1 A 1 A 2
Agricultural expert k A A 1 1
Gardener 1 3 2 A 1 7
Writer i( 4( 1 w 1
Correspondent 1 ie 1- 1 2
Reporter 2 2 1 1 0
Auditor 1 * A A A 1
Accountant 8 10 6 5 7 36
Typist 3 « .x. i 1,
Office worker 20 9 7 QO
Secretary D 7\ A i J 9
Short-hand typist JLJt 3 2. k c
Petroleum manager A 1 1
Oil-well driller 1 1 A
Petroleum worker n 1 k k 1X
Petroleum engineer 1 3* J. X k "XJ
Executive 1 « A X 1X 3
Petroleum operator i A A 1
1Petroleum inspector 1 k A k
Member religious order * 7 5 9 13 34
Priest 1 2 A * A 3
Technician it * A * 2 2
Sugar technician 1 A 1 2
Electronic technician it * A 1 A 1
3Electrical technician A * 1 k 2
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TABLE 42 (continued)
Occupation 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 Total
Metai-olatine terhnldfln i 1 1 3
Assemblage technician k 9 A 7t 2
Dress—makine technician k 1 7t 1
Machinery technician it 1 J, 1
Industrial technician it * A 1J
Industrialist 10 AH 1 0 Li.
IBM technician it * 1X A X
Radio technician 2 J 1X A Q
Drainage technician :>\ 1 A 1X
Textile technician * * ? A 9 A
Paint technician * A 1 1X
Lamination technician * * A A 1X X
Chauffeur 19 4 9 5 3 40
Motorcyclist it 1X A 1 0Am
Greaser * A 1 A 1
Motor specialist * 1 A 1
Streetcar driver * A A 1 1
Automobile mechanic * * A 1 A 1
Aviculturalist it * A 1 1 2
Sugar worker 1 * A A A 1
Breeder 1 A A A 1
Cowboy * A 1 A 1
Retired 1 1 A 2 * 4
Nursemaid * 1 A A A 1
Barber 1 6 6 4 5 22
Winp <? 1" OT"p—owner it * 1 A 1
Butcher 2 4 8 2 A 16
Sunervisor 6 * 2 5 3 16
Cook 12 9 17 8 1 47
L ^ O O lllCl X. 15 * 1 1 3 20
Dr t sina.n1~ (-4 .1- W- u IllLiA 4 * 4 4 3 15
Elec tro—mechanic 1 it A 1 2
Housewife 180 195 181 286 456 1,298
Students 14 27 30 48 142 261
Cabinetmaker 3 3 2 1 1 10
10 7 11 5 1- 34
Ml 1 T" c;o 10 3 3 3 3 22
D UOlvcl. * 1 *
* * 1
* 1 it A 1
Blacksmith 4 6 8 1 2 21
Hotelkeeper
Waiter
1
3
*
4
*
5
1
5
A
3
2
20
Jeweler 2 1 1 1 5
Brazier 1 1 A 3
A 5
1
Miller * A 1
A
Mechanic 101 63 48 47 24
283
5
Machinist 3 1 *
A 1
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TABLE 42 (continued)
'-'i-t.upciLXon 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 Total
Day-laborer 41 82 115 35 17
Machine operator 6 3 5 2 A 16
Hairdresser 7 1 2 2 1 13
Plumber 5 3 1 1 1 11
Polisher •k 1 * A 1 2
Watchmaker 2 k 2 1 A 5
Solderer 13 1 3 5 A 28
Upholsterer 1 * 2 1 1 5
Dry cleaner 1 * 1 1 A 3
Lathe operator 6 1 1 A A 8
Tool and die worker * * 1 A A 1
Tractor driver 1 1 3 2 A 7
Inspector 2 * A A A 2
Domestic servant 4 7 22 19 23 75
Industrial "perito" 1 * 1 A A 2
Counter boy * * 1 A A 1
Tlm v\an en Y\ i~ucpcnuenu Id 15
Embroiderer * * 1 A 1
Cigarrette maker A * A A 1 1
Varnisher * * A A 1 1
Car-body worker * * 1 A A 1
Not given * 1 A * A 1
Total 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 999 4,999
Source: VENIMSTATS.
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TABLE 43
Dominance of Selected Occupations by Nationality and Permanency
Profession % by Nationality % Permanent
Agriculture
Baker
44% Spanish
23y^I Pot t" II ui if^
40% Spanish
30% Italian
59% stayed
oKj/o stayed
64% stayed
13% stayed
Barber 64% Italian 43% stayed
Butcher 63% Italian 40% stayed
Car driver 53% Spanish
23% Italian
38% stayed
67% stayed
Carpenter 34% Italian
33% Spanish
17% Portuguese
45% stayed
52% stayed
56% stayed
Cook 57% Spanish 63% stayed
JU/o bUciytiU
Draftsman 47% Spanish 86% stayed
Engineer 40% American
10% Italian
5% stayed
50% stayed
Metalsmith 43% Italian 22% stayed
Mason 54% Italian
33% Spanish
37% stayed
52% stayed
Mechanic 40% Italian
30% Spanish
45% stayed
64% stayed
Merchant 45% Others
21% Italian
56% stayed
33% stayed
Seamstress 50% Spanish
20% Colombian
77% stayed
89% stayed
Servant 43% Spanish
'^'^7 rnlnmhianO ~J /o \-*\J A~\Jlillj XCXtl
63% stayed
96% stayed
Shoemaker 53% Italian
18% Spanish
39% stayed
44% stayed
Solderer 57% American 0% stayed
Tailor 70% Italian 35% stayed
Unspecified & coramer- 33% Spanish
cial employee 31% Others
Unskilled laborer 59% Italian
20% Spanish
57% stayed
45% stayed
35% stayed
50% stayed
Source: VENIMSTATS.
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TABLE 44
Incidence in the Samples of Selected Occupations by Nationality
\
' Other
Occupation Total Total Am. Col
.
It. Port. Sp. Nationalities
Artis t 23 23 2 - 0 3 14
Painter (House) 21 20 1 0 8 3 5 3
Engineer 99 92 39 1 10 1 3 38
Medical doctor 17 17 0 0 2 0 2 13
Merchant 236 215 4 19 45 14 28 105
Unspec. i Cora.
employee 140 131 4 14 24 7 42 40
Com. Represent. 10 9 2 0 2 0 3 2
Mason 211 206 0 3 114 13 69 7
Builder 16 15 0 0 6 1 4 4
Carpenter 201 189 3 4 69 34 67 12
Electrician 34 32 3 0 9 2 12 6
Unskilled laborer 288 266 0 8 170 22 57 9
Plumber 11 10 3 0 3 0 1 3
Teacher 38 34 7 1 0 10 14
Photographer 10 9 0 1 1 0 1 6
Sailor 18 18 2 0 1 2 8 5
Locksmith 10 10 0 0 0 4 3 3
Seams tress 44 44 0 9 5 2 22 6
Baker 28 27 0 1 8 4 11 3
Tailor 42 42 1 2 29 0 6 4
Shoemaker 49 44 0 3 26 3 9 3
Agriculture 668 628 1 26 101 156 300 44
Accountant JD "5/.JH 0 TJ 5 n g 10
Office worker 44 4l 9 3 '~ 1 4 Z J,
Religious 34 29 ~ - 4 U ib J
Industrialist 22 20 1 1 4 6 D
Driver 40 39 0 3 9 1 21 5
Barber 22 20 0 0 14 1 4 1
Butcher 16 16 0 0 10 1 2 3
Cook 47 47 1 0 10 1 27 8
Supervisor 15 12 9 0 0 0 0 3
Dressmaker 19 18 2 0 2 1 3 10
Draftsman 15 15 3 3 1 0 7 1
Nurse 22 20 3 4 0 0 2 11
Metalworker 21 20 1 1 9 3 5 1
Mechanic 283 269 6 12 114 4 84 49
Waiter 12 12 1 0 3 3 5 0
Machine operator 16 14 6 0 6 0 1 1
Hairdresser 13 12 1 1 0 4 2
Solderer 28 27 16 1 5 0 3 2
Servant 75 69 0 26 1 3 32 2
Others'^ 2005 1854 178 103 398 87 564 525
TOTAL 4999 4669 319 257 1238 381 1464 1010
Total in samples 342 308 1318 401 1540 1090
Source: VENIMSTATS.
^The distribution bv nationality was processed by permancy; because
o1
death or lack of information such information was lacking for 330 cases.
''others includes 2281 housewives, students and dependents; 49% of the
total.
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TABLE 45
Place of Entry into Venezuela
:
Samples 1948-1961
riace 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 Total Percent
La Gualra^ 150 686 818 522 436 2,612 52.3
Maiquetia^ 541 180 148 365 396 1,630 32.6
X. . cMaracaibo 87 40 11 40 27 205 4.1
Puerto Cabello'^ 143 45 5 4 5 202 4.0
San Antonio de
Tachira*^
28 33 10 48 85 204 4.1
Others 51 16 8 21 50 146 2.9
Source: VENIMSTATS.
The major seaport of Venezuela; located in the Federal District.
The major airport of Venezuela; located next to La Guaira.
The seaport for the state of Zulia.
'The seaport for the state of Carabobo; the initial high number of
immigrants was due to an immigrant reception center, El Trompillo,
which ceased functioning by the end of 1951.
A frontier city on the border with Colombia.
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TABLE 46
Permanency in Venezuela by Selected Nationalities and Sample Years
(Percentage)
Nat ionaiity 1948 Igsi 19^5
P 5+ P 5+ P -5 5+
American 8. 9 77. 4 13. 7 6. 8 67 8 25. 4 3. 2 80. 6 16. 1
Colombian 51. 2 34. 1 14. 6 75. 7 16 2 8. 1 88. 9 11. 1 0 0
Italian 43. 9 24. 7 31. 4 35. 5 23 5 41. 0 42. 2 29 4 28 4
Portuguese 61 4 18 2 20. 5 71. 7 7 5 20. 8 76 9 6 0 17 1
Spanish 60 3 16 0 23. 7 53. 9 15 5 30. 6 62 1 10 1 27 .4
1958 1961
P -5 5+ P _ c 5+
American 6. 9 84. 5 8. 6 6. 4 89. 4 4. 3
Colombian 80. 0 18. 3 1, 7 88. 2 10 0 1 8
Italian 46. 4 30. 1 23 5 63. 2 18 7 18 1
Portuguese 80. 2 7 0 12 8 85. 2 7 4 7 4
Spanish 60. 9 17 2 22. 0 70. 9 16 8 12 3
Source: VENIMSTATS.
P still in Venezuela in 1975
-5 left Venezuela within five years of arrival and had not returned
by 1975.
5+ left Venezuela five years or more after arrival and had not re-
turned by 1975.
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TABLE A
7
Civil Status by Sex, Selected Nat ionalities and Year of Sample
COLOMBIAN
Civil Status Sex 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 Total
Single Male 22 12 6 31 30 101
Female Q 10 4 zu D / lOU
Married Male 13 8 1 1 RX _)
r emaxe 3 11 Z 1 22 45
ITALIAN
_ .
Civil Status Sex 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 Total
Single Male 112 143 195 71 29 550
Female
-f 12 17 1
4
7fS
Married Male 129 147 95 31 18 420
r ema j.e 23 HO 45 100 249
PORTUGUESE
Civil Status Sex 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 Total
Single Male lo 25 71 J J / / Z
Female 0 0 2 5 11 18
Married Male 25 25 40 16 10 116
Female 3 J « 16 41 73
SPANISH
Civil Status Sex 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961 Total
Single Male 60 131 124 141 64 520
Female 8 26 56 55 62 207
Married Male 62 127 116 106 36 447
Female 26 38 70 103 88 315
Source: VENIMSTATS.
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TABLE 48
Sex and Permanency by Selected Nationalities, Samples 1948-1961
Year Sex Am. % P Col % P Ital." % P Port
.
% P Span
.
% P
1948 M 87 7.2 36 48. 4 245 43. 0 41 58.5 125 57. 7
F 41 12.2 13 60. 0 30 51. 7 3 100.0 35 67. 6
1951 M 37 5.4 20 64. 7 290 34. 7 50 71.4 261 51. 2
F 23 9.1 22 85. 0 65 38. 7 5 75.0 73 63. 8
1955 M 18 0.0 7 83. 5 290 40. 9 112 75.7 242 59. 6
F 13 7.7 6 100. 0 53 49. 1 10 90.0 130 66. 1
1958 M 41 8.1 47 79. 4 102 47. 4 69 83.3 248 60. 2
F 27 4.3 29 77. 8 60 44. 6 21 70.6 165 61 1
1961 M 32 3.6 46 87. 5 48 61. 0 37 90.9 100 70 7
F 23 9.5 82 88 6 135 63. 5 53 81.3 161 70 6
Others 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961
M 203 41 .1% 96 41 3% 67 48.4% 117 51.9% 145 56 .4%
F 141 46 .6% 58 38 .11 52 35.3% 74 40.3% . 137 49 .2%
Source: VENIMSTATS.
TABLE 49
Permanency by Sex and Year of Sample, 1948-1961 (Percentage)
Sex 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961
Male 42.0 43.0 52.4 57.0 62.9
Female 46.5 47.8 54.7 52.6 65.0
Source: VENIMSTATS.
TABLE 50
Permanency by Civil Status and Year of Sample, 1948-1961 (Percentage)
Year Civil Status P -5 5+
^ Q/.QX.VHO Single 47.9 31.2 20.8
I"larried 41.2 33.5 25.4
1 Q R 1 Single 54.3 15.6 30.0
Marr ied 36.6 30.5 32.9
Dingle 58.1 17.0 25.0
Married 47.5 26.0 26.5
1958 Single 64.7 19.0 16.2
Married 46.6 33.1 20.3
1961 Single 71.9 20.0 8.1
Married 59.6 29.2 11.2
Source: VENIMSTATS.
TABLE 51
Permanency by Civil Status and Selected Nationalities
Nationality Civil Status Total No. % P % -5 % 5+
Colombian
Single
Married
168
81
79.8
76.5
15.5
18.5
4.8
4.9
Italian
Single
Married
604
618
49.8
38.2
19.4
31.2
30.6
30.6
Portuguese
Single
Married
203
177
82.3
70.6
4.9
11.9
12.8
17.5
Spanish
Single
Married
695
736
69.4
54.3
9.4
19.7
21.3
26.0
Source: VENIMSTATS.
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TABLE 52
Permanency by Age Cohort at Entry and Year of Sample, 1948- 1961
(Percentage)
Age Cohort 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961
4(J . U 75.7 64
.
7
72.7 81.7
17 - 26 53.1 53.8 61. 7 64.9 67.4
27 - 40 43.8 40. 7 46. 2 46. 5 64.7
41 - 50 36.3 30.8 43.8 50.0 52.9
Over 50 14.0 1/ . 1 30 .
4
30. 0 33.3
Source: VENIMSTATS.
TABLE 53
Permanency by Selected Age Cohorts, Nationalities and Sample Years
(Percentage)
Cohort 17 - 26
Nationality 1948 1951 1955 1958 1961
Colombian 77.8 84.6 100.0 77.3 93 8
Italian 53.7 43.7 49.4 52.5 66 7
Portuguese 68.8 86.7 73.2 83.0 90 9
Spanish 76. 3 67.3 73.8 66.1 72 5
Cohort 27 - 40
Colombian 38.9 66.7 80.0 90.5 88 .1
Italian 42.0 34.4 29.7 37.5 . 64 .5
Portuguese 52.4 65.4 73.2 66.7 71 .4
Spanish 62.2 49.2 54.5 52.7 69 .2
Source: VENIMSTATS.
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TABLE 54
Permanency by iype or Visa and Sample Years (Percentage)
j-ypc oj. visa 1951 1955 1958 1961
Temporary 22 .
0
36.0 49.9 50.2 61.1
Resident 40.1 46.5 72.0 66.5 81.0
Immigrant 52.6 54.5 46.2 60.3 66.2
Other 30.0 38.9 50.0 40.7 23.3
No Visa 53.6 63. 3 55.6 94.4 91.1
Source: VENIMSTATS.
TABLE 55
Permanency by Selected Occupations: All oampxcs Combined (Percentage)
Occupation P -5 5+ Total Number
Agriculture 62.7 15.1 22.1 628
Carpenter 49.7 22.2 28.0 189
Employee (Store) 58.0 23.7 18.3 131
Engineer 20.7 66.3 13.0 92
Housewife 53.9 25.1 21.0 1204
Mason 47.1 26.7 26.2 206
Mechanic 53.2 22.7 24.2 269
Merchant 50.7 29.8 19.5 215
Unskilled laborer 43.2 25.6 31.2 266
Other 49.8 30.0 20.2 146-9
Source: VENIMSTATS.

